MESSRS USMANI ASSOCIATES SUB PROPRIETARY FIRM VS CENTRAL BOARD OF REVENUE
2001 P T D 2982
[Karachi High Court]
Before Sabihuddin Ahmed and Zahid Kurban Alavi, JJ
Messrs USMANI ASSOCIATES SUB PROPRIETARY FIRM
versus
CENTRAL BOARD OF REVENUE and another
Constitutional Petition No.D‑646 of 1999; decided on 22/03/2001.
Per Zahid Kurban Alavi, J.‑‑‑
(a) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)‑‑‑
‑‑‑‑S.3‑‑‑Expression 'Taxable supplies'‑‑‑Connotation‑‑‑Scope of the expression has to be restricted only to ‑such transaction as may amount to ` sale‑‑‑Any extended meaning would render the provision extra -Constitutional.
(b) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)‑‑‑
‑‑‑‑Ss. 3 & 16(34)‑‑‑Sales tax, levy of‑‑‑Condition precedent‑‑‑Expression 'taxable activity'‑‑‑Applicability‑‑‑Tax under the Sales Tax Act, 1990 is charged, levied and paid only when taxable supply is made in the course or furtherance of 'taxable activity, as such the expression 'taxable activity' involves in whole or in part 'the supply of goods to any other person' ‑‑‑Such is the condition precedent for the levy of sales tax.
(c) Interpretation of statutes‑‑‑
‑‑‑‑ Enactment of a statute on subject on which already there is a statute‑‑ Laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation and with full knowledge of all existing ones on the same subject, it is but reasonable to conclude that the Legislature, in passing a statute would not intend to interfere with or abrogate any former, law relating to the same matter; unless the repugnancy between the two is irreconcilable‑‑‑Inconsistency or repugnancy is not to be readily assumed in a statute and attempt should be made to reconcile and give effect to all the provisions.
Ali Ameer v. Dalmia Cement PLD 1961 Kar. 255; Said Omer v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 1956 Lah. 382; Messrs Karachi Steam Navigation Company Limited v. Messrs Abdul Rehman Abdul Ghani PLD 1962 SC 90; Gul Khan and others v. The State PLD 1986 Kar. 629 and Construction of Statutes by Crawford, para. 166 ref.
(d) Interpretation of statutes‑‑‑
‑‑‑‑Change in existing statute‑‑‑Object of the change in the law if any, is to be ascertained.
(e) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)‑‑‑
‑‑‑‑S. 3(a) [as amended by Finance Act (IX of 1996)]‑‑‑Substituting word 'business' by expression 'taxable activity'‑‑‑Effect‑‑‑Such amendment in S.3(a) of Sales Tax Act, 1990, was intended to bring about a change in the existing law and was to narrow down the scope of the charging section.
Construction of Statutes by Crawford para. 166 ref.
(f) Maxim‑‑‑
-----"Leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant (subsequent laws repeal prior contrary laws)‑‑‑Applicability‑‑‑When the existing provision of law is absolutely contradictory to. or inconsistent with the amending provision maxim leges posteriores priores contrarias . abrogant comes into play.
Construction of Statutes by Crawford, para. 166 and Ahmed Saeed Kirmani, M.L.A. v. Fazal Illahi, Speaker, West Pakistan Assembly PLD 1956 Lah. 807 ref.
(g) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)‑‑‑
‑‑‑‑S. 16(33)(34)‑‑‑Expressions 'supply' and 'taxable activity'‑‑‑Defined and distinguished‑‑‑Both Ss.16(33) & 16(34) can be so construed in the light of rules of Interpretation of Statute that full effect can be given to the both‑‑‑To achieve this object, definition of 'supply' has to be construed in such a manner that it does not offend against expression 'involves in whole or in part the supply of goods to any other person'‑‑‑Such can be done, if, instead of giving a very wide and extended meaning to the expression putting to private business or non‑business use", it is restricted to disposition of goods to any other person, keeping self‑use or in‑house use for the manufacture of finished exempt goods outside of its purview‑‑‑Person, who supplies taxable goods to his wife or to his son even without consideration would be deemed to have made a taxable supply chargeable with sales tax‑‑‑Supply of goods to another person for the purpose of charity, without consideration, would similarly fall Within the scope of charging section‑‑‑Interpreted in such manner the activity sought to be taxed would remain within Constitutional limits of taxation on 'sale' otherwise it would transgress the said limits and would be rendered ultra vires of the Constitution‑‑‑If, however, restricted meaning is not assigned to the definition of 'supply', then either cf. (a) of the definition of 'supply' will have to be treated as absolutely superfluous or phrase 'supply of goods to any other person' in the definition of 'taxable activity' will have to be treated as surplus‑‑‑While interpreting the two terms appearing in the charging section, choice is to be made between treating the phrase 'putting to private, business or non‑business use' as surplus, or treating the phrase 'involves in whole or part, the supply of goods to any other person' as superfluous, or stretching or restricting the scope of any of the two expressions referred to above in any or both the definitions, so as to reconcile the two apparently conflicting provisions and harmonize them‑‑ While making the choice one should not be oblivious of the principle that no part or word of the statute is to be held as surplusage.
