(a) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979)----

----S. 134---Appeal to Appellate Tribunal---Right of appeal---Substantive right ---Lis---Meanings---Amendment in statute---Appeal is not merely a matter of procedure but is a right, which every statute provides for against every order by the lowest tier---Such right was a substantive right---Such a right pre-exists and could not be destroyed by an amendment or a subsequent legislation---'Lis' means a right accrued on the date of initiation of proceedings which came into existence immediately after filling of return under S.55 or issuance of a notice under S.56 or S.65 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 as the case may be---Right of appeal became available on the date of `lis' i.e. filing of return or issuance of a notice from the Department.

(b) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979)---

----S. 134---Appeal to Appellate Tribunal---Right of appeal provided by law in a statute could not be withdrawn by a subsequent statute against the proceeding, which had been initiated earlier.

(c) Income-tax---

----Limitation---Illegal order -No limitation runs against an illegal order.

(d) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979)---

----S. 134---Appeal to Appellate Tribunal---Accrual of right of appeal-- Relevant date---For the purpose of accrual- of the right of appeal the critical and relevant date is the date of initiation of proceedings and not the decision itself.

(e) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979)---

----Ss. 134 & 66A---Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001), S.131-- Filing of appeal against order under S.66-A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 after 1-7-2002 i.e. after promulgation of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Department contended that Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 was applicable on the appeal filed after 1-7-2002 and since the appeal had been filed on 28-10-2002, the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 did not come into picture and appeal under S.131 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 had only been provided against the order passed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner or Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) and not against an order passed by the Inspecting Additional Commissioner under S.66-A of the Income Tax Ordinance; 1979-- Validity---Order under S-66A was decided before 30th of June, 2001-- "Lis" arose when the return was filed by the assessee---Return was filed much earlier than the date of the decision under S.66-A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979---Relevant law was the one which was applicable on that date---Provision of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 did not and could not take away inherent and substantive right provided earlier-- Provision of S.239(4) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 further gave life to all such pending proceedings and the law as was obtaining on 30th of June, 2001 and before shall be applicable on all such proceeding at any stage of the assessment---Right from the start of existence of "lis" the proceeding remained pending till implementation of the final order by the Supreme Court of Pakistan or in between where the parties concerned opt not to continue the , same---Objection raised by the Department was overruled and Appellate Tribunal took up the appeals for regular hearing.

Black's Law Dictionary Sixth Edn., p.1204; PLD 1965 (W.P.) Lah. 214; PLD 1965 (W.P.) Lah. 102; PLD 1963 Kar. 182; AIR 1945 Mad. 106 and Messrs Home Service Syndicate (Pvt.) Limited through Liquidator v. Commissioner of Income-tax/Wealth Tax Company, Zone-I, Lahore 2002 PTD 3106 ref.

Hoosain Kasam Dada (India) Ltd. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh and others (1953) 4 ITR 114; (1963) 50 ITR 761 and (2000) 242 ITR 263 rel.

(f) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979)---

----S. 31---Deduction---Expenses, entitlement of---Person became entitled to an expense if he had laid it out or expended same for the purpose of earning of the respective income.

(g) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979)---

----Ss. 66-A & 30---Powers of Inspecting Additional Commissioner to revise Deputy Commissioner's order---Interest income---Transaction of loan between company and Bank in the name of Director---Assessment was cancelled on the ground that interest income received by the assessee had neither been declared in-the return nor the Assessing Officer had taken cognizance of the fact at the time of completion of assessments and suppression of interest income constitute an - act of concealment of income/furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income which was liable to be taxed in the hands of assessee---Assessee contended that loan was in the name of Director but the entire transactions after its approval had directly been made by the principal company and the Bank---Amount had never come to the kitty of the assessee and the entire transactions were through the Bank account and the limited company---Entire amount of interest received by the assessee had directly been paid to the Bank-- Even if the assessee had earned something it had been paid to Bank the effect of which obviously was nil---Further, even if the case was said to be erroneous it shall not cause any prejudice to the interest of Revenue as his income from interest was equalized with the expenses he had paid as interest to Bank---Validity---Company through a resolution obtained loan in the name of Director with the purpose of tuning up its accounts and smooth running of the affairs of its business---If the assessee individual status as a, legal person was to be retained in between the Bank and the limited company, his entitlement towards allowance of the interest paid to Bank shall not diminish ---Assessee obtained loan from Bank for granting further loan to company thus should have declared the same as his income to claim the interest paid as an expenditure---Element of error was quite strong but prejudice to the interest of Revenue was not there---For invoking jurisdiction under S.66-A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 error and prejudice to interest of Revenue should simultaneously exist---Order passed by the Inspecting Additional Commissioner under S.66-A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 was not a valid or legal order and the same was cancelled by the Appellate Tribunal.

