Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979)‑‑‑

‑‑‑‑Ss, 24(ft), 59, 66‑A & 136(2)‑‑‑Assessee returned his income, which was accepted under Self‑Assessment Scheme‑‑‑Assessee was subsequently issued a notice under S.66‑A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, to cancel such assessment for not having paid lease money through cross cheques, which expense was legally inadmissible and hit by S.24(ff) of the Ordinance‑‑‑Revising authority rejected the explanation of assessee and after cancelling such assessment framed the fresh one‑‑ Tribunal after agreeing to the plea of assessee that provisions of S.24(ff) )f the Ordinance were not attracted at the relevant time, rejected the appeal holding that evidence produced before it was insufficient to substantiate the contention that lease money had been paid in 12 equal installments‑‑‑Validity‑‑‑Such appreciation of evidence could not be said o have given rise to a question of law simply for the reason that Tribunal had rejected the plea ---Whether in the given situation, a particular payment was made in a particular manner and in particular sub‑division during the year, would not give rise to any question of law‑ Tribunal had rejected the evidence with reasons, thus, no question of law could be said to have arisen‑‑‑Such findings, if were not based upon evidence, then the order could have given rise to question of law‑‑‑High Court dismissed the petition in limine.

Shahbaz Butt for Petitioner.

Muhammad Ilyas Khan for the Revenue. .

ORDER

NASEEM SIKANDAR, J.‑‑‑We intend to dispose of PTR Nos. 170 and 171 of 2001, through this single order.

2. Through these references under section 136(2) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 (for short the Ordinance), the petitioner an association of persons, engaged in running a Flour Mill claims that following questions of law have arisen out of the order of the Tribunal, dated 23‑12‑2000:‑‑‑

"(i) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the learned Tribunal can discard an evidence on the suspicion that the same might have been contrived after the show cause?

(ii) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case after admitting that lessor's ledger account maintained shows monthly payment of lease money, the Tribunal was right in discarding the evidence on the ground that the same might have been contrived by the appellant after receipt of IAC's notice?

(iii) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case facilitating clause of an agreement duly supported by evidence of actual happening can be read, so as to conclude that the payments were made other than the manner recorded?

(iv) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that the learned IAC has unbridled powers and is competent to complete a reassessment himself after cancelling the original assessment?

3. For the two assessment years involved viz, 1995‑96 and 1996‑97 the assessee returned his income from the above source which was accepted under Self‑Assessment Scheme vide orders, dated 16‑10‑1996 and 28‑10‑1996 respectively. Subsequently it was served with a notice under section 66‑A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 expressing the intention of the concerned IAC to cancel the aforesaid assessments framed under the Self‑Assessment Scheme. The main reason for the proposed action being that the assessee had not paid the lease money of Rs.360,000 through cross‑cheques, and therefore, that expense was legally inadmissible and accordingly hit by the provisions of section 24(ff). The assessee replied that the provisions of section 24(ff) at the relevant time were not attracted to his case inasmuch as no single transaction of Rs.50,000 or more was ever made. The revising authority, however, rejected the submissions made before it and proceeded to cancel the aforesaid assessments and thereafter to frame fresh assessment on 18‑1‑2000 through a consolidated order,

4. Learned Tribunal, according to the asses see despite its having agreed that provisions of section 24(ff) of the Ordinance at the relevant time were not attracted, proceeded to reject the appeal. Thereafter, its prayer for reference of the aforesaid questions was also declines by the Tribunal on 29‑9‑2001. Hence these reference petitions under section 136(2) of the Ordinance, 1979.

5. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, we will sustain the objection taken by the Revenue that no question of law arises out of the order of the Tribunal. It is correct that the Tribunal agreed to the plea of assessee that the provisions of section 24(ff) of the Ordinance as these existed at the relevant time were not attracted in this case. However, at the same time they proceeded to hold that evidence referred to before them to be insufficient to substantiate the contention that lease money was paid through 12 equal monthly installments. The appreciation of evidence referred to before the "Tribunal cannot be said to have given rise to the aforesaid questions only for the reason that the Tribunal rejected the plea raised ‑before it. Whether in the given situation, a particular payment was made in a particular manner and in particular sub‑division during the year does not give rise to any question of law. If the findings were not based upon any evidence then the order could have given rise to a question of law. However, where the Tribunal has rejected the evidence produced before it and has also. given the reason for its rejection no question of law can possibly be said to have arisen. While disposing of the reference application the learned Members took up and discussed every question to conclude 'that these do not merit reference to this Court. We are of the view that the reasons so made are valid and cogent.

Dismissed in limine.

S.A.K./M‑994/LApplication dismissed.