East and West Steamship Co. v. Queensland Insurance Co. PLD 1963 SC 663 ref.
(h) Interpretation of statutes‑‑‑
‑‑‑‑ No part or word of a statute is to be held as surplusage.
(i) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)‑‑‑
‑‑‑‑S. 16(34)‑‑‑Expressions 'any activity carried on in the form of a business, trade and manufacture'‑‑‑Effect‑‑‑Where term 'manufacture' has been used in the definition of 'taxable activity.' alongwith expression 'trade and business' at the end, the expression 'any activity carried on in the form of a business, trade and manufacture' used at end of the definition is to be read in conjunction with 'any activity which is carted on by any person' in the beginning of the definition of 'taxable activity'.
(j) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)‑‑‑
‑‑‑‑S. 16(34)‑‑‑Expressions 'whether or not for a pecuniary profit' and 'whether for any consideration or otherwise' appearing in definition of 'taxable activity'‑‑‑ Connotation‑‑‑Where the two expressions interpolated in the middle of the definition clause, the same are meant to cover the entire spectrum of possible motives for an activity.
(k) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)‑‑‑
‑‑‑‑S.16(34)‑‑‑Term 'taxable activity'‑‑‑Interpretation‑‑‑Term 'taxable activity' would mean 'any activity' including any activity in the form of business, trade or manufacture which is carted on by any person, and involves in whole or in part, the supply of goods to any other person, whether or not for any pecuniary profit or for any consideration or otherwise‑‑‑Read in such manner, expression 'any activity carried on in the form of any business, trade or manufacture' used in the end of the definition of 'taxable activity' does not seem to have the effect of making a supply, which is not made to any other person liable to sales tax.
(l) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)‑‑‑
‑‑‑‑Ss. 2(16)(17)(41)(47), 3 & 16(34)‑‑‑Taxable activity‑‑‑Sales tax, levy of‑‑‑Mere fact, that a supply is taxable or that a person is a manufacturer of that he manufactures or produces goods or is wholesaler within the meaning of S.2(16), (17), (41) or (47) of Sales Tax Act, 1990, is not enough to levy tax on the taxable supply or manufacture or wholesale unless the taxable supply is made in the course or furtherance of taxable activity carried on by him as envisaged by S.3 of Stiles Tax Act, 1990, which is the charging section, as distinguished' from 'business activity, as such these terms by themselves cannot be equated with 'sale'.
(m) Interpretation of statutes‑‑‑
‑‑‑‑ Taxing statute‑‑‑Taxing statutes are to be interpreted strictly‑‑‑Subject will be taxed only if he falls within the strict letter of charging section.
B. P. Biscuit Factory Limited, Karachi v. Wealth Tax Officer and another 1996 SCMR 1470 ref.
(n) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)‑‑‑
‑‑‑‑Preamble‑‑‑Word "sale" appearing in Sales Tax Act, 1990‑‑‑Defined‑‑ Sale in its simple parlance means the transfer of a property from one individual to another on payment of or passing of a consideration‑‑‑Any different interpretation would be against the basic concepts of law‑‑‑To infer and to suggest that goods consumed by a person would also fall within the ambit of a sale and, therefore, the tax shall be levied, such inference or suggestion is far‑fetched and against justice.
(o) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)‑‑‑
‑‑‑‑Ss. 3; 16(34) & 19‑‑‑Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199‑‑ Constitutional petition‑‑‑Sales tax, levy of‑‑‑Taxable activity‑‑‑Compulsory registration under $.19 of Sales Tax Act; 1990‑‑‑Issue in question was regarding compulsory registration of petitioner on the basis of his using pre -cast material in construction of a bridge‑‑‑Authorities while considering the use of pre‑cast material as taxable activity, registered the petitioner under S.19 of Sales Tax Act, 1990, and made a demand of sales tax from the petitioner‑‑‑Validity‑‑‑Petitioner did not supply pre‑cast material as such to any other person‑‑‑Use of such material in the construction ,of a bridge could not be considered a "taxable supply" in the course of furtherance of a taxable activity‑‑‑If private use of goods was held to be liable to sales tax merely because it amounted to sale to self, then expression "involves in whole or in part, the supply of goods to any other person' would have to be declared as surplus or redundant‑‑‑Such an interpretation would be against all canons of interpretation‑‑‑Where the petitioner had undertaken to build bridge and purchased raw material viz. Sarya, cement and concrete, which were already liable to sales tax and were consumed by him in creating that bridge, under no circumstances, it could have created at the intermediatory stage independent marketable products, which could be sold in the market and, therefore, he would be liable to be registered and pay sales tax.
Hunza Central Asian Textile and Woollen Mills Limited's case 1999 SCMR 526 distinguished.
