BHAGWANDAS JAIN VS DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAX
2001 P T D 1934
[246 I T R 632]
[Madras High Court (India)]
Before S.K. Kulshrestha, J
BHAGWANDAS JAIN and 3 others
Versus
DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAX and another
Miscellaneous Petitions Nos.2671 and 2637 of 1988 and 3590 and 3634 of 1989, decided on 25/01/2000.
(a) Wealth tax‑‑‑---
‑‑‑‑Reassessment‑‑‑Assessment for assessment years 1979‑80 to 1981‑82 obtaining finality in 1984‑‑‑Reassesssment notices issued in 1988 on basis of a report of Valuation Officer‑‑‑Report of Valuation Officer not called for during pendency of assessment but after completion of assessment‑‑ Valuation report relating to valuation dates from December, 1981 to December, 1984‑‑‑Reopening of assessment on basis of valuation report not valid‑‑‑Notices for reassessment liable to be quashed‑‑‑Indian Wealth Tax Act, 1957, S.17.
(b) Wealth tax‑‑‑---
‑‑‑‑Reassessment‑‑‑Writ‑‑‑Firm‑‑‑Partners of firm issued reassessment notices‑‑‑Some partners agitating matter by way of appeal‑‑‑Other partners directed to pursue similar remedy to avoid anomalous situation‑‑Writ petitions dismissed‑‑‑Indian Wealth Tax Act, 1957‑‑‑Constitution of India, Art. 226.
For the assessment years 1979‑80 to 1981‑82, the partners of a firm were assessed in respect of their share of property in the firm. Certain additions in the valuation of assets were made and the additions were deleted by the Tribunal on appeal. The assessment attained finality in 1984. Notices, dated February 19, 1988, were issued under section 17 of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957, for reopening the assessment on the basis of a valuation report. On a writ petition challenging the notices as illegal and without jurisdiction:
Held, (i) that the report of the Valuation Officer was not called for during the pendency of the assessment but only after its completion. Further, the valuation reports related to the valuation dates December, 1981 to December, 1984, and could have no relevance to the previous years relevant to the assessment years 1979‑80 to 1981‑82 for which assessments were made. Accordingly, the valuation report could not furnish any basis for reopening the assessment for the assessment years 1979‑80 to 1981‑82. The reassessment notices were accordingly liable to be quashed.
(ii) That for the assessment years 1982‑83 and 1983‑84, reassessment notices were issued to all the partners of the firm. Since some of the partners had resorted to alternative remedy and had agitated the matter by way of appeal, the other partners had to pursue their remedy in accordance with the machinery provided under the Act in order to avoid an anomalous situation.
CWT v. Gulnar Marfatia (Smt.) (1986) 159 ITR 311 (Raj.); Lall (B.) (Brig.) v. WTO (1981) 127 ITR 308 (Raj.); Lokendra Singh Rathore v. WTO (1985) 153 ITR 466 (MP); Maharaja Martand Singh Ju Deo (H.H.) v. WTO (2000) 242 ITR 229 (MP) and Ramdas Prabhu (K.M.) v. First WTO (1987) 166 ITR 706 (Kar.) ref.
B.L. Nema, Senior Advocate with Ku. S. Agrawal for Petitioners.
Rohit Arya for Respondents.
JUDGMENT
The petitioners in the above writ petitions are partners in the firm, Bhagwandas Shobhalal Jain, Sagar, and have challenged the notices issued to them under section 17 of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957, on similar facts and grounds. All these petitions are, therefore, being disposed of by this common order.
The petitioners in M.P. No.2637 of 1988 and M.P. No.2671 of 1988 were assessed to wealth tax for the assessment years 1979‑80; 1980‑81 and 1981‑82, in respect of their share of property in the firm. The assessment was made by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Wealth Tax (Assessment) (presently designated as Deputy Commissioner of Wealth Tax (Assessment)), and certain additions in the valuation of the assets were made and assessment orders Annexures A, A‑1 and A‑2 were passed. Against the said additions, the petitioners had filed appeals before the Commissioner of Wealth Tax (Appeals), Jabalpur, who confirmed the additions by orders Annexures B, B‑1 and B‑2. However, on further appeal being filed before the Income‑tax Appellate Tribunal, Jabalpur, against the order of the First Appellate Authority, the additions made .by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Wealth Tax (Assessment) were deleted vide orders Annexures C and C‑1. After the assessments had thus, attained finality in the year 1984 notices, dated February 19, 1988, were issued by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income‑tax (Assessment), Jabalpur, under the provisions of section 17 of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957, which the petitioners have challenged in these petitions as illegal and without jurisdiction. The petitioners have filed copies of notices as Annexures D, D‑1 and D‑2.
