(a) Income-tax---

----Transfer of case---Jurisdiction to transfer case---Director-General, Chief Commissioner and Commissioner have jurisdiction to transfer cases---Indian Income Tax Act, 1961, S.127.

(b) Income-tax---

----Transfer of case ---Co-ordination of investigation is a good ground fog such transfer---Search operations revealing that close relatives of an ex-Minister who were partners in a firm in Madras were assessed in New Delhi and that there was no evidence of business activity of firm in Madras--- Transfer of case of firm from Madras to New Delhi to facilitate investigation---Transfer was valid---Indian Income Tax Act, 1961, S.127.

Subsection (2)(a) of section 127 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, makes it clear that all the three authorities mentioned in it, namely, the Director`-General, the Chief Commissioner or the Commissioner are competent to order transfer of cases.

The object of transfer of a case is to achieve the object of the Act. If co-ordinated investigation is necessary for the purpose of proper assessment, prevention of evasion of tax, collection of tax and other relevant matters, then proper and co-ordinated investigation is a good ground for transfer of the case.

A search and seizure operation was conducted in the petitioner's premises as part of a larger operation conducted at the premises of K, an ex- Minister, and his business associates. During the search and seizure, the documents seized were partnership deeds executed at Madras by the partners of the petitioner-firm including Smt. SP, mother-in-law of the ex-Minister, and one K the partnership deed between the ex-Minister's mother-in-law, his son, K and SK were also seized. The said partnership deed was executed to carry on the business of trade and export of goods under the name and style of General Exporters at Madras. The ex-Minister's son and mother-in-law were assessed in New Delhi. Taking into consideration the above facts, the CIT, New Delhi had apprised the CIT, Madras, of the necessity for the transfer of the case from Madras to New Delhi and the first respondent prima facie concurred with the proposal of the second respondent, and -issued the show-cause notice and thereafter passed the orders of transfer, after affording sufficient-opportunity and after recording reasons for the transfer. On a writ petition challenging the order:

Held, dismissing the writ petition, (i) that terms of section 127(2)(a) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, the Commissioner, the first respondent, was competent to order the transfer.

(ii) That merely because the first respondent-Commissioner had come to a prima facie conclusion or concurred with the second respondent, it, could not be held that he had prejudged the issue and he should not have passed the order.

(iii) That as per the materials recovered during the search and seizure, which were available with the second respondent, the second respondent applied his mind and came to the conclusion that it was essential to have co ordinated investigation of the group of cases. There were sufficient reasons which warranted the transfer of the petitioner's case from Madras to New Assam Surgical Co. v. CBDT (1984) '145 ITR 400 (Gauhati) and Sameer Leasing Co. Ltd. v. Chairman, CBDT (1990) 185 ITR 129, (Delhi) fol.

Ajantha Industries v. CBDT (1976) 102 ITR 281 (SC); Bhatia Minerals v. CIT (1993) 200 ITR 591 (All.); Dwarka .Prosad Agarwalla v. Director of Inspection (1982) 137 ITR 456 (Cal.); General Exporters v. CIT (1998) 234 ITR 860 (Mad.); Jharkhand Mukti Morcha v. CIT (1997) 225 ITR 284 (Pat.); Maheshwari Lime Works v. CIT (1984) 147 ITR 804 (MP); Peacock Chemicals (P.) Ltd. v. CIT (1990) 182 ITR 98 (All.); Rajasthan Mining and Engineering (P.) Ltd. v. CIT (1997) 142 CTR 329 (Raj.); Sagarmal Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. v. CBDT (1972) 83 ITR 130 (MP); Saptagiri Enterprises v. CIT (1991) 189 ITR 705 (AP); Shri Rishikul Vidyapeeth Union of India (1982) 136 ITR 139 (Raj.); V.K. Steel Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Assistant CIT (1991) 187 ITR 403 (AP) and Vijayasanthi Investments (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Chief CIT (1991) 187 ITR 405 (AP) ref.

Mohan Parasaran for Petitioner.