(p) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)‑‑‑
‑‑‑‑S. 16(34)‑‑‑Finance Act (IX of 1996), S.2(33)‑‑‑Expression 'taxable activity' as appearing in S.16(34) of Sales Tax Act, 1990 and S.2(33) of Finance Act, 1996 discussed‑‑‑Definition of the expression under the provisions of .2(35) of Finance Act, 1996, was the same as it stood at the time of enactment of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 as such the definition clearly envisaged the supply of goods to any other person and in that‑ respect it was apparently in direct conflict with S.2(33)(a) of the Finance Act, 1996‑‑‑If there was really a conflict between the two provisions which was irreconcilable, the provision which was inserted in the charging section later in point of time would prevail over the provisions existing earlier, but if the apparent conflict could be reconciled and harmonized so as to give effect to both the provisions, such interpretation would be given effect accordingly.
(q) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)‑‑‑
‑‑‑‑Ss. 3 &.16(34)‑‑‑Sales tax, levy of‑‑‑Semi‑manufactured goods‑‑‑Scope‑‑ No tax should be levied on an individual only on the ground that since a semi‑manufactured goods were capable of independent sale in' the market, therefore, such goods were taxable and fell within the ambit of taxable activity.
(r) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)‑‑‑
‑‑‑‑S. 3 & Preamble‑‑‑Sales tax‑‑‑Object and scope‑‑‑Pre‑cast material used in construction of bridge‑‑‑Levy of sales tax‑‑‑Validity‑‑‑provisions of Sales Tax Act, 1990 showed that‑it was a value added tax, which was levied at every stage, the value addition took place at the time of supply, it was therefore, no more a one‑point levy‑‑‑Pre‑cast material was not separately identifiable goods, which could be sold into market as the same was not marketable because of its particular design, size and specification and as it could not be used in any‑ other fly‑over bridge, building or construction work, it could not be used anywhere except the fly‑over for which it was specifically designed in consideration of multivariable factors‑‑‑Sales tax was leviable only when the, transaction in which the person was involved was completed.
Hunza Central Asian Textile and Woollen Mills Limited 1999 SCMR 526 distinguished.
(s) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)‑‑‑
‑‑‑‑S.3‑‑‑Sales tax, levy of‑‑‑Sales tax becomes leviable only when the transaction in which the person is involved is completed.
Per Sabihuddiun Ahmed, J.‑‑‑
(t) Interpretation of statutes‑‑‑
‑‑‑‑ Taxing statute‑‑‑Striking down statutory provisions‑‑‑When the legislative intent was clear, whereby the tax net had been extended through creation of legal fiction, the Courts were not entitled to nullify it by resorting to an undefined concept of law and justice‑‑‑Statutory provisions could only be struck down after the same was found to be repugnant to any provision of the Constitution and not otherwise.
(u) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)‑‑‑
‑‑‑‑S. 3‑‑‑Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Fourth Sched., Item 49 [as amended] ‑‑‑Sales tax, recovery of‑‑‑Jurisdiction of Federal Government‑‑‑Scope‑‑‑Amendment in Item 49 of Fourth Sched.‑‑‑Object‑‑‑Item 49 of Fourth Sched. to the, Constitution initially spoke of tax on sales and purchases and subsequently through amendment, its ambit was extended to provide for taxes on sales and purchases of goods imported, exported, produced, manufactured or consumed‑‑‑Object of such amendment was to pre‑empt a challenge on the ground that a tax on manufacture, import, export or consumption as distinguished from a sale also came within the, ambit of the Federal Legislative power.
(v) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)‑‑‑
‑‑‑‑S. 3‑‑‑Sales Tax Act (III of 1951), S.13‑‑‑Sales tax, levy of‑‑‑Recovery under the provisions of Sales Tax Act, 1990, and Sales Tax Act, 1951‑‑ Distinction‑‑‑Sales tax payable under Sales Tax Act, 1990, ‑is a value added tax as distinguished from the Sales Tax Act, 1951, where it was one point levy‑‑‑Such distinction, however, does not necessarily lead to the inference that only such activities as may amount to sale of goods in common parlance would fall within the tax net.
(w) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)‑‑
‑‑‑Ss. 3 & 16(34)(41)‑‑‑Finance Act (IX of 1996), S.2(35)‑‑‑Expressions 'taxable supply' and 'taxable activity'‑‑‑Scope‑‑Pre‑cast material used in construction of bridge‑‑‑Sales tax, levy of‑‑‑Quantum of tax liability‑ Determination ‑‑‑Both the expressions operate in their respective fields‑‑‑ Quantum of tax liability was determined on the basis of the value of taxable supply but the liability to pay tax under the charging section would arise only when such supply was made in furtherance of a taxable activity-‑‑Applying the provisions of S.2(35) of Finance Act, 1996, to the facts of the present case, the person while manufacturing the goods in question and using them for the construction of a bridge was engaged in making taxable supplies.
