ASHRAF SUGAR MILLS LTD. VS GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN, 2007 PTD-SUPREME-COURT 2303 (2006)

(On appeal from the judgment and order dated 31-1-2002 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Writ Petitions 8542 of 1991, 6774 of 1992, 8541 of 1991, 7908 of 1992).

Central Excise Act (I of 1944)---

----S.12-A---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 185--- Appear to Supreme Court---Fixation of period of crushing of sugarcane---Government had specified period of crushing of 160 days by notification---Contention of the appellant was that Provincial Government had discriminated the appellants because in the other Provinces, no such limitation for crushing period had been imposed---Validity---Government being competent to fix the crushing period, High Court under the circumstances had rightly dismissed petition holding staid notification to be valid---Order being unexceptionable, admitted no interference by the Supreme Court.

Ch. Muhammad Anwar,Advocate Supreme Court for Appellants.

Ejaz Muhammad Khan, Advocate-on-Record for Respondents.

ORDER

IFTIKHAR MUHAMMAD CHAUDHRY, C.J.---Thelisted appeals are by the leave of the Court, against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, Lahore dated 31-1-2002.

2. Learned counsel while narrating the facts of the cases, painted out that the Government had specified the period of crushing of 160 days by the Notification No. S.R.O. 823(I)/1991 dated 28th of 1991 for the Province of Punjab. According to him, the Provincial Government had discriminated to the appellants because in the other provinces no such limitation for crushing period has been imposed. When we called upon him to explain as to whether the Government in exercise of powers conferred upon it under section 12-A of Central Excise Act, 1944, is not competent to fix 'the crushing period.. He could not answer satisfactorily except saying that on account of some unavoidable circumstances at times it becomes impossible for the appellants to crush the sugarcane during the period of 160 days. It may be noted that the learned High Court after having taken into consideration arguments of parties observed as follows:---

"16. We, therefore, hold that far the purpose of the said proviso in the said S.R.O. No.505(I)/90 dated 7-6-1990, crushing period will mean a period starting from 30th of November and ending on 30th June the next following year. However, we find that the respondent-Department is treating the said crushing season to mean 160 days which is less than the period of the crushing as held by us. The petitioners shall, therefore, be entitled to the benefit of the said departmental interpretation. "

3. Thus we are of the opinion that as the government is competent to fix the crushing period therefore, the High Court under these circumstances had rightly dismissed the petition holding that notification S.R.O. to be valid and order being unexceptionable, admits no interference. Appeals are dismissed:

H.B.T./A-29/SCAppeal dismissed.