The petitioners in M.P. No.3590 of 1989 and M.P. No.3634 of 1989 were likewise assessed to wealth tax for the years 1982‑83 and 1983‑84 and the additions made to the valuation by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Wealth Tax were challenged by them in appeals before the Commissioner of Wealth Tax (Appeals), who by his orders Annexures B and B‑1 had confirmed the additions. In further appeal before the Income‑tax Appellate Tribunal, the additions were maintained by orders Annexures C and C‑1 passed respectively on May 9, 1985, and September 2, 1986. Thereafter, these petitioners were issued notice (Annexure D) under the provisions of section 17 of the Wealth tax Act, which they have challenged. by these petitions under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India.
The respondents have filed a return in which the respondents have raised a preliminary objection with regard to the maintainability of‑ the petitions on the ground that the petitioners have the opportunity of filing a reply and to seek redressal of their grievance under the machinery provided in the Act and reference has also been made to sections 23, 24 and 25 of the Wealth Tax Act providing for appeals and revisions, in support of the contention that even if they feel aggrieved by the order that may be passed by the Assessing Officer, they have an opportunity of filing appeal and revision as provided in the Act.
In so far as the petitioners in M.P. No.2637 of 1988 and M.P. No.2671 of 1988 are concerned, since a pure question of law and jurisdiction is involved, the petitioners cannot be left to seek remedy provided under the Act and in any case, not at this distance of time in relation to the petitions which were filed long back in the year 1988. The assessment years for which the petitioners in these two petitions were assessed to wealth tax under the Act were 1979‑80, 1980‑81 and 1981‑82: Learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to the provisions of section 17 of the Act as it stood during the relevant period and has pointed out that it is not a case where there has been any omission or failure on the part of the petitioners to make a return of their net wealth for the assessment years in question or to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for the assessment of the net wealth that the impugned notices under the said provision have been issued, but the respondents have relied upon a report of the Valuation officer to whom, it appears, reference was made after the assessments had already been closed, to assess the fair market value and on the basis of the report obtained when no assessment was pending, the notices have been issued. Learned counsel submits that such a reference under the provisions of section 16A could not have been made as after the assessment had been closed, there was no occasion for the respondents to make any assessment and to seek such report from the Valuation Officer. Learned counsel for the Revenue has, however, referred to the provisions of section 2(cb) and contended that since assessment includes reassessment, such a report can be called even during reassessment, with the result, the report of the Valuation Officer can furnish valid foundation for reopening the assessment in case it is found on that basis that the wealth chargeable to tax had escaped assessment by reason of under assessment or assessment at too low a rate or otherwise as provided in section 17(1)(b).
Learned counsel for the petitioner has invited attention to the decision of the Rajasthan High Court in CWT v. Sint. Gulnar Marfatia (1986) 159 ITR 311 and to the decision of the Karnataka High Court in K.M. Ramadas Prabhu v. First WTO (1987) 166 ITR 706, in support of his contention that where no proceedings are pending before the Wealth Tax Officer, it is not permissible to make a reference to the Valuation Officer tinder section 16A of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957 and the report of the Valuation Officer cannot form the basis for reassessment proceedings under section 17(i)(a) or (b) of the Act. The respondents in the preliminary submissions in their return paragraph 2 have stated as under:
"That the petitioner is a partner in the firm, Bhagwandas Shobhalal Jain, Sager. During the course of assessment proceedings for later assessment years, the Assessing Officer noticed that the value of interest of the assessee in the partnership firm in respect of the assets in the shape of immovable properties was much more than what was declared in the return of net wealth for the relevant assessment years. The Assessing Officer made a reference under section 16A of the Wealth Tax Act to the District Valuation Officer for ascertaining the fair market value for wealth tax purposes as on the valuation dates December, 1981 to December, 1984. The District Valuation Officer (Incharge Tax Department), Jaipur, vide his Report No.SC(V)/WT‑342/1984‑85/196, dated May 15/19,. 1986, furnished the valuation report. As per the said valuation report, the value of immovable assets owned by the aforesaid partnership firm as on the date of valuation, December, 1981, was determined at Rs. 1,55,37,000 as against Rs.28,24,429 disclosed by the assessee. The Assessing Officer completed the wealth tax assessment in respect of some assessment years reopening the cases ruder section 17 of the Wealth Tax Act in the case of the petitioner and other partners of the firm. In these assessments, the fair market value of the interest of the petitioner in the assets of the partnership firm was assessed on the basis of the aforesaid valuation report. On the basis of information in the possession of the Assessing Officer, the value of the interest of the petitioner in the assets of the partnership firm was much more than shown and assessed and therefore, the Assessing Officer issued notices under section 17 of the Wealth Tax Act for the assessment years mentioned in the petition. "
It is clear from the statement made by the respondents that it was only in the later assessment years that the Assessing Officer had made a reference under section 16A of the Wealth Tax Act to the Valuation Officer for ascertaining the fair market value for the purposes of the wealth tax. In the decision of the Rajasthan High Court in CWT v. Sint. Gulnar Marfatia (1986) 159 ITR 311, reliance was placed on an earlier decision in Brig. B. Lal v. WTO (1981) 127 ITR 308, 328 (Raj.), to the following observation (page 312):
"Section 16A has got no relevancy and cannot be applied after the assessment is complete and before reassessment has commenced, that is, for the purposes of consideration of the question whether a completed assessment can be reopened or not or, in other words, to decide and consider the question whether the valuation accepted by the Wealth Tax Officer was a case of wealth escaping assessment on account of under valuation. Any reference made under section 16A cannot lead to the reopening of .a closed assessment under section 17(1) as the report submitted by the Valuation Officer would be in an invalid reference and must be treated as a nullity in the eye of law, non est and void ab initio .... The report so obtained can neither constitute information within the meaning of section 17(1)(b) nor can it become a reason for the belief with in the meaning of section 17(1)(a)."