(x) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)‑‑‑
‑‑‑‑Ss. 2(12), 3 & 16(34)‑‑‑Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199‑‑ Constitutional petition‑‑‑Sales tax, levy of‑‑‑Term 'goods'‑‑‑Applicability‑‑ Pre‑cast material used in construction of bridge‑‑‑Petitioner was constructing a bridge in which pre‑cast material was being used‑‑‑Authorities treating the material as taxable activity imposed sales tax on the same ‑‑‑Validity‑‑ Expression 'goods' was defined in S.2(12) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, to include every kind of movable property other than money, stocks etc.‑‑ Bridge which was eventually handed over to the Authority could not be treated as goods‑‑‑Such supply was not made in furtherance of a taxable activity and the petitioner could not be saddled with the liability to pay sales tax in circumstances.
Abdul Aziz Memon for Petitioner.
S. Zaki Muhammad, Dy.A.‑G. for Respondents.
Date of hearing: 22nd March, 2001.
JUDGMENT
ZAHID KURBAN ALAVI, J.‑‑‑This writ petition has been filed to challenge compulsory registration of the petitioner under section 19 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 hereinafter referred to as the Act", whilst certificate Annexure ' D' as being without lawful authority and of no legal consequence. Notices Annexures 'F.H.I. and K' issued to the petitioner by the Superintendent Sales Tax (East), Karachi, pursuant to said certificate Annexure 'D' are also challenged as having been issued without lawful authority.
2. Facts of the case, succinctly stated‑ are that Messrs Railway Construction of Pakistan Ltd. Islamabad were awarded contract by the Karachi Development Authority to execute the project of construction of fly over on Rashid Minhas Road and allied works at Gulshan‑e‑Iqbal, Karachi. The said Company engaged the petitioner with the approval of K.D.A. and both mutually agreed to execute the said project jointly and for that purpose they entered into a sub‑contract agreement, according to which the petitioner is the main Sub‑Contractor, under obligation to construct, complete and maintain the project at an agreed lump sum cost.
3. During construction, the petitioner pre cast certain material and put it in its designated position in the fly over. Since, 'in the opinion of Sales Tax Department, pre‑casting of material for the construction of fly over is‑an act of 'manufacture' as defined in subsection (16) of section 2 of the Act and the use of the said material in the construction of the fly over, is a business activity liable to Sales Tax, Deputy Collector (HQRs.) Sales Tax, East Karachi issued notice, dated 30‑6‑1998 to the petitioner, directing them to get their organization registered with the Sales Tax Department immediately.
4. In their reply to the notice, the petitioner inter alia, took up the position that they did not sell, deliver or supply the‑pre‑cast material as such. The said material was not a marketable commodity because of its particular design, size and specifications. Such material could not be used in any other fly over, bridge building or construction work except the fly over for which it was designed. Besides, it lost separate entity when it was put in its designated position and merged in the fly over, which is not 'goods', as defined in subsection (12) of section 2 'of the Act. It was further contended that the mere act of manufacture did not attract levy of sales tax unless the goods so manufactured were supplied in the course or furtherance of a "taxable activity".
5. The contentions of petitioner did not, however, find favour with respondent No.2, who compulsorily registered the petitioner as 'wholesaler' instead of manufacturer' and issued the impugned certificate of registration to them.
6. Deputy Collector (Law) has filed parawise comments to the petition, pursuant to notice issued to the respondents by this Court. His case, in a nutshell, is that the petitioner is engaged in the manufacture of pre cast material within the meaning of section 2(16) of the Act, and is as such a 'manufacturer's as defined in section 2(17) of the Act. The pre cast material is taxable goods, which is supplied on wholesale basis, in the course of a business activity, to K.D.A., who is its consumer. Business activity as a wholesaler attracts the provisions of section 2 (47) of the Act. The petitioner has, therefore, been rightly registered as wholesaler. Since, the petitioner had not filed returns after their compulsory registration as required by section 26, notices were rightly issued to them under section 11 of the Act. Notices issued to the petitioner are, therefore, claimed to be legal and intra vires. It is also the case of the respondent that the Sales Tax is value added tax (VAT) mode based system and whenever any value addition takes place and goods are sold, the same are chargeable to Sales Tax.
7. It is claimed on behalf of the petitioner that the Sales Tax is a Federal Tax and the Federal Government derives its power of taxation from the Constitution. Article 77 of the Constitution provides that the tax for the Federation can be levied only by or under the authority of the Parliament. Article 70 of the Constitution lays down that only a bill relating to matters falling with in the Federal Legislative list or Concurrent Legislative List can be moved before a House of Parliament. The Concurrent Legislative List; does not include power to impose any tax. Thus, the Federation's authority of taxation is restricted to the items enumerated in the Federal Legislative List more specifically items Nos.43 to 54; item No.49 of which provides for imposition of tax on sales and purchases of goods imported, exported, produced, manufactured and consumed. A cursory glance at the said item would make it clear that Sales Tax Act, 1990, was enacted by the Parliament in exercise of its authority under item 49 (ibid.). Preamble of the Act is also couched in words similar to those appearing in item No.49. Thus, under the Act, tax can be levied only on activities enumerated in the preamble.
