Messrs HUSSEIN INDUSTRIES, KARACHI VS ASSISTANT COLLECTOR, COLLECTORATE OF CUSTOMS (EXPORT) REBATE, KARACHI
2005 P T D 501
[Karachi High Court]
Before Anwar Zaheer Jamali and S. Ali Aslam Jafri, JJ
Messrs HUSSEIN INDUSTRIES, KARACHI
Versus
ASSISTANT COLLECTOR, COLLECTORATE OF CUSTOMS (EXPORT) REBATE, KARACHI
Spl. Custom Appeal No.9 of 2003, decided on 29/10/2004.
Customs Act (IV of 1969)‑‑‑
‑‑‑‑Ss.194‑A(b) & 196‑‑‑Appeal to Appellate Tribunal‑‑‑Section 194A(b), Customs Act, 1969 which was made basis by the Appellate Tribunal for dismissal of appeal was omitted much earlier to the passing of impugned order‑‑‑Appeal preferred before the Tribunal therefore could not have been dismissed on said ground‑‑High Court, in appeal, set aside the impugned order and remanded the case to the Tribunal for fresh disposal in accordance with law.
Muhammad Aslam Shaikh for Appellant.
Raja Muhammad Iqbal for Respondent.
ORDER
By this appeal under section 196 of the Customs Act, 1969, while challenging the judgment, dated 11‑12‑2002 passed by the Customs, Excise and Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, Karachi, following question of law has been raised by the appellant:‑‑
"Whether the Appellate Tribunal can pass an order under the proviso of sub‑clause (b) of section 194‑A of the customs Act 1969, which is an omitted sub‑clause and not alive at the time of judgment. Further the said clause has no relevancy whatsoever with the nature of the case?"
Mr. Muhammad Aslam Shaikh, learned counsel for the appellant, has referred to the Finance Ordinance, 2000, which came into force on at once i.e. 19th June, 2000, to show that section 194‑A(b) on the basis of which the appeal preferred by the appellant was dismissed by the Tribunal for want of jurisdiction was omitted much earlier to the passing of impugned order against the appellant. He submitted that for this short reason impugned order is misconceived and is liable to be set aside.
Raja Muhammad Iqbal, learned counsel for the respondent, is unable to controvert the above legal submission of learned counsel for the appellant.
We have perused the relevant provision of Finance Ordinance, 2000 which confirms the statement of learned counsel for the appellant that section 194‑A(b) which, was made basis by the Tribunal for dismissal of appeal, was omitted much earlier to the passing of impugned order. It is thus clear that the appeal preferred by the appellant before the Tribunal could not have been dismissed on this ground.
In view of the above the impugned order is set aside and case is remanded to the Tribunal for‑ fresh disposal of appeal in accordance with law. Since it is an old matter it is expected that the same will be heard and disposed of within three months time.
M.B.A./H‑29/K Case remanded.