2001 PTD 1158; 2003 PTD (Trib.) 279 and NTR 1990 (Trib.) 240 ref.

1999 PTD (Trib.) 708 rel.

Naveed A. Andrabi for Appellant.

Muhammad Asif, D.R. for Respondent.

Date of hearing: 3rd June, 2003.

ORDER

KHAWAJA FAROOQ SAEED (JUDICIAL MEMBER).---The petitioner in this case is the assessee. However, at the time of hearing the learned DR raised a preliminary, objection, regarding the very maintainability of the appeal before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. His objection was on the basis of argument that Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 has been promulgated and the same is applicable on the appeal filed after 1-7-2002. Since the present appeal has been filed on 28-10-2002 the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 does not come into picture. He brought our attention to section 131 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 which provides appeal against the order passed by AAC and CIT(A) i.e. the First Appellate Authority. The order impugned before us is under section 66-A by Inspecting Additional Commissioner against which appeal has not been provided before the Tribunal by the new law:

The learned AR who was not ready for this objection firstly sought adjournment and on the subsequent hearing started his argument from the plea that the order under section 66-A and the appeals are continuation of the same proceedings and the provisions of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 are applicable on this case. He brought our attention to repeals and saving provision of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 and as per its subsection (4) he said that the issue stands covered. These appeal though are against an order which was decided on 20-6-2002 i.e. just before the end of the financial year up to which Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 was applicable, cannot deprive the assessee of the right of appeal. He said that this is a misconception that if the department manages to cancel an assessment somewhere near 30th of June or before and serves the order after the end of the financial year, it can deprive the assessee of the right of appeal. It is correct that in Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 the power to review and cancel an order lies with the Commissioner hence they have provided a separate hierarchy but the same cues not come into operation on the orders passed under section 66A.

Before moving ahead reference to the relevant provision shall be of help. The order has been passed under section 66A which has held the order passed by Assessing Officer to be as erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of Revenue. These appeals are under section 134 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979. After suspension of the operation of the said Ordinance the new Ordinance i.e. of 2001 has provided for following section:

Section 131. Appeal to the Appellate Tribunal.--(1) "Where the (taxpayer) or Commissioner objects an order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals), the (taxpayer) or Commissioner may appeal to the Appellate Tribunal against such order".

The above section clearly provides for appeal right to persons against all orders passed by the Commissioner (Appeals). However, it does not include an order passed by an IAC. This is where the `Savings' provision of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 is of the relevance. The same sneaks as follows:--

Section 234(4). `Any proceeding under the repealed Ordinance pending on the commencement of this Ordinance before any Income-tax Authority, the Appellate Tribunal or any Court by way of appeal, reference, revision or prosecution shall be continued and disposed of as if this Ordinance has not come into

The emphasis in the above provision is on the usage of word "Any proceedings" -----'pending on the commencement of this Ordinance'. The AR says that the word "proceedings" has been defined in Black's Law Dictionary at Page 1204 Sixth Edition and it speaks as follows:--

Proceeding In a general sense, the form and manner of conducting judicial. business before a Court or Judicial Officer. Regular and orderly progress in form of law, including all possible steps in an action from its commencement to the execution of judgment. Term also refers to administrative 'proceedings before agencies, Tribunals, bureaus, or the like.