8. The Sales Tax Act starts with the preamble "whereas it is expedient to consolidate and amend the law relating to the levy of tax on the sale (importation, exportation, manufacture or consumption) of goods." Further, the Act goes on in its various clauses to define the terms contained in the Act but primarily starts with section 3 where the scope of the tax has been discussed. The scope of the tax from the bare reading of section 3 has been sub‑divided into two portions; (1) taxable supplies made in Pakistan by a registered person in the course or furtherance of any taxable activity carried on by him; (2) goods imported into Pakistan. Section (IA) has been added by Finance Act, 1998 wherein it has been further elucidated that where taxable supplies are made in Pakistan to a person other than registered person there shall be charged levied and paid a further tax. Thereafter, there is a proviso, which stipulates that the additional 3% as contained in section (IA) shall not be charged, levied or paid if the taxable supplies are made by a person registered as a retailer or by any registered person to a person whose income is not liable to tax under the Income Tax Ordinance but has deducted income tax at source.
9. Although, expression "taxable supplies" instead of "sales" has been employed in the charging section, which seems to have wider connotation than term "sales" used in the preamble and in item No‑49 of the Federal Legislative List but in my humble opinion, the scope of the expression shall have to be restricted only to such transactions as may amount to sale. Any extended meaning would render the provision extra‑Constitutional.
10. Three terms/expressions used in the first part of the charging section, have been defined in the Act. These expressions are:‑‑‑
(i) Supply
(ii) Taxable activity
(iii) Taxable supply.
The question to be examined is whether, within the ambit of section 3 of the Act, being the charging section, 'supply' 'taxable activity' and taxable supply' defined in section 2(33), (35) and (41) of the Act, as also 'manufacture' used in definition of taxable activity' as defined in section 2(16) and 'wholesaler' defined in section 2(47) of the Act can be equated with 'sale' even notionally.
11. For ease of reference, it would be necessary to reproduce these terms as defined in the Act ad seriatim;
"16. Manufacture or produce includes‑‑‑
(a) any process in which an article single or in combination with other articles, materials, components, is either converted into another distinct article or product or is so changed, transformed or reshaped that it .becomes capable of being put to use differently or distinctly and includes any process incidental or ancillary to the completion of a manufactured product;
(b)----------------------------------------
(c) process and operations of assembling, mixing, cutting, diluting, bottling, packaging, repackaging or preparation of goods it, any other manner;
(33) 'supply' includes sale, lease or other disposition of goods ill' the course or furtherance of business carried out for consideration and also includes:‑‑‑
(a) putting to private, business or non‑business use of goods acquired, produced or manufactured in the course of business; '
(b)----------------------
(c) ----------------------
(d) ----------------------
(34) 'taxable activity' means any activity which is carried on by any person, whether or not for a pecuniary profit, and involves in Whole or in part, the supply of goods to any other person, whether for any consideration or otherwise, and includes any activity carried on in the form of a business, trade or manufacture;
(41) 'taxable supply' means a supply of taxable goods made in Pakistan by an importer; manufacturer, wholesaler (including dealer), distributor or retailer, other than a supply of goods, which is exempt under section 13 and includes a supply of goods chargeable to tjx at the rate of zero per cent under section 4;
(47) 'Wholesaler' includes a dealer and means any person who curries on, whether regularly or otherwise, the business of buying and selling goods by wholesale or of supplying or distributing goods, directly or indirectly, by wholesale for cash or deferred payment or for commission or other valuable consideration or stores such goods belonging to others as an agent for the purpose of sale; and includes a person supplying taxable goods to person deducting advance tax under subsection (4) of section 50 of the income Tax Ordinance, 1979 (XXXI of 1979), and a person who in addition to making retail supplies is engaged in wholesale business; and‑‑.'
12. Section 3 of the. Act makes it clear that Sales Tax will be charged, levied and paid only when the taxable supply is made in the course or furtherance of "taxable activity". Definition of "taxable activity" lays down in clear and unambiguous terms that it involves in whole or in part, the supply of goods to any other person. In my view, this is the condition precedent for the levy of Sales Tax but a confusion has been created by clause (a) of subsection (33) of section 2 which lays down that "supply" includes putting to private, business or non‑business use of "goods" acquired, produced or manufactured in the course of business.
13. An apparent inconsistency between these two definitions, both of which appear in the charging section, strikes the mind at once while reading the two provisions in juxtaposition. While the definition of "supply" apparently renders even self‑use of taxable goods chargeable to sales tax, the definition of "taxable activity" indicates that the tax can be levied only if the taxable supply is made to any other person. Obviously "self‑use" cannot by any stretch of imagination be equated with supply to "any other person".
14. As the laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation, and with full knowledge of all existing ones on the same subject, it is but reasonable to conclude that the legislature, in passing statute, did not intend to interfere with or abrogate any former law relating to the same matter, unless the repugnancy between the two is irreconcilable.
