LAHORE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY, LAHORE through Secretary VS INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, LAHORE, 2006 PTD-LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHORE 96 (2005)

Wealth Tax Act (XV of 1963)---

----S. 27---S.R.O.650(I)/85, dated 1-7-1985---Appeal to High Court---Appellant, during pendency of the proceedings had sought to raise an additional ground/question of law with regard to retrospectivity of S.R.O.650(I)/85, dated 1-7-1985---Validity---Held, admission of a new ground or a question at the present stage was likely to create complication inasmuch as the S.R.O. was in the field when the impugned judgment of the Tribunal was passed, therefore the issue could not be said to have arisen out of the order of the Tribunal or as a natural consequence thereof---S.R.O. in question having the force of law at the relevant time and apparently due to inadvertence on the part of the assessee it was not brought to the knowledge of the Tribunal nor the matter was argued on the basis of concession given by the S.R.O., High Court set aside the order of the Tribunal and remitted the matter to the Tribunal for consideration of the effect of the said S.R.O. for the relevant assessment year as well as all the earlier years involved.

Shahtaj Sugar Mills Ltd. through Chief Executive v. G.A. Jahangir and 2 others 2004 PTD 1621; Iftikhar Hussain Alvi C/o Kaghan Ghee Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer/Dy. Commissioner, Income Tax and others 2003 PTD 812 and Commissioner of Income Tax v. Shahnawaz Ltd. and others 1993 SCMR 73 ref.

Siraj-ud-Din Khalid for Appellant.

Shahid Jamil Khan for Respondents.

Date of hearing: 12th May, 2005.

JUDGMENT

NASIM SIKANDAR, J.---In this case on 9-3-2004 we admitted for hearing following three questions of law as proposed by the assessee in this further appeal under section 27 of the late Wealth Tax Act, 1963:--

"(8) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Lahore Chamber of Commerce and Industry is a "charitable institution" and is holding its property under trust or other legal obligation for public purpose of a charitable or religious nature?

(9) Whether the' immovable property which is let out and income where from is utilized for charitable purpose, is exempt from tax under section 5(1)(i) of the Wealth Tax Act?

(10) Whether on the facts and in circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was correct to hold that immovable property having been leased out by the Chamber is "not held for public purpose of charitable nature" and hence not exempt under section 5(1) of the Wealth Tax Act?"

2. During the pendency of the proceedings the appellant by way of C.M. No.688 of 2004 has sought to raise an additional ground/question of law, which reads as under:

"Whether, the provisions of S.R.O. 650(I)/85, dated 1-7-1985 and clause (25) of the Second Schedule to the Wealth Tax Act, 1963, introduced in 1986, are retrospectively applicable for the years 1979-80 to 1985-86 for which years the appeals were pending when the said provisions were introduced?"

3. According to the learned counsel the aforesaid S.R.O. issued on 1st of July, 1985 clearly attracts or is applicable in respect of one pending appeal for the year, 1985-86. He argues that the concession given by the aforesaid S.R.O. being beneficial in nature, it could be given retrospective effect in view of the various judgments of the superior Courts including re: Shahtaj Sugar Mills Ltd. through Chief Executive v. G.A. Jahangir and 2 others (2004 PTD 1621), re: Iftikhar Hussain Alvi C/o Kaghan Ghee Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer/Dy. Commissioner, Income Tax and others 2003 PTD 812 and re: Commissioner of Income Tax v. Shahnawaz Ltd. and others (1993 SCMR 73).

4. We have heard the learned counsel for both the parties and in our view the admission of the new ground or the question at this stage is likely to create complication inasmuch as the S.R.O. was in the field when the impugned judgment of the Tribunal was passed. Therefore, the issue cannot be said to have arisen out of the order of the Tribunal or a natural consequence thereof. However, since the S.R.O. had the force of law at the relevant time and apparently due to inadvertence on the part of the appellant it was not brought to the knowledge of the Tribunal nor the matter was argued on the basis of the concession given by the S.R.O., we will consider it appropriate to set aside the order of the Tribunal and remit the matter to it for consideration of the effect of the aforesaid S.R.O. for the assessment year 1985-86 as well as all the earlier years involved.

5. Disposed of.

M.B.A./L-132/LCase remanded.