An act which is done by the Authority or direction of the Court, agency, or Tribunal, express or implied; an act necessary to be done in order to obtain a given and; a prescribed mode of action for carrying into effect a legal right. All the steps of measures adopted in the prosecution or defense of an action. Satter v. United States, C.C.A. Alasks, 66 F. 2d 819, 822. The word may be used synonymously with `action` or `suit' to describe the entire course of an action .at law or suit in equity from the issuance of the writ or filing of the complaint until the entry of a final judgment, or may be used to describe any act done by authority of a Court of law and every step required to be taken in any cause by either party. The proceedings of a suit embrace all matters that occur in its progress judicially.

Term `proceedings' may refer not only to a complete remedy but also to a mere procedural step that is part of a larger action or special proceeding. Rooney v. Varmont Investment Corp., 10 Cal. 3d 351, 110 Cal. Rptr. 353, 365, 515 P. 2nd 297. A `proceeding' includes action and special proceedings before judicial Tribunals as well as proceedings pending before quasi Judicial Officers and Boards. State ex rel. Johnson v. Independent School Dist. No. 810. Wabasha Country, 2600 Minn. 237, 109 N.W. 2d 596, 602. In a more particular sense, any application to a Court of justice, however made, for aid in the enforcement of rights, for relief, for redress of injuries, for damages, or for any remedial object.

`Proceedings' means any action, hearing, investigation, inquest, or inquiry (whether conducted by a Court administrative agency, hearing officer, arbitrator, legislative body, or any other person authorized by law) in which, pursuant to law, testimony can be compelled to be given.

Above meanings, he remarked, are quite exhaustive and the same start from the initiation of the proceedings at first stage to the culmination of the same after decision by the highest Appellate Forum. In the case of Income Tax proceeding this would mean and, include the assessment- stage before the Taxation Officer to the final order by the Supreme Court of Pakistan. During this period or if in between the petitioner does not opt for an appeal, the case attains finality and until than the entire process is covered within the definition of the word `proceedings'.

The use of word `pending' enlarges the scope of the section. It has been defined at Page 1134 of the same Dictionary. It originates from the Italian words `Lis-Pendens' which mean continuity till final judgment through which the cause of action is set at rest. The A.R. further referred Article 264 of Islamic Republic of Pakistan and remarked that this matter has been defined in PLD 1965 (W.P.) Lahore 214 and PLD 1965 Lah. 102. Seeking help from General Clauses Act, 1893 section 6 he defined the pending proceedings to be as the continuation up to the execution or implementation of the final order: The judgment referred was PLD 1963 Karachi 182 i.e. Rah-e-Manzal Transport v. Muhammad Amin. He said similar definition has been given in AIR Madras 106, AIR 1945 Madras. He finally referred 2002 PTD 3106 Lahore High Court i.e. in the case of Messrs Home Service Syndicate (Pvt.) Limited through Liquidator v. Commissioner of Income Tax/Wealth Tax Company Zone-1, Lahore and another. Wherein pending proceedings has been held as continuation till culmination point i.e. execution of the final order after which neither any appeal was filed nor any remedy was left.