15. It is, an accepted rule of construction of statutes that inconsistency or repugnancy is not to be readily assumed in a statute. It is an equally well -accepted principle of construction of statutes that an attempt should be made to reconcile and give effect to all the provisions. In the case of Ali Ameer v. Dalmia Cement (PLD 1961 Kar. 255), the rule was stated thus:
"In interpreting the provisions of any statute or any other document effort should be made to interpret the various provisions in a manner so as to give effect to all of them and it should not be readily concluded that a particular provisions either redundant or repugnant with another. Attempt should be made to reconcile the various provisions unless it is not possible to do so. "
16. In the case of Said Omer v. Federation of Pakistan and others (PLD 1956 Lah. 382), it was held that it is a cardinal principle of interpretation that redundancy must not be unnecessarily attributed to the legislature. In the case of Messrs Karachi Steam Navigation Company Limited v. Messrs Abdul Rehmari Abdul Ghani (PLD 1962 SC 90), it was held that redundancy in statutes is not to be attributed unnecessarily..
17. In the case of Gul Khan and others v. The State PLD 1986 Kar. 629, while holding that every effort should be made to avoid redundancy, the Court went to step further to hold that if necessary the 'language may be stretched so as to give it some meaning justified b context and object of the legislature.
18. In para. No. 166 of the Crawford on the, "Construction of Statutes" it is stated:
"The Court should seek to avoid any conflict in the provisions of the statute by endeavouring to harmonize and reconcile every part so that each shall be effective ...Consequently, that construction which will leave every word operative will be favoured over one, which leaves some word or provision meaningless because of inconsistency. "
19. In the light of the above, neither expression "activity involving in whole or in part, the supply of goods to any other person" used in the definition of "taxable activity" can be construed as redundant or superfluous, nor can expression "putting to private business or non‑business use of goods" (1) clause (a) of subsection (33) of section 2, to the definition of "supply" can be held to be redundant, unless the two provisions are absolutely repugnant or irreconcilable. Therefore, first of all an attempt is to be made to reconcile these two seemingly inconsistent provisions in the same section so as to give full effect to both.
20. Before I embark upon this task, I would note one more principle: It is that; the object of the change, if any, made in the law is to be ascertained.
21. In this respect, it is to be noted that a change was brought about in the charging section. The section as it stood before amendment was as under:
3. Scone of tax.‑‑‑(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, there shall be charged, levied and paid a tax known as sales tax at the rate of fifteen per cent. of the value of‑‑‑
(a) Taxable supplies made in Pakistan by a registered person in the course or furtherance of any business carried on by him; and
Word "business" was substituted in clause (a) by the expression "taxable activity" with effect from 1st July, 1996 vide Finance Act, 1996. The definition of "taxable activity" was already on the statute book as sub section (24) of section 2 of the Act, even prior to the said substitution. If, while amending a provision of law, a change is made in the phraseology it creates a presumption that the legislature had intended a change in the meaning‑--
22. In this regard reference may be made to para. No.304 of Crawford on the "Construction of Statutes" where it is stated:
"Conversely a change in the phraseology creates a presumption that the legislature intended a change of meaning."
It is, therefore, reasonable to presume that the amendment in the section was intended to bring about a change in the existing law. In my humble view, the said amendment was intended to narrow down the scope of the charging section.
23. It is also a rule of construction of statutes that when the existing provision of law is absolutely contradictory to or inconsistent with the amending provision maxim: leges posteriores priores contraries abrogart would come into play. In the case of Ahmed Saeed Kirmani MLA v. Fazal Illahi, Speaker, West Pakistan Assembly (PLD 1956 Lah. 807), it was observed:
"If the two provisions involve an absolute contradiction and it is impossible to construe them together, the former provision must give way to the latter. The maxim; lees posteriores priores contraries abrosant will come into play."
24. In para. No.304 of Crawford on the construction of the statutes at page 620 it is stated.
"moreover, the clear intent of the amending clause of a statute must prevail over contradictory provision within any section thereof. "It is therefore clear that definition of terra 'supply' cannot overthrow the intention of the legislature which was amended to introduce a change in the scope of the tax and narrow it down."
25. In my opinion, the two provisions can be so construed in the light of rules of interpretation noted above that full effect can be given to both the provisions. To achieve this object, definition of supply will have to be construed in such a manner, that it does not offend against expression "involves in whole or in part the supply of goods to any other person. This can be done, if, instead of giving a very wide and extended meaning to the expression" putting to private business or non‑business use", it is restricted to disposition of goods to any other person, keeping self‑use or in‑house use for the manufacture of finished exempt goods outside of its purview. Thus, a person, who supplies taxable goods to his wife or to his son even without consideration would be deemed to have made a taxable supply chargeable with Sales Tax. A supply of goods to another person for the purpose of charity, without consideration, would similarly fall within the, scope of charging section. Interpreted in this manner the activity sought to be taxed would remain without Constitutional limits of taxation on 'sale', otherwise it would transgress the said limits and would be rendered ultra vires of the Constitution. If, however, restricted meaning is not assigned to the definition of "supply" then either clause (ay of the definition of "supply" will have to be treated as absolutely superfluous or phrase 'supply of goods to any other person' in the definition of taxable‑activity will have to be treated as surplus.