S.V. Subramaniam for C.V. Rajan for Respondents

JUDGMENT

The petitioner prays for the issue of a writ of certiorari calling for the records comprised in the proceedings of the first respondent, dated October 14, 1997, in Order No.66/I1I of 1997--98 (1127/111/ Jurisdiction 1997-98) and quash the same.

Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned senior counsel for the respondents. With the consent of either side, the writ petition itself was taken up for final disposal.

No counter has been filed by the respondents, as there is no factual dispute and counsel for either side confined themselves to the legal contentions alone.

On the earlier occasion, the petitioner filed W.P. No.9731 of 1997 on the file of this Court to call for and quash the order of transfer, dated June 10, 1997, passed by the first respondent. This Court, by order, dated September 11, 1997, (General Exporters v. CIT (1998) 234 ITR 860), allowed the writ petition and quashed the impugned proceedings, dated June 10, 1997, and directed the respondents to pass fresh orders in terms of section 127 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, by complying with the requirements of the said provision. Further, the earlier order of transfer was quashed by this Court following the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Ajantha Industries v. CBDT (1976) 102 ITR 281 and Vijayasanthi Investments (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Chief CIT (1991) 187 ITR 405 (AP), as in the show-cause notice, no reasons have been set out for the transfer, no reasons have been communicated to the petitioner and there has been violation of principles of natural justice as well as the mandatory requirements of subsection (2) of section 127 of the said Act.

Subsequently, the first respondent issued a notice under section 127(1) read with section 127(2)(a) of the said Act on September 22. 1997, proposing to transfer the case of the petitioner from, the file of the Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, City Circle VII (Investigation Chennai, to the file of the Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, Central Circle VIII, New Delhi, for the three reasons detailed in the said notice and the petitioner had been called upon to state its objects.

The petitioner was also called upon to attend the hearing on September 30, 1997, before tht first respondent. On October 10, 1997, the petitioner submitted its objections in detail. At the request of the petitioner, the hearing was adjourned to October 13, 1997, and a permission to inspect the file was also granted by the first respondent. The file was inspected by the petitioner's authorised representative on October 7, 1997.

The first respondent had listed the matter to October 13, 1997, for affording personal hearing to the petitioner, but the petitioner had not availed of the said opportunity. Instead, the petitioner had submitted its objections, dated October 10, 1997. The objections submitted by the petitioner had received elaborate consideration in the hands of the first respondent, and the said objections have been overruled. The first respondent by the impugned proceedings, dated October 14, 1997, transferred the petitioner's file to the file of the Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, Central Circle VIII, New Delhi.

Being aggrieved, the present writ petition has been tiled.

Mr. Mohan Parasaran, learned counsel for the petitioner, while realising the legal position and while admitting that it is the subjective satisfaction of the first respondent, did not address arguments on the merits. It is to be pointed out that this Court is not exercising appellate jurisdiction with respect to the impugned proceedings passed by the first respondents, dated October 14, 1997, but it could only exercise the power of judicial review. On the merits, this Court will not at all be justified in interfering with the orders passed by the first respondent, as it is the subjective satisfaction of the first respondent which matters, and with respect to the conclusions arrived at by the first respondent, unless the reasons are perverse or arbitrary or suffer from an error apparent on the face of the record, this Court will not be justified in interfering with the impugned proceedings passed by the first respondent after careful consideration.

On the merits, learned counsel for the petitioner rightly accepted that it is subjective satisfaction of the first respondent, who is the transferring authority and this Court further holds that no case has been mace out in this respect. Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, contended that the Commissioner of Income-tax, the first respondent herein---is not the competent authority but it IS the Chief Commissioner, who could pass orders.

In this respect, it is relevant to quote subsection (2)(a) of section 127 of the income-tax Act, which reads thus:

"Where the Assessing Officer or Assessing Officers from whom the case is to be transferred and the Assessing Officer or Assessing Officers to whom the case is to be transferred are not subordinate to the same Director-General or Chief Commissioner or Commissioner,---

(a) where the Directors-General or Chief Commissioner or Commissioners to whom such Assessing Officers are subordinate are in agreement, then the Director-General or Chief Commissioner or Commissioner from whose jurisdiction the case is to be transferred may, after giving the assessee a reasonable opportunity of being heard in matter, wherever it is possible to do so, and after recording his reasons for doing so, pass the order. "

The above statutory provision enables either the Director-General or Chief Commissioner or Commissioner to whom such Assessing Officers are subordinate and if the said transferring authorities are in agreement, then either the Director-General or Chief Commissioner or Commissioner from whose jurisdiction the case is to be transferred, after affording the assessee a reasonable opportunity of being heard, could order transfer for reasons to be recorded. Thus, all the three authorities are competent and the present impugned proceedings have been passed by the Commissioner of Income-tax.

