FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN VS METROPOLITAN STEEL CORPORATION
2002 P T D 87
[Karachi High Court]
Before Sabihuddin Ahmed and S. Ali Aslam Jafri, JJ
FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN
Versus
METROPOLITAN STEEL CORPORATION
High Court Appeals Nos. 128 and 129 of 1995, decided on /01/.
th
May, 2001. (a) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)---
---S. 3B---Collection of excess tax---Claim for refund of tax which was not payable or was paid in excess, could only be made by the person paying the tax and not the one who had collected the same.
Sajjad Nabi Dar & Co. v. Commissioner of Income-tax PLD 1977 SC 437 rel.
Commissioner of Sales Tax, Lahore v. Associated Hotel (India) Limited 1969 PTD 490 ref.
(b) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)---
----S. 7---Determination of tax liability ---Assessee was entitled to deduct the input tax paid by him from the output tax payable for the purpose of determining its tax liability---If assessee paid a much higher amount than what was lawfully due by way of input tax by mistake, a corresponding advantage in terms of reduction of its own tax liability would be available to the assessee.
(c) Sales tax---
----Service of summons---Irregularity---Effect---Any irregularity in the service of summons does not vitiate a decree and service through a Court Officer is not the only mode of service.
Mahmooda Sultana v. Naseem Mumtaz 1990 MLD 1028 rel.
(d) Sales tax---
----Void order---Limitation---No limitation runs against a void order which is non-existent in the eyes of law and which can even be ignored.
Rehmat Bibi and others v. Punnu Khan and others 1986 SCMR 962 and Syed Haji Abdul Wahid and another v. Syed Sirajuddin 1998 SCMR 2296 rel.
Conforce Limited v. Syed Ali PLD 1977 SC 599 ref.
(e) Sales tax---
----Void order---Illegal or voidable order---Distinction---Limitation--?Distinction between the void and illegal or voidable orders---Limitation has been held applicable only to the second type of order.
Muhammad Swaleh v. United Grain Fodder Agencies PLD 1964 SC 97 rel.
(f) Sales tax---
----Void order and illegal or voidable order---Concept and distinction--?When a Court or a Tribunal assumes jurisdiction not vested in it by the law or fails to exercise jurisdiction so vested, its order may be void and a nullity in law---When the Court or the Tribunal acts illegally or with material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction the order is only voidable but not void.
Muhammad Swaleh v. United Grain Fodder Agencies PLD 1964 SC 97 rel.
(g) Sales tax---
---Void order---Broadened scope---Effect---Broadened scope of the? expression "void order" might upset the entire judicial system and particularly the provisions, invoking appellate remedies within the time prescribed by statutes of limitation as every unsuccessful litigant could sleep over a Court's order which in his opinion was void or defy the same with impunity in the hope that he could ultimately plead that the order was void and non-existent in law which could be ignored.
(h) Sales tax---
---- Illegal or voidable judgment and judgment being nullity in law--?Distinction and treatment---Mere fact that certain provisions of substantive law and the subsequent pronouncements of the Supreme Court were not taken into consideration might render the judgment illegal or voidable but could not be treated as a nullity in law.
Sajjad Nabi Dar & Co. v. Commissioner of Income-tax PLD 1977 SC 437 and Commissioner of Sales. Tax, Lahore v. Associated Hotel (India) Limited 1969 PTD 490 ref.
(i) Duty to Court---
---- Public functionaries and their duty to Court---Court made drastic observations on the callous and lethargic attitude of Revenue and other Government functionaries in conducting cases on behalf of Government causing huge loss to public exchequer, and issued necessary directions in this behalf.
A. H. Lakho for Appellant.
Khalid Anwar and Afsar Abidi for Respondent No. 1.
M. G. Dastagir for Respondent No. 4.
Dates of hearing: 17th, 18th, 19th, 24th and 25th April, 2001:
JUDGMENT
SABIHUDDIN AHMED, J.---H.C.A. No. 128 of 1.995 arises from a judgment and decree of a learned Single Judge of this Court decreeing the respondent Suit No. 746 of 1992 for recovery of Rs. 16,35,000 with 14% interest and costs as against the appellant. H.C.A. No. 129 of 1995 arises from an order, dated 28-3-1995 passed by another learned Single Judge in the same suit dismissing the appellant's application for setting aside the judgment and decree in the same suit.