All the cases referred by learned AR and discussed by us above are relevant to the issue under discussion. In our opinion appeal is not merely a matter of procedure. It is a right which every statute provides for against every order by the lowest tier. The Courts have. called this right a substantive right. Such a right pre-exists and cannot be, destroyed by an amendment or a subsequent legislation. 'Lis' which means right in case accrues on the-date of legislation of proceedings in a case. It comes into existence immediately after filing of return under section 55 or issuance of a notice under section 56 or 65 as the case may be. The right of appeal, therefore, becomes available apparently on the date of `lis i.e. filing of return or issuance of a notice from the Department. The argument of learned DR that on the date of decision this right was available but on the date of service of order the legislative withdraws it to us -is like snatching some belonging to a person. It is just a misconception as the tight of appeal provided bylaw in a statute cannot be withdrawn by a subsequent statute against the proceedings which had been initiated earlier. In this regard the definition given by learned AR are quite relevant and apt. The pending proceedings by all standards would be till culmination point i.e. the final appeal. This hardly needs any discussion that if legislature withdraws such a right through a clear and unambiguous legislation, one can agree with the Department. However, Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 intended to simplify the laws and provide more remedies and benefits to the assessee. In fiscal statutes a special judicial hierarchy has been provided, This right has always remained available under Income Tax Act, 1922 and Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 and now through Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The right of appeal is not merely 'a matter of technicality of procedure. It is a substantive right and by mere technicalities it cannot be done away. The High Courts in recent judgments have even gone to hold that tote Courts should do their best, to decide the case on merits and. even if the petitioner has laches in his case he should not be deprived of his right of decision of the issue on merits. This way the superior Court has held that the next higher forum must exercise the right of hearing of appeal on the facts and circumstances of the case and delay in filing petition should be condoned as far as possible. The superior Courts have even gone to hold that no limitation runs against an illegal order and, this again is to strengthen the right of appeal and decision of the case on merits. In the presence of such liberal pronouncements arguing that a right of appeal does not exist in the case of a person the `lis' arising in whose case existed even at the time of finalization of the original order is not justified. If the argument of learned DR is accepted, it would mean that all orders finalized by an IAC prior to 30th of June, 2001 with or without intimation to the assessee kept by some unscrupulous official of his staff and served after 30th of June would result in a situation where the assessee on one hand would be either in deep sea or on the other hand on the Mount Everest. Meaning thereby that any demand created under such circumstances shall become final and notwithstanding the amount thereon the, assessee will have to pay the same without a right of appeal. Obviously such a mal injustice cannot be attached to legislature. Though we have no doubt that there is no restriction in laws for the petitioners whose orders have been passed prior to 30th of June under section 66-A. We would still like to refer the case of Hoosein Kasam Dada (India) Ltd., v. The State of Madhya Pradesh and others reported as ((1953) 4 .ITR 114). In this case the Honourable Supreme Court of India has held that "for the purposes of the accrual of the right of appeal the critical and relevant date is the date of initiation of the proceedings and not the decision itself". Further in judgment reported as ((1963) 50 ITR 761) in the case of D.P. Wadia. and Sons v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Poona the Bombay High Court held that "assessment proceedings can be said to be initiated when either voluntary return is filed by the assessee, or an individual notice under section 22(2) calling upon him to submit a return is issued by the ITO, 'whichever is earlier". In the same judgment it was further held "for the purposes of accrual of the right of appeal the critical and relevant date is the date of initiation of the proceedings and not the decision itself".

The view of the Court, therefore, was that for the purpose of accrual. of the right of appeal the critical and relevant date is the date of initiation of proceedings and not the decision itself. The High Court view which has subsequently been confirmed in the case of the State of Madhya Pradesh and others is as follows:--

"It appears to us clear from the view expressed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that the accrual of the right of appeal is determined on the date of the initiation of the proceedings in which a possibility of a lis arising exists even though the lis may actually arise at a stage subsequent to the initiation or even at the end of the proceeding, when the order thereon is passed.

In the case before us, the notice under section 22(2), calling upon the assessee to submit a return, has been issued on the 11^th of June, 1956, which is long before the new Court Fees Act came into operation. Proceedings in the case of the present assessee, therefore, could be said to have been initiated before the provisions of the nevi Act came into force and, therefore, the reference will be governed by the old Court Fees Act."

Similar finding has been given by the Kerala High Court in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax v. Kerala Transport Co. The judgment is quite recent and is reported as 2000 242 ITD 263. The ratio decided therein is also the same as in the cases, mentioned supra. The language of the same being applicable on all fours on facts of the case impugned before us we reproduced the same as follows:--

"Held, that the relevant question to decide the applicability of the provision is the date on which the lis for the dispute arose. In the case at hand, the lis could be stated to have commenced latest by the date when the notice under section 143(2) of the Act was issued, that is, a date prior to April 1, 1989. The Tribunal was justified in its conclusion that the appeal was to be entertained on the basis of law as it stood prior to April 1, 1989. The appeal was competent."