In terms of section 127(2)(a) of the said Act, the Commissioner--the first respondent herein---is competent to order transfer. The contentions -raised by learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be sustained.

Learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the judgment reported in Rajasthan Mining and Engineering (P.) Ltd. v. CIT (1997) 142 CTR 329 (Raj.), where a single Judge of the Rajasthan High Court had occasion to consider an order of transfer and quashed the order of transfer as invalid as no reasons have been recorded. One of the contention that has been raised before the Rajasthan High Court being that being the Commissioner of Income-tax of Jaipur, he has no power to transfer the case to Cuttack and that he could only transfer the cases. If permissible under law to the file of any Income-tax Officer subordinate to him in area and not to the Commissioner of Income-tax, Cuttack It was further contended in the said case that such a transfer could be ordered only by the Director-General, who is incharge of all the Income-tax Departments in the country. But the learned Judge just made a reference to the contentions raised by learned counsel for the petitioner therein and had not decided the said point, as there were other grounds on which the order of transfer has been quashed. In the said decision, this aspect had not been decided, as the learned Judge had decided the writ petition on the ground that the impugned order did not contain reasons. However, this Court is of the considered view that the Director General or Chief Commissioner or Commissioner has been conferred with concurrent jurisdiction to order transfer as in the present case.

The order of transfer is not a stigma nor could it be considered as if it is of penal nature. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that it is only the Director-General who could only order transfer cannot be sustained.

Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that after the Commissioner agreeing with the proposal for transfer, the present notice has been issued and, therefore, the Commissioner had already made up his mind and, thereafter, issued a notice, which is only a formality and it would be in violation of the principles of natural justice. It is further submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that having agreed to the proposal or the move of the Commissioner, the first respondent should not have decided the matter, but it would have been decided by some other authority. This contention also cannot be sustained. When the second respondent, the Commissioner of Income-tax, Central Circle, New Delhi, sends the proposal, it is open to the first respondent to agree and if the first respondent concurs with the second respondent, thereafter a show-cause notice could be issued in terms of the said provision.

Objections; if any, submitted to the show-cause notice is considered by the first respondent and the orders are being passed by the first respondent. Where the two Commissioners are not in agreement, the order transferring the case has to be passed by the Board or such Director-General as the Board may, by notification, authorise in this behalf, which would fall under clause (b) of subsection (2) of section 127 of the said Act.

In a case falling under subsection (3) of section 127 of the said Act the procedure prescribed under subsection (1) and subsection (2) need not be followed as it is within the same city or jurisdiction or from one Assessing Officer to another Assessing Officer in the same city or locality or place. Subsection (2) of section 127 of the Act prescribes the procedure and the said procedure has been followed in the present case. Merely because the Commissioner, the first respondent, had concurred with the second respondent, it cannot be assumed that there has been violation of the principles of natural justice or the first respondent, who had issued the show cause notice is disqualified to decide the question of transfer. If such a contention is to be accepted, then every authority, who issues a show-cause notice would be disqualified or would be disabled from passing orders after considering and hearing objections. Such a proposition is farfetched and cannot be appreciated.

The order of transfer,, is a discretionary order and for reasons recorded, the authority competent could order transfer of the case. In other words, at the time when the first respondent-Commissioner had agreed with the proposal, he had prima facie concurred with the second respondent Commissioner for the transfer of the case and, thereafter, issued a notice. After considering the objections, it is still open to the first respondent to sustain the objections raised and decline to transfer the case. Merely because the first respondent-Commissioner had come to a prima facie conclusion or concurred with the second respondent, it cannot be held that he has prejudged the issue and he should not have passed an order. Such a contention cannot be sustained and it is rejected. Only when the first respondent-Commissioner agrees or arrives at a consensus with the second respondent, issue of show-cause notice arises and it is only a prima facie view and it is not as if the first respondent after considering the objections, cannot sustain the objections.