2. The admitted facts appear to be that the respondent No. 1 is engaged in manufacturing of various steel products and used to purchase mild steel billets from respondent No. 4. It was required to pay sales tax .at the rate of 12% ad valorem in terms of a Notification No. S.R.O. 734(1)/89 issued by the Central Board of Revenue and such tax was collected by the respondent No. 4 and passed on to the respondent No. 1. The levy of sales tax at such rate was questioned before this Court through C.P. No. D-1087 of 1989, and several petitions on the ground that steel ingot, which was substantially the same kind of product were being subjected only to sales tax at the rate of Rs. 375 per metric ton and the rate of duty on billets was discriminatory. These petitions were allowed by a Division Bench of this Court vide judgment, dated 11-4-1991. The respondent No. 1 applied for refund of the excess amount paid but having failed to obtain redress from the Sales Tax Authorities filed the above suit as well as another suit bearing No. 745 of 1992 which is still pending.
3. We called for the record and proceedings of the suit which shows that summons to respondent No. 1 were dispatched to the District Judge, Rawalpindi and the remaining respondents were personally served. Service on all of them was held good but respondents Nos. 1 to 3 failed to appear. Respondent No. 4 on the other hand, put in a written statement admitting that the amount mentioned in the plaint had been collected by aforesaid respondent, but contended that the same had been passed on to the respondent No. 1 i.e. Federal Government. In the circumstances the learned Single Judge vide order, dated 15-8-1993 directed the parties to appear under Order X, C.P.C. on 23-8-1993, when he observed, taking into consideration the position taken up by the respondent No. 4, that since the defendant No. 1 would be liable to refund the amount notice may issue to Deputy Attorney-General and further directed that "the officer of defendant No. 1 will also remain present in Court on" that date with the relevant documents on the next date i.e. 26-8-1993.
4. When the matter came up before the Court, on 26-8-1992, it was brought to the attention of the Court that two letters, dated 10-12-1992 and 2-12-1992, from, one Mr. M. Bachal Mirani, Section Officer, Finance Division addressed to the Superintendent concerned branch of the Court, were available on record, wherein adjournment was requested to enable the Government to appoint counsel and prepare parawise comments. It was, however, observed that nothing had been done ever since and the learned D.A.-G. who appeared pursuant to Court notice, stated that he had no instructions from the appellant. In the circumstances noticing that the levy of ad valorem sales tax had been declared, invalid and the judgment had attained finality, the suit against the appellant were decreed on 26-8-1993.
5. No action was taken by the appellant for more than one year and, as is evident from the record that an application for certified copy of the judgment and decree was applied for only on 1-9-1994. The copy was delivered on 7-9-1994 but instead of filing the appeal within twenty days the appellant chose to present a memo of appeal (H.C.A. No. 128 of 1995) only on 13-10-1994 i.e., after a further delay of 16 days. Moreover, it appears that even thereafter the matter was allowed to remain under objection for another six months and Court Fee Stamp were supplied only on 18-4-1994. The memo. of appeal was also not accompanied by any application for condonation of delay.
6. Almost simultaneously, on 13-9-1994, the appellant moved an application under Order 9, rule 13, C.P.C. praying for setting aside of the decrees which were accompanied by application for condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act. It was stated in the affidavit in support of the application that the officer concerned Mr. Mirani could snot pursue the matter for filing written statement in the suit due to non?-cooperation of some departments /authorities and particularly uncooperative attitude of the then Standing Counsel and D.A.-G. The applications were numbered as (C.M.A. 4082/94 and 4083/94 respectively.
7. The applications mentioned in para. 6 above, came up for hearing before another learned Single Judge on the Original Side, and were disposed of by a common order, dated 28-3-1995. It was held that after referring to the record as well as the statements made in the affidavits in support of the applications that the appellants were fully aware of the suit having been filed and they were only negligent in' defending the same. It was further observed that while it has been acknowledged in the affidavit in support of the application under Order 9, rule 13, C.P.C., that the appellants were aware of the suit having been filed they not only failed to defend the same but preferred an application for setting aside the ex parte decree more than one year after its disposal as such the application under Order 9, rule 13, was dismissed as hopelessly barred by limitation and the one under section 5 of the Limitation Act, was also dismissed as the appellant had failed to explain the delay of each day. Against this order the appellant have come in appeal by way of H. C. A. No. 129 of 1995.