At this juncture taking note of the facts of the case once again becomes. quite relevant. The order under section 66A was decided before 30th of June, 2001. Following the above judgments we need not go into the ,details of when the order was served. In this case the `lis' arose when the return was filed by the assessee. Obviously it was filed much earlier than the date of the decision under section 66A. The law in this case, therefore, was the one applicable on that date. The provisions of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 does not and cannot take away this inherent anti substantive right provided earlier. We also hold that the provisions of section 236(4) further give life to all such pending proceedings and the law as is obtaining on 30th of June, 2001 and before shall be applicable on all such proceedings at any stage of the assessment. It does not need any further elaboration, however, we reiterate our earlier finding that right from the start of existence of lis the proceedings remain pending till implementation of the final order by the Supreme Court or Pakistan or in between where the parties, concerned opt not to continue the same.

The result of the above discussion, therefore, is obvious. The preliminary objection raised by the department is overruled and the appeals are taken up for regular hearing.

These appeals filed by the assessee against order under section 66-A are on a common ground. It says that the IAC was not justified in cancellation of the orders of the assessee earlier finalized under section 59(1) respectively for 1998-99 and 1999-2000 and under section 59(A) for 2000-2001. The, objection of the IAC with regard to error and prejudice to the interest of Revenue is as follows:--

"Examination of assessment record of the company Messrs Kashmir Edible Oil revealed that the assessee advanced a loan of Rs.16,000,000 to the said company. As per accounts of the company the assessee received. interest/mark-up on short term loan as under:--

1998-991999-20002000-2001

Interest paid by- Kashmir

Edible Oil.27932053131684 2550494

The above interest income received by the assessee has neither been declared in his return nor the Assessing Officer has taken cognizance of this fact at the time of completion of assessments. The suppression of interest income constitutes an act of concealment of income/furbishing of inaccurate particulars of income which is liable to be taxed in the hands of the assessee and added in his total income already assessed under SAS'.

Then IAC issued a show-cause notice on the basis of above noted observations and after receiving reply of the assessee cancelled the order. The final observation given by him for cancellation is as follows:--

"The explanation/reply submitted by the AR of the assessee has been considered and found unsatisfactory for the reason that the company ,Messrs Kashmir Edible Oil Limited has paid the interest to the assessee during the years under consideration which is apparent from the record of the company. Thus the suppression of interest income constitutes an act of concealment of income/furnishing of inaccurate of particulars of income which is liable to be taxed in the hands of the assessee and added in his total income already assessed under SAS.

Due to above infirmity, the assessments finalised by the Assessing Officer of Circular 9, Coys. Zone-I, Lahore for the assessment years 1998-99 to 2000-2001 are thus erroneous in so far as these are prejudicial to the interests of revenue. I, therefore, cancel the above assessments in toto under section 66A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 for de novo proceedings.

The learned AR while challenging the order-first of all said that the IAC has not applied independent mind as the proceedings have been initiated on the basis of audit report. He produced before us copy of the audit report and said that its language is highly objectionable as the same has directed the IAC to invoke jurisdiction under section 66A and to report back. He remarked that in the light of the language of section 66A the jurisdiction to cancel an order is to be exercised after calling for the record of the proceedings of the assessee. He said that there was no infirmity in the record and the objection of the audit party was something outside the purview of the record of the assessee. Defining the word "record" as used in section 66A he said that it includes only the record of this assessee as was obtaining at the time of assessment and cannot include any direction be that from his Commissioner or any third person etc. etc. He referred few famous judgments and remarked that in ail the said judgments the Honourable higher Courts and superior Courts have disagreed with cancellation of order under section 66A if the same are on the direction of others. He said even the cancellation on the direction of the immediate boss has been held to be as unjustified. He cited 2001 PTD 1158, 2003 PTD (Trib.) 279 and NTR 1990 (Trib.) 240. Referring before judgments he further remarked that it was beyond the scope of section 66A to proceed on the basis of the audit party objection.

Coming to the merits learned AR said that the loan is in the name of Director i.e. the impugned assessee but the entire transactions after its approval has directly been made by the principal company and the bank. The amount has never come to the kitty of the assessee and the entire transactions are through the bank account and the limited company. He produced before us copy of the bank statement which is in the name of Mian Samiuddin but the transactions therein are statedly directly added and deleted from the books of the company and the assessee individual account has not Len attached. He further added that for all the three years the IAC has to en the loan as Rs.16 million. This, he said, is on the basis of the account of the said limited company that ends on 30th of August while the assessee account closes on 30th of June. He admitted that the loan is of wining on the valuation date of this assessee but remarked that the figure are entirely different and rather much less than the figure mentioned by the IAC. At this juncture he added that non-application of mind by the IAC is clear even from these facts.

