CHAUDHRY SUGAR MILLS LTD. VS GOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB, 2012 PTD-LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHORE 798 (2011)

(a) Federal Excise Act (VII of 2005)---

----S.3A---Notification S.R.O. No.655(I)/07, dated 29-6-2007---General Order No.3, dated 30-7-2007---GeneralClausesAct(X of 1897),S.22---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.73---Law Reforms Ordinance (XII of 1973), S.3---Additional levy---Scope---Grievance of appellants was that levy as "special excise duty" could not be imposed by authorities on the basis of notification issued by them---Validity---On the day a Money Bill was passed, it was validly made law but one that would come into force not latter than ten days from the date of its presentation for Presidential assent---In terms of proviso to Art. 73(1) of the Constitution, Finance Bill was Money Bill that contained Annual Budget statement for that year, therefore, duly passed Finance Bill, 2007, was valid legislation which could be analogized with "passed" Act for the purposes of S. 22 of General Clauses Act, 1897---Word "additional" did not alter character of levy imposed under S. 3-A of Federal Excise Act, 2005---Nor did name of levy as "special excise duty" made it distinct from levy of "duties of excise" that Federal Government could lawfully impose under Federal Legislative List---Whether it was additional or special, levy remained the same, i.e. excise duty---Division Bench of High Court declined to interfere in the judgment passed by Single Judge of High Court---Intra Court Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.

Sohail Jute Mills' Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Finance and others PLD 1991 SC 329 rel

(b) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Art.73---Money bill---Presidential assent---Bill passed was valid legislation which could be analogized with "passed" Act for the purpose of S.22, General Clauses Act, 1897---Principles.

Ijaz Ahmed Awan, Miss Komal Malik Awan and Noman Awan for Appellants.

Muzammil Akhtar Shabbir, for Appellant.

Dr. Ilyas Zafar and Syed Nasir Ali Gillani forAppellant.

Sh. Izhar-ul-Haq and Mrs. Kausar Parveen for Respondents.

ORDER

UMAR ATA BANDIAL, J.---This order shall dispose of I.C.A. No. 257-2011,I.C.A. No.258-2011, I.C.A. No.259-2011, I.C.A. No.266-2011 I.C.A. No.267-2011, I.C.A. No.268-2011, I.C.A. No.275-2011, I.C.A. No.276-2011, I.C.A. No.278-2011, I.C.A. No.279-2011, I.C.A. No.280-2011, I.C.A. No.281-2011, I.C.A. No.287-2011, I.C.A. No.312-2011, I.C.A. No.313-2011, I.C.A. No.314-2011 I.C.A. No.315-2011, I.C.A. No.316-2011, I.C.A. No.285-2011, I.C.A. No.286-2011, I.C.A. No.273-2011, I.C.A. No.296-2011, I.C.A. No.288-2011, I.C.A. No.344-2011, I.C.A. No.345-2011 and I.C.A. No.298-2011 involving common questions of law and fact.

2. These appeals are directed against the judgment of the learned Single Judge in Chamber on 13-5-2011 passed in anumberofconnected petitions challenging the vires of S.R.O. No.655(I)/2007 dated 29-6-2007 and General Order No.3 of 2007 dated 30-7-2007. The aforesaid statutory notification is issued in exercise of powers conferred under section 3A of the Federal Excise Act, 2005 which was incorporated by amendment made in the Finance Act, 2007. The Finance Bill 2007 was passed by the National Assembly on 22-6-2007 and it was given Assent by the President on30-6-2007.

3. The question addressed in the impugned judgment is whether the respondents could have issued the afore-noted S.R.O. No.655(I)/2007 on 29-6-2007 in purported exercise of a power which was conferred later by the Finance Act, 2007 that was assented on 30-6-2007 and came into effect on 1-7-2007. The learned Single Judge relied upon section 22 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 which permits subordinate legislation under an Act to be made after the passing of such Act but the same to take effect after the commencement of that Act. Under Article 73 of the Constitution a Money Bill is passed solely by the National Assembly whereas an ordinary Bill is passed by both Houses of Parliament. The Presidential Assent which is given to both types of Bills signifies the enactment of a passed bill and not the passing thereof. Therefore, the impugned notification was validly framed on 29-6-2007 after passing of Finance Bill 2007 on 22-6-2007. Learned counsel reiterates that under the Constitution a passed bill does not equate a passed Act and therefore the impugned notification is issued without authority Heard.

4. Under our Constitution, a Money Bill has a unique position under Article 73(1A) of the Constitution. After being passed by the National Assembly, a Money Bill must be presented to the President for his Assent. When so presented, the President must assent the same within 10 days in terms of the duty imposed by Article 75(1)(b) of the Constitution read with Article 75(1)(a) thereof. Consequently, a duly passed Money Bill is legislation that can be deemed under Article 75(2) of the Constitution to have been assented by the President. Therefore, on the day a Money Bill is passed, it is a validly made law but one that comes into force not later than ten days from the date of its presentation for the Presidential Assent. In terms of proviso to Article 73(1) of the Constitution, a Finance Bill is a Money Bill that contains the Annual Budget statement for that year. For the foregoing reasons the dulypassed Finance Bill, 2007 is valid legislation which can be analogized with a 'passed' Act for the purposes of section 22 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Accordingly the challenge made by the appellants has no force.

5. However, even from the point of view of date of enforcementof the impugned notification and with reference to the provision of Article 77 of the Constitution, Special Excise Duty under section 3A of the Federal Excise Act, 2005 became leviable on 1-7-2007 in terms of the impugned notification. The Finance Act, 2007 had come into force onthatdateandtherefore,theimpugnednotificationwasdulysupported by enabling legislation in-order to be valid in terms of Article 77 of the Constitution. Accordingly, any cavil to the validity and vires of the impugned levy on and after 1-7-2007 is illusory and without substance.

6. Dr. Ilyas Zafar and Syed Nasir Ali Gillani, Advocates for the appellant in connected appeals have raised the further point that the impugned levy is additional in character. When there is no original levy on the product in question, namely, sugar then additional levy under section 3-A(2) of the Federal Excise Act, 2005 is invalid.

7. The word 'additional' does not alter the character of the levy imposed under section 3A ibid. Nor does the name of the levy as 'special excise duty' make it distinct from the levy of "duties of excise" that the Federal Government can lawfully impose under the Federal Legislative List. Thus whether it is additional or special, the levy remains the same, that is, excise duty. This view was taken by the Honourable Supreme Court with reference to 'additional custom duty' in Sohail Jute Mills'Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Finance and others (PLD 1991 SC 329). Accordingly, the objection taken by the learned counsel for the appellants is theoretical and lacks any significant constitutional or legal bearing. We have no reason to interfere with the judgment given by the learned Single Judge. Appeals dismissed with no order as to costs.

M.H./C-3/LIntra Court Appeal dismissed.