8. Mr. Abdul Hafeez Lakho learned counsel for the appellant addressed us elaborately both on the-merits of the case as well as the bar of limitation and in fairness to learned counsel we have considered the matter from both aspects. As regards merits learned counsel referred to the case set up by the respondent No. 1 themselves in the plaint. It has been alleged that the aforesaid respondents are engaged in the manufacture of various steel products and used to purchase mild steel billets from the respondent No. 4. They were required to pay sales tax at the rate of 12?% ad-valorem in terms, of S.R.O. No. 734(1)/89 issued by the Central Board of Revenue and such tax was collected by the respondent No. 4 and passed on to the appellant. However, sales tax on steel ingots which is substantially the same kind of product as billet was levied at the confessional rate of Rs. 375 per metric ton. Various parties paying sales tax on billets challenged the discrimination between the two products for the purposes of sales tax through C.P. No. D-1078 of 1989 and several other petitions. These petitions were allowed and levy on billets exceeding Rs. 375 per metric ton was declared unlawful. Learned counsel argued that though the respondent No. 1 had paid sales tax to the respondent No. 4 it is well-established that the burden of such tax is invariably passed on to the ultimate consumer of the goods. He attempted to refer to certain documents' placed on record in H.C.A. No. 128 of 1995 to indicate that sales tax component was built-in certain invoices issued by the respondent No. 1 to buyers of their manufacture product. Nevertheless he candidly conceded that such evidence was not adduced before the trial Court as the appellant remained ex parte and we could not treat those documents as evidence.
9. Learned counsel, however, argued that it was the duty of the learned Single Judge to examine the question whether the respondents were themselves called upon to bear the burden of sales tax liability or such burden had passed to the consumer. He argued that there was always a presumption that such burden had been passed on the customer by the respondent No. 1 and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary the respondent No. 1 was not entitled to claim refund. Learned counsel relied upon a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sajjad Nabi Dar & Co. v. Commissioner of Income-tax (PLD 1977 SC 437) which appears to support his view. In this case the petitioner company, a timber merchant, had carried out transaction for sale and purchase of timber in the tribal areas, had collected sales tax from buyers and deposited the same with the Government. Subsequently, upon realizing that the Sales Tax Act was not applicable to the tribal areas it claimed that the tax had been illegally collected and the Sales Tax Officer directed that the amount be refunded. The case was, however, subsequently reopened and an order was passed requiring the petitioner to repay the amount to the Government. The petitioner challenged the order in appeal and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner accepted the petitioner's contention. An appeal preferred by department was also dismissed by the Appellate Tribunal but an application for reference to the High Court to decide the question whether the petitioner was entitled to refund of the "sales tax amount collected from customers separately in addition to the sale proceeds of timber instead of paying it to the State" was granted. The Hon'ble High Court held that the petitioner had collected the amount involved from its customers as an agent of the Government. This agency came to an end on the deposit made and the petitioner had no locus standi to seek refund of the amount particularly when it neither applied on behalf of the customer nor had shown that the amount erroneously collected from them had been refunded to such customers. The contention that the matter -could not be reopened under section 30(1) of the Sales Tax Act, 1951 was repelled on the ground that the order of refund stemmed from a mistake apparent on the face of the record. Refusing leave to appeal their lordships in Supreme Court observed that nothing turned on the fact that the Sales Tax Act had not been extended to tribal areas and real question was of the terms on which the petitioner had collected such tax from its customers. Although the evidence was in the petitioner exclusive possession, since it withheld the same an adverse influence had to be drawn against it. The above judgment indeed supports Mr. Lakho's contention to the extent that refund of an amount paid in excess to the tax legally due can only be claimed by the person who has eventually borne the burden of tax and not by one who has collected such tax on behalf of the Government.