Arguing the case on facts learned AR further added that the entire amount of interest receive by this assessee has directly been paid to the bank hence eve, if he has earned something it has been paid to the bank the effect of which obviously is nil. He therefore, commented that even if the case is said to be as erroneous it shall not cause any prejudice to the interest of Revenue as his income from interest is equalized with the expenses he has paid as interest to bank.

Learned DR on his turn remarked that the audit party is a statutory body and anything he points out on inspection of record becomes a part of the proceedings of the assessment. If subsequently an IAC calls for the records of assessment and-inspect the same the audit report is equally relevant document for determining the error and prejudice to the interest of Revenue. He said that the word "record" is not restricted to the record of the assessee itself but it includes everything within the file and outside the file which was part of the proceedings. He further remarked that this way the learned AR is ignoring that the books of accounts and documents which might not be placed in the file of the assessee as well as other attached vouchers are also part of the proceedings of an assessee. Talking about the facts he remarked that the interest received by the assessee is income in his hands and even if the amount has been paid to bank of the matching figure the same cannot be allowed as an expense. He said the assessee is not involved in the business of taking loans hence is not entitled to the benefit of the interest paid to the bank. It was pointed out to him that this is not the case of the Department. He remarked that this is the actual reason for cancellation of the order. The claim of the assessee that he is only a name lender and this is a Benami transaction is of no help to him. Once he comes into picture as a loaner he becomes a third party and is bound to disclose all entries in his personal account including his receipts and expenditure. Whether somebody is entitled to any expense or not can only be settled at the subsequent, stage and not before the IAC hence cancellation is fully justified and proper.

We have heard both and have perused the record. In fact we have decided this issue while deciding assessee appeal of Wealth Tax vide W.T.A. No.1778/LB of 2002, order dated 29-5-2003. We have discussed this issue in detail. There is one exception i.e. whether the assessee is entitled to the expenses paid to bank as a debit entry against his interest income or not. In this regard the judgment reported as 1999 PTD (Trib.) 708 was brought into discussion. In the above full Bench judgment the learned ITAT had disallowed -interest paid to bank against interest income received by the assessee on his deposit to bank. The observation of the Honourable ITAT was that the assessee had not obtained the loan for the purpose of depositing it in bank. Had be received this loan for granting to another party he could have been entitled to the expenses therein. Under section 31 a person becomes entitled to an expense if he has laid it out or expended for the purpose or earning the respective income. In the present case this requirement is fully met with. The Company through a resolution obtained this loan in the name of this director with the purpose of tuning up its accounts and smooth running of the affairs of its business. So even if the assessee individual status as a legal person is to be retained in between the, his entitlement towards allowance of the interest paid to bank shall bank and the limited company, which legally we believe should have been not diminish. He obtained this loan from bank for granting further loan to the company thus should have declared the same as his income to claim the interest paid as an expenditure.

Learned DR challenged the treatment from another angle and said that the difference between the valuation date and the closing of account of the principle company goes to damage the assessee. He remarked may be that the interest might have accrued by June and paid subsequently thus some discrepancy could result in prejudice to the Revenue but, however, could not specify the figures in favour of this proposition. Moreover, this again is not the case of the IAC. We, therefore, without going into the discussion as to whether the IAC legally was entitled to invoke jurisdiction on the basis of audit report or not hold that it was not a case of prejudice to the interest of Revenue. The element of error is quite strong, however, prejudice to the interest or Revenue is not there. Since this Tribunal has already in a number of cases held that for invoking jurisdiction under section 66A error and prejudice to the interest of Revenue should simultaneously exist, we have not hesitation in holding that this order under section 66A was not a valid or legal order. We, therefore, cancel the same and allow assessee appeals.

C.M.A./824/Tax (Trib).Appeal accepted