Messrs QADRI CLOTH HOUSE, LAHORE VS INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, LAHORE
2005 P T D 2430
[Lahore High Court]
Before Nasim Sikandar and Jawwad S. Khawaja, JJ
Messrs QADRI CLOTH HOUSE, LAHORE
Versus
INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, LAHORE and 2 others
I.T.A. No. 535 of 1998, heard on /01/.
rd
March, 2005. (a) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979)---
-----Ss.65, 13(1)(d) & 136---Appeal to High Court---Scope---Reopening of assessment---Issue of reopening of assessment cannot be taken at appellate stage before High Court after its earlier confirmation by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)---Issue of reopening of assessment is not a jurisdictional fact, which can be taken in appeal before the High Court under 5.136, Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, all the more so when said issue does not appear to have seriously been mooted upon before the Tribunal---Appellate jurisdiction of High Court, as vested under S. 136, Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, is comparable to referable jurisdiction which means that before High Court only the facts found by the Tribunal can be made basis of answer to any question of law raised before the High Court---Question of law raised before High Court must arise out of the order of the Tribunal---When the case is remanded by the First Appellate Authority the issue of reopening of the assessment under S.65 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 can be agitated before the Tribunal, that having not been done by the assessee, it became a past and closed transaction.
(b) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979)---
----Ss.13, 65 & 136---Valuation of property predominantly pertains to the fact's of a particular case---Assessing Officer, in the present case, after remand reduced the valuation of the property, which was further reduced by the Tribunal---Further interference in the valuation so determined by the Tribunal will certainly amount to rule upon a factual position which is not possible in appellate jurisdiction of High Court under S. 136, Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 and same remains correct with regard to the contention that the parallel cases considered by the Revenue Authorities as well as Tribunal are not comparable---Registered value of a property and its market value are particular to every case, it cannot be ruled as a principle that the value indicated in registered sale-deed should invariably be accepted by the Revenue Authorities; to do so will amount to strike down "part of the provisions of S.13, Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, which is not possible in appellate jurisdiction of High Court under S.136 of the said Ordinance.
Siraj ud Din Khalid for Appellant.
Muhammad Ilyas Khan for Respondents.
Date of hearing: 3rd March, 2005.
JUDGMENT
NASIM SIKANDAR, J.---This further appeal under section 136 of the late Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 seeks to challenge an order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Lahore Bench, dated 1-6-1998. Following questions or law are stated to have arisen out of the said order of the Tribunal:
"(i) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the initiation of proceedings under section 65 was valid?
(ii) Whether the Appellate Tribunal was right to uphold the rejection of value of shop declared at Rs.9,00,000 evidenced by registered sale-deed'?
(iii) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case there was any material with the Tribunal to fix value of Plot at Rs.4 lac per Marla?
(iv) Whether there was any material with the Tribunal to confirm the estimate of value of superstructure @ Rs.350 per sft. particularly when a rate of Rs.222 per sft. was directed by it in 1992-93, for a Residential House.
2. The assessee-appellant is an individual and during the period relevant to the assessment year 1994-95 derived income from retail sale of cloth. His declared income for the assessment year at Rs.37,100 was accepted under Sell'-Assessment Scheme. Subsequently, his case was reopened under section 65 of the late Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 on the ground that he purchased a commercial property situated at Main Wahdat Road, Lahore during April, 1994. In the reassessment proceedings that followed an addition of Rs.34,76,000 under section 13(1)(d) of the late Ordinance was made which represented the estimated value of the property in question as against its declared value at Rs.9 lass. The assessment order so framed on 30-6-1996 was set aside by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), Lahore on 10-12-1996. After remand the Assessing Officer by way of assessment order, dated 30-6-1997 repeated the addition under the said provisions of the late Ordinance at Rs.11,33,017. The First Appellate Authority CIT(Appeals), Lahore on 17-12-1997 maintained the addition so made. On further appeal the learned Members of the Tribunal though agreed in principle with the addition made under section 13(1)(d) of the late Ordinance yet finding the estimated value of the property to be on the higher side directed its reduction from Rs.600,000 per Marla to Rs.400,000 per Marla. This has brought the appellant in further appeal before us.
3. Learned counsel for the appellant on the basis of a number of reported judgments of this Court as well as those of the Hon'ble apex Court contends that no definite information being available with the Assessing Officer, the reopening of the case of the assessee under section 65 of the late Income Tax Ordinance was without jurisdiction, that objection with regard to jurisdiction can be taken at any time and that the enhancement of the value of the property in question was made without any justifiable reason or having brought sufficient material on record.
4. Learned counsel for the Revenue, on the other hand, states and we will agree that the issue of reopening 9f the assessment cannot be taken at this stage after its earlier confirmation by the CIT(Appeals), Lahore on 10-12-1996. Also we will not agree that the issue of reopening of an assessment is a jurisdictional fact, which can be taken in appeal before us under section 136 of the late Income Tax Ordinance. All the moreso when this issue does not appear to have seriously been mooted upon before the learned Tribunal. Needless to say that it was not ruled A upon by the Tribunal. It is by now well-settled that the appellate jurisdiction of this Court as vested under section 136 of the late Income Tax Ordinance was comparable to referable jurisdiction. That means before this Court only the facts found by the Tribunal can be made basis of answer to any question of law raised before us. Secondly, the question of law raised before this Court must arise out of the order of the Tribunal. As noted above after remand of the order by the First Appellate Authority the issue of reopening of the assessment under section 65 could be agitated before the Tribunal. That having not been done by the assessee it became a past and closed transaction.
5. As far the valuation of the property in question is concerned, we will again agree that it predominantly pertains to the facts of a particular case. The Assessing Officer alter remand reduced the valuation of the property, which was further reduced by the learned Members of the Tribunal. A further interference in the valuation so determined by the Tribunal will certainly amount to rule upon a factual position, which is not possible in appellate jurisdiction of this Court under section 136 of the late Income Tax Ordinance. Same remains correct with regard to the suggestion that the parallel cases considered by the Revenue Authorities as well by the learned Tribunal were not comparable. We are aware of the case-law and the judgments of this Court as well as that of the Hon'ble apex Court in which the value shown by a registered sale-deed was finally directed to be accepted by the Revenue Authorities. However, since the registered value of a property and its market value are particular to every case it cannot be ruled as a principle that the value indicated in a registered sale-deed should invariably be accepted by the Revenue Authorities. To do so will amount to strike down part of the Provisions of section 13 of the late Income Tax Ordinance, which is not Possible in appellate jurisdiction of this Court under section 136 of late Income Tax Ordinance. Therefore, agreeing with the Revenue we will hold that question No.(i) as framed does not arise out of the order of the Tribunal while questions Nos. (ii) to (iv) are predominantly questions of fact.
6. Answer declined. Appeal rejected.
M.B.A./Q-25/LAppeal dismissed.