SADIA JABBAR VS FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary, Revenue Division, Islamabad, 2012 PTD-SUPREME-COURT 898 (2012)

(On appeal from the judgment dated 28-2-2011 in Constitutional Petitions Nos. D-2673 of 2009, D-707, 1101 and 1269 of 2010 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Karachi)

Customs Act (IV of 1969)---

----Ss. 18, 25 & 25A---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)---Goods dutiable, determination of customs value of goods, powers to determine the customs value---Contention of petitioners that when S.25 of Customs Act, 1969 exhaustively provided the modes for determination of value, resorting to S. 25A of the Act without any convincing reason was uncalled for, and that S.18 of Customs Act, 1969 dealt with determination of the value of the goods imported, which could not be stretched to include the goods to be imported---Validity---Case had been sent back to department (Director Evaluation) for determination of value afresh which was not in any way detrimental to the petitioners---Impugned judgment of the High Court contained nothing which could show that any of the provisions of the Customs Act, 1969 in general or S.18 thereof in particular had been overstretched against its letter and spirit---Apprehension of petitioners in circumstances appeared to be conjectural---Petitions were time barred by four days and no plausible explanation had been offered for the delay---No adverse decision had been passed against the petitioners---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed accordingly.

Shehzada Mazhar, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (in all cases).

Raja Muhammad Iqbal, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No.4.

Date of hearing: 24th January, 2012.

JUDGMENT

EJAZ AFZAL KHAN, J.---By this single judgment we propose to decide CPLA Nos. 813 to 816 of 2011 which have arisen out of the judgment dated 28-2-2011 of the High Court of Sindh Karachi.

2. The main contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners was that when section 25 of the Customs Act exhaustively prescribes the modes for determination of value, resort to section 25A of Act without there being any convincing reason, would be uncalled for. Learned counsel next contended that when section 18 of the Act deals with the determination of the value of the goods imported, it cannot be overstretched to include the goods to be imported, therefore, the impugned judgment overstepping the limits prescribed by the statute cannot be maintained.

3. Leaned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents by referring to para 27 of the impugned judgment contended that when the case has been sent back to Director Evaluation for determination of value of the goods afresh the petitioners do not have any cause of grievance. Even the apprehension of the petitioners, the learned counsel added, which is conjectural on the face of it, cannot form basis for grant of leave to appeal.

4. We have gone through the relevant record. Before we discuss the arguments addressed by the learned counsel for the petitioners it is worthwhiletorefertopara27oftheimpugnedjudgmentwhich reads as under:--

"The next ruling is No.Misc/38/2009-VI-A dated 28-10-2009, issued in relation to automotive safety glass. The ruling refers to some of the methods of section 25 (referring to subsections (1), (5), (6) and (7) and then purports to apply the computed value method (subsection (8)). However, it is not evident how the computed value method has been applied. It is clear from Rule 120 that in order to properly apply this method, information must be obtained from the producer of the imported goods. It seems that no such exercise was carried out, and the method was applied essentially on the basis of information supplied by local manufacturers. Furthermore, the customs value determined is applied to China and the "Far East". As noted above, the Valuation Agreement and section 25 operate in the context of a country of export and a country of import (which of course, is Pakistan), and the "Far East" is not a country. This ruling therefore, is also ultra vires section 25A."

A look at the above quoted paragraph shows that no decision much less adverse has been passed against the petitioners. Yes the case has been sent back to the department for determination of value afresh, but we don't think that that would in any way go to the detriment of the petitioners. There is absolutely nothing in the above quoted paragraph as could show that any of the provisions of the Customs Act in general or section 18 of the Act in particular has been overstretched against its letter and spirit. The apprehension of the learned counsel for the petitioners in this background appears to be conjectural on the face of it. Quite apart from this when the petitions are barred by 4 days and no plausible explanation has been offered therefor, we do not feel persuaded to grant leave to appeal. For the reasons discussed above all the petitions are dismissed.

M.W.A./S-3/SCPetitions dismissed.