26. Therefore, while interpreting the two terms appearing in the charging section, choice is to be made between:
(1) treating the phrase 'putting to private' business or non‑business use' as surplus, or
(2) treating the phrase 'involves in whole or part, the supply of goods to any other person' as superfluous, or
(3) stretching or restricting the scope of any of the two expressions referred to above in any or both the definitions, so, as to reconcile the two apparently conflicting provisions and harmonize them.
While making the choice we should not be oblivious of the principle that no part or word of the statutes is to be held as surplusage as has been held I in the case of East and West Steamship Co. v. Queensland Insurance Co. (PLD 1963 SC 663).
27. I have already made observations in respect of expressions, 'supply' and 'taxable activity'. It is now to be seen what is the effect of expression 'any activity carried on in the form of a business, trade or manufacture' on the charging section.
28. Term 'manufacture' has been used in the definition of taxable activity' alongwith expression 'trade and business' at the end. In my opinion expression "any activity carried on in the form of a business, trade and manufacture" used at the end of the definition is to be read in conjunction with "any activity which is carried on by any person" in the beginning of the definition. Words "whether or not for a pecuniary profit" and "whether for any consideration or otherwise", interpolated in the middle of the two expression in the definition clause are meant to cover the entire spectrum of possible motives for an activity.
Thus 'taxable activity' would mean 'any activity, including any activity in the form of business, trade or manufacture which is carried on by any person, and involves in whole or, in part, the supply of goods to any other person, whether or not for any pecuniary profit or for any consideration or otherwise."
Read in this manner, expression "any activity carried on I the form of any business, trade or manufacture" used in the end of the definition 'taxable activity' does not seem to have the effect of making a supply, which is not made to any other person liable to sales tax.
29. The mere fact, that a supply is taxable or that a person is a manufacturer or that he manufactures or produces goods or is wholesaler within the meaning of section 2(16), (17), (41) or (47) of the Act is not enough to levy tax on the taxable supply or manufacture or wholesale unless the taxable supply is made in the course or furtherance of taxable activity carried on by him as envisaged by section 3, which is the charging section, as distinguished from business activity' which has been made the basis of petitioner's registration under section 19 of the Act. These terms by themselves cannot be equated with 'sale' even notionally. The impact and effect of definition on the substantive provisions of the 'Act was thus, stated by Crawford in para. No.208 of his treatise on the construction of the statutes:
"In the event that the definition found in the interpretation clause is at variance with the intention of the lawmakers as expressed in the plain language of the statute, that intention must prevail over the legislative definition. To give the interpretation clause precedence, where the two cannot be harmonized would operate to make the ancillary portion of the statute superior to the primary portion. The statute's meaning would in all probability the distorted, and the legislative intent defeated."
30.The taxing statutes are to be interpreted strictly. The subject will be taxed only if he falls within the strict letter of charging section. In the case of B.P. Biscuit Factory Limited Karachi v. Wealth Tax Officer and another (1996 SCMR 1470) it was held:
"All charges upon the subject must be imposed by clear and unambiguous language, because in some degree they operate as penalties; the subject is not to be taxed unless the language of the statute clearly imposes the obligation and language must not be strained in order to tax a transaction, which, had the legislature thought of, it would have covered by appropriate words..."
31. The terms used in the charging section have been defined in detail in section 2 including taxable supplies and taxable activity. The terms and their implications have already been discussed above in detail. However, what I would like to re-emphasise here is that section 3(1) and (1A) including the proviso to subsection (1 A) envisage a transaction. There should not be any doubt that a sale in its simple parlance means the transfer of a property from one individual to another on payment of and passing off a consideration. To my mind any different interpretation would be against the basic concepts of law. To infer and to suggest that goods consumed by a person would also fall within the ambit of a sale and, therefore, the tax shall be levied, to my mind, is far fetched and against justice. The definitions of supply, taxable activity and taxable supplies respectively mentioned in sections 2(33), 2(35) and 2(41) are very broad based. However, what is interesting is the definition of supply, which also envisage putting to private business or non‑business use of goods acquired, produced; or manufactured in the course of business. Further the taxable activity once again is broad based and refers to all activities carried on by a person whether for a pecuniary profit and involves in whole or part the supply of goods to any other person whether for any consideration or otherwise.
32. Under section 3 of the Act, sales tax is charged and levied on taxable supplies made by registered person. Under section 14 of the Act only such persons are required to be registered who make taxable supplies in Pakistan in the course or furtherance of any taxable 'activity' carried on by them. Under section 19 of the Act only such persons are compulsorily registered who are required to be registered under section 14 of the Act but have not applied for registration. In the instant case the petitioner did not supply pre cast material as such to any other person. Use of pre cast material in the construction of a bridge can by no stretch of imagination be considered a taxable supply to K.D.A. in the course or furtherance of taxable activity.