10. Moreover, we have noticed that section 3-B of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 explicitly-states that legal position is in the following words:--
S. 3B. Collection of excess tax, etc.---(1) Any person who has collected or collects any tax or charge, whether under misapprehension of any provision of this Act or otherwise, which was not payable as tax or charge or which in excess of the tax or charge actually payable and the incidence of which has been passed on to the customer, shall pay the amount of tax or charge so collected to the Federal Government.
(2) Any amount payable to the Federal Government under subsection (1) shall be deemed to be an arrears of tax or charge payable under this Act and shall be recoverable accordingly and no claim for refund in respect of such amount shall be admissible.
(3) The burden of proof that the incidence of tax or charge referred to in subsection (1) had been or has not been passed to the customer shall be on the person collected the tax or charge.
11. It may be noticed that even prior to the enforcement of the 1990 Act, section 30-A of the Sales Tax Act, 1951 also provided that the amount collected by a person by way of sales tax under some misapprehension of the provisions of the Act or otherwise, which is not payable as tax or in excess of the tax payable is to be paid to the Federal Government it obviously implies that a claim for refund could only be made by the person eventually paying the tax and not the one who had collected it.
12. Mr. Khalid Anwar learned counsel for the respondent No. 1, however, placed reliance upon a slightly earlier judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax. Lahore v. Associated Hotel (India) Limited 1969 PTD 490 in this case a some what different view appears to have been taken by their lordships which prima facie seems to support Mr. Khalid Anwer. Apparently the respondent-company had deposited an mount collected by it from its customers in excess of what was lawfully due. An application for refund was dismissed by the Sales Tax Officer but the order was reversed in appeal and the amount was held to be refundable. This view was upheld by the Appellate Tribunal as well as Hon'ble High Court. Dismissing a petition for leave to appear preferred by the Department the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that if the assessee had by mistake or miscalculation realized some excess amount from its customers then it was not the Department but the customer who may insist upon refunding the amount so collected but the Department could not arrogate to itself the right of retaining money which was not due to it.
13. With profound respect, however, we deem it necessary to point out that the leave petition was decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 4-4-1969 and the provision of section 30-A of the Sales Tax Act, 1951 which had only been brought on the statute book through Finance Act, 1967 were never brought to their lordships' attention. It is evident that it is through these provisions that the amount of tax recovered from customers through mistake became payable to the Government. In view of the abovementioned statutory provision and the subsequent judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, we are doubtful if the cited principle can be of much help to the respondents.
14. Nevertheless Mr. Khalid Anwer argued that reliance of Sajjad Nabi Dar's case on behalf of the appellant was misconceived inasmuch as in the facts of the instant case the ultimate consumer of billets was to respondent No. 1 itself. As regards the sales tax paid on its manufactured goods learned counsel contended that it was an independent levy and had nothing to do with the sales tax on billets. He proceeded to argue that if evasion or non-payment in respect of sales tax on such manufactured goods was discovered the appellant could initiate independent proceedings against the respondents. Technically learned counsel appears to be correct inasmuch as the manufactured goods produced by the respondent are independently liable to sales tax. However, with profound respect to his learning we do not think this plea could be of much assistance to learned counsel in context of the facts and circumstances of this case. Under section 7 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 the respondent No. 1 was entitled to deduct the in put tax paid by him from the out p4 tax payable for the purpose of determining its tax liability. If on account of the mistake the respondent paid a much higher amount than what was lawfully due by way of in put tax it also received a corresponding advantage in terms of reduction of its own tax liability. We are therefore, inclined to observe that Mr. Lakho succeeded in making out a reasonably good case on merit.