Learned counsel for the petitioner next contended faintly that the transfer of a case for co-ordinated investigation cannot be a valid ground and on this ground, the impugned proceedings ate liable to be quashed. Before considering the contentions, this Court his to necessarily refer to the portions of the orders, which necessitated the transfer of the petitioner's case. A search rind seizure operation was conducted under section 132 of the Income tax Act in the petitioner's premises on November 6. 1996, as part of a larger operation conducted at the premises of Sri S. Krishnakumar, ex-Minister, and his business associates. During the search and seizure, documents seized were instruments of partnership executed at Madras by the partners of the petitioner firm including Smt. L. Sridevi Pillai, mother-in-law of the ex- Minister, Shri S. Krishnakumar, and Mr. M.A. Karim. The partnership deed, dated September 20, 1994, between the said Smt. L. Sri Devi Pillai, Mr. Adarsh Kumar, Mr. M.A. Karim and Sinju A. Karim was also seized and the said partnership deed was executed to carry on the business of trade and export of gods under the name and style of General Exporters at Madras. Mr. Adarsh Kumar is the son of the said ex-Minister, S. Krishnakumar. The said Smt. Sri Devi Pillai and Mr. Adarsh Kumar are the partners in the firm, General Exporters, which is already assessed in the Central Circle VIII, New Delhi.

According to the first partnership deed, dated September 20, 1994, the said Mrs. Sri Devi Pillai and Mr. Adarsh Kumar had a profit-sharing right of 40 per cent. and 40 per cent. in the said firm and the balance being shared by other partners, while in the second instrument of partnership, dated October 5, 1994, the said Sri Davi Pillai had a profit-sharing ratio of 80 per cent. Though there is some variance in the profit-sharing ratio, the fact remains that the said Sri Devi Pillai and Mr. Adarsh Kumar, respectively, mother-in-law and son of Shri S. Krishnakumar, ex-Minister, have substantial share in the profit-sharing ratio. The said two persons were being assessed at New Delhi.

As per the materials recovered during the search and seizure, which are available with the second respondent, the second respondent applied his mind and came to the conclusion that it is essential to have a co-ordinated investigation of the said group of cases. The search and seizure in the premises of Shri S. Krishnakumar, ex-Minister, revealed that the said two persons are close relatives and business associate and the recovery of documents necessitated co-ordinated investigation by the Department and this consequently necessitated the transfer of the petitioner's case also to the Assessing Officer at New Delhi.

Taking into consideration the above fact, the second respondent had apprised the first respondent of the necessity of transfer of the petitioner's case from Madras to New Delhi and the first respondent, prima facie, concurred with the proposal of the second respondent, issued the show-cause notice and, thereafter, passed the orders of transfer, after affording sufficient opportunity and after recording reasons for the transfer.

The main objection that has been raised by the petitioner being that instead of transferring the case to Delhi, the case at Delhi may be transferred to Madras, which aspect of the matter has been considered by the first respondent. So also the objection that the petitioner would be put to irreparable loss has also been considered. The first respondent has held thus:

'This is a clear case where the Commissioner of Income-tax, Central II, New Delhi, and the Commissioner of Income-tax, Tamil Nadu III (myself), are in clear agreement that the case is to be assessed alongwith the other connected cases by the Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, Central Circle 8, New Delhi. There is a clear connection between the assessee-firm and close relatives of Shri S. Krishnakumar who are being assessed at Delhi. The asscssees' objection that the file cannot be transferred in order to facilitate co-ordinated investigation and that this itself is an irrelevant circumstance, is also not accepted and I am supported by the Court decisions already cited in paragraphs 1.5, 1 6, 17, 18, 19 and 20. Again, the assessees objection that he could be put to irreparable, loss and inconvenience if he is made to travel to Delhi, is not accepted as in any case, the partners to not reside in Madras. Even in their writ petition before the High Court of Madras in W.P. No.9731 of 1997 in June, 1997. Shri M.A. Karim, managing partners, has stated that he is residing at Quilon. It was also found that nobody is residing at the business address given in No. 3, 3rd Cross Street, Sylvan Lodge Colony, Chennai-10, when notices were sent for service and the Income-tax Inspector had to go and serve it by affixture on the address. He has stated that though there was a sign board by name of General Exporters, there was no sign of any business activity being carried out in that premises. The assessee's auditor's Shri B.R. Rao & Co., have also stated in their letter, dated September 23, 1997, that, 'there is no business in General Exporters as at present'. Therefore, no inconvenience will be caused to the assessee by transferring the file from Madras to Delhi. In any case, the High Court decisions already cited also make it very clear that inconvenience and entailment of extra expenditure to the assessee will not constitute a valid ground for not transferring the case. Therefore, after examining the assessee's petitions, I do not accept the same. I am of the opinion that in order to have co-ordinated investigation in this group of cases, the assessee-firm is to be transferred to the Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, Central circle 8, New Delhi."

On a consideration of the above reasons, set out in paragraph 22 of the impugned proceedings, this Court is of the firm view that there are more than sufficient reasons which warranted the transfer of the petitioner's case from Madras to New Delhi.

In Maheshwari Lime Works v. CIT (1984) 147 ITA 804 (MP), an identical objection was considered by a Division Bench of the Madya Pradesh High Court. The, Division Bench, while, rejecting the identical contention, held thus (page 806):

"The objection of the petitioners that they have to incur a lot of expenditure in travelling to and. from Katni to Jabalpur and back has been duly considered by the Commissioner and the Income-tax Officer, Special Investigation Circle-II, Jabalapur, has been directed to take hearing of these cases as far as possible at Katni. Shri Sanghi, learned counsel for the Commissioner, assured that for the purpose of disposing of these cases, the petitioners would not be required to come to Jabalpur as the Income-tax, Officer, Special Investigation Circle-II: Jabalpur, will be camping at Katni. The petitioners have no legal right to insist that their assessment case be tried by a particular officer, simply because he is a senior-officer. The Commissioner is the best Judge as to who should decide these cases. It appears that there was a raid in the premises of the petitioners on May 12, 1981. The search and seizures were challenged in a writ petition in this Court, which was dismissed, although the account books were ordered to be returned. On scrutiny it has been found that several parties were concerned with the transactions entered into with the petitioners. Under the circumstances, the Commissioner was justified in ordering that the cases be handled by the Income-tax Officer, Special Investigation Circle-II, Jabalpur, who generally deals with such cases. It has also been mentioned that because of the routine cases it may not be possible for the Income-tax Officer, Katni, to complete a thorough scrutiny and detailed investigation before completing the assessment. "

In Bhatia Minerals v. CIT (1993) 200 ITR 591 (All), a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court had occasion to consider as to whether the reasons to have a co-ordinated investigation, is a valid ground for transfer and in that context, it has been held thus (page 593):

"The petitioner's counsel strongly urged that the cases should not be transferred to Meerut but should remain at Dehradun for otherwise, the petitioner will face a lot of hardship. We are not inclined to accept this submission. The allegations in the counter-affidavit indicate that threats were given to the Income-tax Officers and difficulties were created in their official work. It becomes thus evident that an Income-tax Officer at Dehradun may not be able to work properly and may get threats in future also. It is hence best if the assessment work of the group is done at a place away from Dehradun.

Learned counsel for the petitioner placed before us the decisions of the' Andhra Pradesh High Court reported in Vijayasanthi Investments (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Chief CIT (1991) 187 ITR 405 and Saptagrir Enterprises v. CIT (1991) 189 ITR 705, in support of his contention that the expression 'co-ordinated investigation's is vague, but in view of the decision of our Court in Peacock Chemicals (P.) Ltd. v. CIT (1990) 182 ITR 98 (All), with which we respectfully agree, we are not inclined to follow the decisions of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. With regard to the decisions of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Sagramal Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. v. CBDT (1972) 83 ITR 130, it may only be mentioned that, subsequently, the Madhya Pradesh High Court has taken a contrary view in Maheswari Lime Works v. CIT (1984) 147 ITR 804. The Delhi High Court (sic) has also taken a view which is in consonance with the view of out Court. " '