In the present case, as per the statement in the return, as referred to above, the report of the Valuation Officer had not been called for during the pendency of the assessment but only after its completion. There is yet another infirmity in the reopening of the assessment. As is clear from the return, the valuation report was obtained about valuation of the property as on the valuation dates December, 1981, to December, 1984. In so far as the petitions M.P. Nos.2637 and 2671 of 1988 are concerned, assessment was made for the periods 1979‑$0, 1980‑81 and 1981‑82 and since the valuation report, even as per the return of the respondents, relates to the valuation dates December, 1981, to December, 1984, and can have no relevance to the previous years relating to these assessment years in which the last such date could at the most be March 31, 1981, the valuation report could otherwise not have furnished any basis for reopening the assessment for the assessment years 1979‑80, 1980‑81 and 1981‑82 on the ground that on the basis of the said report, the net wealth chargeable to tax had escaped assessment or had been under assessed or assessed at too low a rate. It is, therefore, clear that notwithstanding the objection that such a report could not have been called for where the proceedings were not pending, the notices for reassessment on the basis of the report in reference to any of the previous years relevant to the assessment years in question, could not have been issued. The petitions M.P. Nos.2637 of 1988 and 2671 of 1988, thus, deserve to be allowed.
The case of the petitioners in M.P. Nos.3590 of 1989 and 3634 of 1989 is, however, different. In these cases, the assessment relates to the periods 1982‑83 and 1983‑84. Apart from the preliminary objection raised by the respondents with regard to the alternative remedy available in accordance with the machinery provided by the Act, the respondents have further pointed out that in relation to similar notices issued to other partners of the firm, the assessees had agitated the matter up to the stage of the Income tax Appellate Tribunal, and the Tribunal, by its common order, dated September 23, 1986, had directed the Assessing Officer to examine all the aspects in accordance with law after giving hearing to the assessees against which the reference under section 27(3) of the Act was rejected by the High Court. It has further been stated that in relation to the petition M.P. No.3639 of 1989 filed by the partners, Hukumchand Jain, for the assessment years 1982‑83 and 1983‑84, the statement was made that on account of the subsequent events, the petition had become infructuous and the petition was dismissed and likewise the petitions M.P. Nos.3591 and 3638 both of 1989 were dismissed as withdrawn. Learned counsel for the respondents has invited my attention to a recent order, dated April 19, 1999, of the Income tax Appellate Tribunal, Jabalpur, passed in similar cases of other partners of the firm in support of his contention that since other partners have pursued the remedy available under the Act in respect of the assessment years 1982‑83 and 1983‑84, these petitions should also be left to seek the same remedy. Learned counsel for the petitioners has, however, urged that apart from the fact that the report had been called for not in any pending assessment, since the belief about escapement of I assessment or underassessment was not based on any cogent material to lead to any such conclusion, the assessing authority had no jurisdiction to issue such notice and, therefore, the impugned notices deserve to be quashed and reference has been made to the decision of this Court in Lokendra Singh Rathore v. WTO (1985) 153 ITR, 466 and also in H.H. Maharaja Martand Singh Ju Deo v. WTO (2000) 242 ITR 229 (MP). Learned counsel has further contended that, since it was open to the assessing authority to have referred the matter to the Valuation Officer during the assessment and there was no failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for assessment merely because proper investigation was not carried out by oversight, carelessness or inefficiency, the assessing authority had no power to reopen the assessment.
As seen from the return of the respondents, some of the partners have pursued the remedy in accordance with the machinery provided under the. Act and, therefore, it would not be proper to bring about an anomalous situation, by considering the matter in these two writ petitions especially when in similar matters, observations have already been made on reference being sought under section 27(3) of the Act by this Court. In a situation like this, these petitioners should also be left to seek the remedy in accordance with the machinery provided under the Act as has been done by the other partners of the same firm.
In the result, the petitions M.P. Nos.2637 of 1988 and 2671 of 1988 are allowed and the impugned notices under section 17 of the Act are quashed. The petitions M.P. No.3590 of 1989 and M.P No.3634 of 1989 are dismissed‑ with liberty to the petitioners to pursue remedy provided under the Act. There shall be no order as to costs.
M.B.A./516/FCOrder accordingly.