NISHAT MILLS LTD., LAHORE VS COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, KARACHI and another, 2006 PTD-KARACHI-HIGH-COURT-SINDH 2726 (2005)

(a) Interpretation of statutes---

----Word used in a statute or notification---Scope---Intention of legislature would be gathered from language used---Where statute or notification made mention of its applicability in particular circumstances detailed therein, then no other meaning thereof could be taken---Principles.

(b) Interpretation of statutes---

----Statute creating an obligation also specifying manner of its performance could not be enforced in a manner other than what was provided therein---Principles.

Where an Act creates an obligation and enforces the performance in specified manner, it cannot be enforced in any other manner, because when the language of statute is clear and when a specified manner and expression is shown therein, the same cannot be curtailed or interpreted in a manner other than what is sought therein.

(c) Notification---

----Notification could not be given retrospective effect, until and unless specifically enacted so.

Tasawar Ali Hashmi for Appellant.

Nemo for the respondents.

Date of hearing: 1st November, 2005.

JUDGMENT

MRS. YASMIN ABBASEY, J.---These Appeals have arisen out of the impugned order, dated 25-4-2001, whereby the refund claim, filed by appellants was rejected on the ground that benefit of S.R.O. No.1076/95, dated 5-11-1995, which was sought to be availed by them was not permissible under law.

2. To rebut the observations made against the appellants, it is contended by learned counsel for the appellants that though appellants got their consignment released under S.R.O. No. 487/93, dated 14-6-1993, availing concessional rate of custom duty at 10% but is continuation of that they are also entitled to avail the benefit of subsequent notification promulgated on 5-11-1995 vide S.R.O. No.1076/95, as this notification also cover the period during which disputed consignments were imported. It is argued by him that the perusal of the above referred notification further does not impose any bar on availing the benefit of the same by those importers, who had already availed benefit of former one as this subsequent S.R.O. is to be read in conjunction with the previous one.

3. According to him through S.R.O. No.1076/95 special exemption and concession has been provided to all importers of Ring Frames, whose cases are pending in the courts or were released prior to it but we regret to say that these arguments advanced by learned counsel are not convincing because S.R.O. No.1076/95 imposes certain conditions for its applicability: First that the import should be within the period from 14-6-1984 to 30-6-1995, secondly the release should had been allowed provisionally either in terms of interim order from various Courts of law or by Customs Authorities. The first condition is not relevant in the matter. So far as the second requirement, which is relevant in the matter, is concerned, the term "released provisionally" grants benefit to a particular class whose consignments are still under consideration of customs department. Whereas admittedly the present cases are not cases of provisional release of consignment but they were got released by the appellant on 14-4-1995, after payment of full customs duty and other taxes.

4. To further strengthen his argument, learned counsel has referred a letter of Central Board of Revenue, dated 20-5-1996, and particularly to its first paragraph, and has argued that it provides an opportunity to the importers, who had paid duty but had not entered in litigation with the Department to avail the benefit granted therein but in the subsequent paragraph the benefit, as referred above in S.R.O. No. 1076/95, has been enumerated that refund will be allowed only to those importers (1) who were subjected to statutory duty merely on the ground that Ring Frames were being manufactured locally and (ii) who otherwise are eligible for concession in accordance with S.R.O. No. 1076/95. The contents of this letter/clarification of C.B.R. in paragraph 2 is to be read as a whole and the portion of it cannot be separated for the wishful meaning to be taken by appellants.

5. In view of above discussion, we are of the considered view that the impugned order passed in the matter does not find any irregularity, because the elementary principle of interpreting any word while considering any statute is to gather the intention of legislature and where language is clear the intention is to be gathered from the language used. So when the contents of S.R.O. No.1076/95 specifically makes mention of its applicability in particular circumstances, as detailed therein no other meaning of them can be taken.

6. Even otherwise, it is general rule that where an Act creates an obligation and enforces the performance in specified manner it cannot be enforced in any other manner, because when the language of statute is clear and when a specific manner and expression is shown therein the same cannot be curtailed or interpreted in a manner other than what is sought therein.

7. The other aspect of the cases under hand, is that S.R.O. No.1076/95 was issued on 5-11-1995 whereas the consignment in question were imported on 10-4-1994 and were got released on c 14-4-1994, therefore, S.R.O. No. 1076/95 until and unless specifically enacted, cannot be given retrospective effect. Hence we are of the view that impugned order does not require any interference.

8. Foregoing are the reasons for the short order passed in this Appeal on 1-11-2005, whereby we had dismissed these Appeals.

S.A.K./N-26/KAppeals dismissed.