In Sameer Leasiug Co. Ltd, v, Chairman, CBDT (1990) 185 ITR 129 (Delhi), a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court held thus (page 133):

"The power under section 127 of the Act is to be exercised in publicinterest and in the interest of, administration of the Act. In order to safeguard the interest of the assessee, an opportunity of being heard is granted and the section further requires reasons to be stated for transferring a case. The decision to transfer can be taken, in a case like the present, only if there is a concurrence between the two Commissioners of Income-tax who may be concerned with the transfer. When such high functionaries agree to the transfer and a show-cause notice is issued and reasons are contained in the order of transfer and those reasons appear to be germane to the transfer and show that the transfer has been made in the public interest and for a proper adjudication under the Act, we do not see how the impugned provision can be said to be ultra vines."

In Jharkhand Mukti Morcha v. CIT (1997) 225 ITR 284, the Ranchi Bench of the Patna High Court, after referring to Sameer Leasing Co. Ltd. v. Chariman, CBDT (1990) 185 ITR 129 (Delhi); V.K. Steel Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Assistant CIT (1991) 187 ITR 403 (AP) and Vijayasanathi Investments (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Chief CIT (1991) 187 ITR 405 (AP), preferred to follow the decision reported in Assam Surgical Co. v. CBDT (1984) 145 ITR 400 (Gauhati) and Bhatia Minerals v. CIT (1993) 200 ITR 591 (All), as against the view of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Vijayasanthi Investments (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Chief CIT (1991) 187 ITR 405 and further held thus (page 295):

"Apart from the Delhi and Allahabad High Courts, the Gauhati High Court in the case of Assam Surgical Co. v. CBDT (1984) 145 ITR 400, the Rajasthan High Court ~in the case of Shri Rishikul Vidyapeeth v. Union of -India (1982) 1.36 ITR 139 and the Calcutta High Court in the case of Dwarka Prosad Agarwalla v. Director of Inspection (1982) 137 ITR 456, have held that facility of investigation or co-ordinated investigation is a substantial ground for transfer from one officer to another officer.

As noticed above, the very object of transfer is to achieve the object of the Act. If co-ordinated investigation is necessary for the purpose of proper assessment, prevention of evasion of tax, collection of tax and other relevant matters, then proper and co ordinated investigation is a good ground for transfer of the case. It cannot be laid down as a proposition of law that the said ground cannot be a ,valid ground for transfer. In a given case the same may not be a good ground for transfer, on being noticed that the co ordinated investigation in no way will help to achieve the object of the Act. No doubt, transfer of a case from the place where the assessee has its place of residence or business to another place causes inconvenience but if it is necessary in the public interest then the transfer on the ground of proper and co-ordinated investigation cannot be held to be impermissible in law. I find myself in disagreement with the view that co-ordinated or centralised investigation will not be a ground of transfer under section 127 of the Act. I am in agreement with the view taken by the different High Courts as mentioned above holding that proper and co ordinated investigation would be a relevant ground to exercise the power under section 127 of the Act."

This Court is in respectful agreement with the view taken in Assam Surgical Co. v. CBDT (1984) 145 ITR 400 (Gauhati) and Sameer Leasing Co. Ltd. v. Chairman, CBDT (1990) 185 ITR 129 (Delhi) and, on the facts of the case-this Court holds that the first respondent is well-founded and well-justified in considering the request of the second respondent to transfer the petitioner's case to Delhi in order to have co-ordinated investigation alongwith Shri S. Krishnakumar group of cases. Further, there is every justification for the first respondent to order transfer of the petitioner's case to New Delhi and no interference is called for with respect to the impugned proceedings.

Learned counsel for the petitioner had not placed any Division Bench judgment of this Court taking a contrary view by following the view of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Vijayasmanthi Investments (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Chief CIT (1991) 187 ITR 405.

The writ petition is dismissed, with costs of Rs.3,500 (rupees three thousand five hundred only). Consequently, W.M.P. No.27432 of 1997 is also dismissed.

M.B.A./654/FCPetition dismissed.