15. On the question of limitation, however, learned counsel's task was for more formidable. In this context he raised a two-fold plea. In the first place he argued that the appellant was not duly served and summon were served only through the District Judge, Rawalpindi and not District Judge, Islamabad. This we must say is making of a fetish of technicality. In the first place any irregularity in the service of summons does not vitiate a decree as held in the case of Mahmooda Sultana v. Naseem Mumtaz (1990 MLD 1028). Secondly, service through a Court'' Officer is not the only mode of service. In any event it is evident from the record that though summons were initially transmitted to District Judge, Rawalpindi, they were forwarded by the latter to Senior Civic Judge, Islamabad within whose territorial jurisdiction the appellant resided. In any event the two letters, dated 10-12-1992 and 12-12-1992, from Mr. Muhammad Bachal Mirani, Section Officer, Ministry of Finance clearly showed that summons had been duly received. It wad, next contended that Mr. Mirani had no authority to receive summons. However, Mr. Khalid Anwer had rightly pointed out that in the affidavit in support of the application under Order IX, Rule 13; C.P.C. it was, specifically urged that Mr. Mirani could not file written statement due to non-cooperation of some department and also non-cooperative attitude off the Law Officer of the Government. This shows that at least Mr. Mirani's capacity to defend the suit on behalf of the appellant was ratified and obviously the appellant Government could not be allowed to raise self-contradictory pleas. Furthermore an office memorandum by Mr. Marani, dated 17-5-1993 has been placed on record whereby they' Central Board of Revenue was requested to defend the case on behalf oh the Ministry of Finance. There is also a letter, dated 24-5-1993 from a Second Secretary, C.B.R. addressed to the respondent No. 2 requiring him to take further action on the office memorandum. The record also shows a letter from office of the respondent No. 2 addressed to respondent No. 3, dated 9-6-1993 requiring him to define the case on behalf of the appellant. There is also no dispute as to the fact that the', respondents Nos. 2 and 3 who are officers of the appellant responsible font, the collection of sales tax were personally served. All these facts lead to the inevitable conclusion that the appellant and its responsible officer had been duly served and were fully aware of the suit having been filed but through sheer culpable negligence failed to take any measure to defend the same.
16. In any event even if the appellant's plea as to being unaware of the ex parte decree is to be accepted, it is clear from a perusal of the certified copy of the impugned judgment that an application for grant of copy was made on 1-9-1994 and such copy was delivered on 7-9-1994. Even if the date of application for copy is to be treated as the date of knowledge of the judgment and the benefit of section 12 of Limitation Act is granted to the appellant. H.C.A. No. 128 of 1995 would still be barred by 16 days. No explanation whatsoever has been furnished for such delay and Mr. Lakho was unable to offer any justification except submitting that he was not representing the appellant at that time.
17. Alternatively Mr. Lakho argued that the impugned judgment and decree was void and a nullity in law and it was well-settled that statute of limitation do not run against such judgments and orders. In this context he relied upon the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rehmat Bibi and others v. Punnu Khan and others (1986 SCMR 962) and Syed Haji Abdul Wahid and another v. Syed Sirajuddin (1998 SCMR 2296). Indeed we are Aware that apart from the above-cited precedents there are several other pronouncements where their lordships have held L that no limitation runs against a void order which is non-existent in the eyes of law and can even be ignored. Nevertheless it is important to consider whether the impugned judgment can be characterized as void or a nullity in law so as to attract the application of the above principle.
18. Mr. Khalid Anwer on the other hand relied upon the observations of the four Member Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court to the effect that it was a fallacy to assume that a void order would invariably be struck down regardless of the consequences of its decision because by describing it as void a Court cannot alter the fact that such order was passed and could create consequences. He also referred to the observations that a writ may be refused against a void order if it would enable the petitioner to circumvent the provision of a statute of limitation. In the above context we would like to refer to the observations of their lordships to the effect that void orders and order without jurisdiction are overworked expression and it would be better to, use this expression in the narrow sense as held in Conforce Limited v. Syed Ali (PLD 1977 SC 599) as being confined to order passed by Tribunal not having jurisdiction to do so.
19. Be that as it may, a survey of the precedents clearly reveals that their lordships have always maintained a distinction between the void and illegal or avoidable order and statute of limitation have been held applicable only to the first type of order. The distinction was explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Muhammad Swaleh v. United Grain Fodder Agencies (PLD 1964 SC 97) with reference to the three grounds of revision contained in section 115, C.P.C., their lordships observed IF that when a Court or a Tribunal assume jurisdiction not vested by law or fails to exercise jurisdiction so vested its order may be void and a nullity in law. However, when it acts illegally or with material irregularity, in (F the exercise of its jurisdiction the order is only voidable but not void. Even in subsequent cases their lordships have declared orders passed by Tribunals having no jurisdiction or passed without notice to necessary party void but have not applied this concept to all illegal orders. Indeed a broadened scope of the expression "void order" might upset the entire ?judicial 'system and particularly the provision for invoking appellate remedies within the time prescribed by statutes of limitation as every unsuccessful litigant could sleep over a Court order which in his opinion is void or defy the same with impunity in the hope that he could ultimately plead that the order was void and non-existent in law which could be ignored. Mr. Lakho himself in all fairness did not want us to go to such extent.
20. Nevertheless applying the settled legal principle to the facts of the instant case while we agree with Mr. Lakho to the extent that the learned Single Judge should have taken into consideration the law declared in Sajjad Nabi Dar's case (PLD 1977 SC 437) and, if we may respectfully add, the provision of section 30-A of the Sales Tax Act, 1951 and section 3-B of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, we are afraid we cannot agree that on account of failure to do so the judgment pronounced became void or a nullity in law. The act remains that the Court had the jurisdiction to entertain the suit, summons were recorded to have been duly served, the appellant itself felt the need to move the Appellate Court and the judgment was perfectly in accordance with the earlier pronouncement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Associated Hotel (India) Limited 1969 PTD 490. The mere fact that certain provision of substantive law and the subsequent pronouncement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court was not taken into H consideration might render the judgment illegal or voidable but could not be treated as a nullity in law. For the foregoing reasons we have no option but to dismiss H. C. A. No. 1.28 of 1995 as barred by limitation.
21. Coming to H.C.A. No. 129 of 1995 it may be observed that the memo of appeal against the order, dated 28-3-1995 appears to have been presented on 24-4-1995 though it was asserted that the application for certified copy was made on 30-3-1995 and such copy was made available on 6-4-1995. This assertion is not supported by the record. The certified copy of the impugned order available on record indicates that an application for the same was made on 19-9-1995 and the copy was made available on 30-10-1995. This can possibly lead to two inferences i.e. either that the appeal was presented alongwith the certified copy after 30-10-1995 and the date of presentation was wrongfully recorded by the office or that it was presented without a certified copy. In the first instance it would be time-barred on account of having been presented after more than seven months of the impugned order. In the second case the appellant could not claim the benefit of section 12 of the Limitation Act and would be barred by six days. In either case this appeal would also be liable to be dismissed on ground of limitation.
22. In any event even if H.C.A. No. 129 of 1995 to be deemed to have been presented within time it is liable to be dismissed on merit as well, as discussed in para. 16 above. There is amply material on record to establish that the appellants were fully aware of the suit having been filed and were plainly negligent in taking appropriate measure to defend or to move the Court for setting aside the ex parte decree within the time prescribed by law. It may also be observed that the statement made before the learned Single Judge to the effect that the appellant acquired knowledge of the decree on 13-9-1994 was obviously untrue inasmuch as an application for certified copy of the judgment and decree had been preferred earlier to the said date i.e. on 1-9-1994. We are constrained to express our regrets over such irresponsible statement made at the bar by counsel representing the Federal Government.
23. In view of the foregoing reasons, we have no option but to dismiss H.C.A. No. 128 of 1995 as being barred by limitation and H. C. A. No. 129 of 1995 both on merits as well as grounds of limitation. Before parting, however, we deem it necessary to record our deep anguish over the manner in which a very substantial money belonging to the tax payer was squandered through negligence of public officials. Though arguments were addressed at the Bar, strictly speaking, it was not necessary for us to dilate upon the merits of the controversy but we have done so primarily to illustrate the point that though a reasonable defence was available the concerned defendants shied away from the proceedings and failed to take any measure to defend the suit in the performance of their public duty. Apart from the appellant the respondents Nos. 2 and 3 who are officers of the appellant concerned with collection of `revenue never bothered to enter appearance and no explanation was furnished on their behalf. It is indeed high time that the revenue collecting agencies as well as those responsible for representation of the Government in law Courts pull up their socks and ensure that matter involving huge amount of public revenue are properly proceeded with or defended in Courts. We would, therefore, direct the Registrar to forward a copy of this judgment to the Chairman, Central Board of Revenue and Secretary, Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs for appropriate action and would also express the hope that at least Suit No. 745 of 1995 is properly defended. We would also record our gratitude to Mr. Abdul Hafeez Lakho and Mr. Khalid Anwer, Advocates for their valuable assistance.
C.M.A./M.A.K./F-27/K????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Appeal dismissed.