33. In the case of Hunza Central Asian Textile and Woolen Mills Limited (1999 SCMR 526), the use of goods by the manufacturer or producer for manufacture of finished goods was by fiction of law regarded as transaction of sale. The treatment of such use as sale was challenged as unconstitutional. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, however, held in para. 25 of the judgment that deeming provisions created a legal fiction and that in the aforesaid restricted parameters, the use or consumption of independently identifiable goods would be considered as a sale so as to bring such goods within the tax net. It was further held that in the aforesaid restricted sense, the use and consumption of intermediary goods could be treated as sales by legal fiction so as to bring such goods under the levy of Sales Tax where the final product was not subject to sales tax when sold and that the use or consumption of intermediary goods in such circumstances have a rational nexus with sale. Federal Legislature was therefore competent to enact the deeming provision under entries of (Sales of goods) in the Constitutional documents.
34. It was further observed that if a raw material is made into or given a shape at the intermediary stage and, therefore, identifiable as separate goods then they would be subjected to tax as such goods under the deeming provisions. Even though a number of cases have been decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on this issue with utmost humility we would consider the case of the present petitioner as different from those where large Multinationals were involved and goods were being manufactured in Factories and during the course of manufacture different shapes took place. Those shapes were considered to be saleable items independently in the market and, therefore, were considered to be liable for sales tax.
35. The ratio in the abovementioned case is distinguishable from the case in hand. The provisions sought to be interpreted in this case are different in the scope and text. The abovementioned case was decided on interpretation of provisions of the Sales Tax Act, 1951. Section 3 of that Act was the charging section and in clause (d) of subsection (6) of the said Act it was provided as under:
3(6): determination of value for tax in certain circumstances .... Where goods are produced or manufactured in Pakistan under such circumstances or conditions as render it difficult to determine the value thereof because‑‑
(a) ‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑ ---
(b) ‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑
(c) Such goods as are for use by the manufacturer or producer,
the Sales Tax Officer may determine the value for the tax under this Act and all such transactions shall for the purposes of this Act be regarded as sales.
36. This provision was available in the charging section right from the day the Act was enacted in 1951. Deeming provisions of subsection (15) of section 2 and clause (iv) of subsection (4) of section 3 were substituted/inserted by Finance Act, 1966. Clause (iv) of subsection (4) reads as under:
Section 3(4).‑‑‑‑The tax in respect of goods mentioned in clauses (a)(c)(d) and (f) of subsection (1) and clause (d) of subsection (vi) shall be payable on the occurrence of the first of the following events:
(i)
(ii) ........... .
(iii) ......... ..
(iv) When the goods are actually used by the manufacturer or producer.
It will further be observed that subsection (15) of section 2 of the Act as it is stood before insertion of amendment by Finance Act 1966 was as under:---
(15) sale with al its grammatical variations and cognate expressions, means every transfer of the property in goods from one person to another in the course of trade or business for cash or for deferred payment or other valuable consideration.
By Finance Act 1996 following insertion was made in the said definition:
"and includes all such transactions and use one's own goods as are specified in subsection (6) of section 3. "
37. The provisions reproduced above would show that the substitution and insertions made in the charging section and the interpretation clause were intended to bring in harmony those provisions with the provisions of subsection (6) of section 3. Since there is no ambiguity or conflict in these provisions the Supreme Court of Pakistan did not advert to the interpretation of these provisions in the cited judgment and rest contented with the interpretation of validity of deeming clause referred to above.
38. The position in the instant case is, however, totally different. In the case in hand, under the charging section as it stood originally, sales tax was to be charged, levied and paid on the value of taxable supplies made in Pakistan by a registered person in the course or furtherance of any business carried on by him. Term business was, however, substituted by expression "taxable activity" vide Finance Act 1996. Word business used in definition of "supply" section 2(33) was, however, not substituted. Both, the definition of supply and the definition of "Taxation activity" in section 2(35) were same as they stood at the time of enactment of Sales Tax Act, 1990. Definition of "taxable activity" clearly envisages the supply of goods to any other person. In this respect it is apparently in direct conflict with clause (a) of subsection (33) of section 2. If there is really a conflict between the two provisions which is a irreconcilable, the provisions which was inserted in the charging section later in point of time would prevail over the provision existing earlier, but if the apparent conflict can be reconciled and harmonized so as to give effect to both the provisions. Such interpretation shall be given effect.
39. If the course convassed in these paragraphs is not adopted and private use of goods is held to be liable to sales tax merely because, it amounts to sale to self, then expression "involves in whole or in part, the supply of goods to any other person" will have to be declared as surplus or redundant. Such an interpretation would in my opinion be against all canons of interpretation.
40. In the instant case where an ordinary contractor (thekedar) agrees to build during the course of his job assigned to him and collects raw material by way of Bajri, cement, sarya and combines the lot through the process of hand and completes the job which has been assigned to him, can this be considered a taxable activity bringing the contractor (a thekedar) into the range of those persons who are compulsorily registerable and have to pay sales fax. The petitioner had undertaken to build the bridge and purchased raw material viz sarya, cement and concrete, which were already liable to sales tax. These items were consumed by him in creating a bridge. Under no circumstances could he have created at the intermediately stage independent marketable products, which could be sold in the market and, therefore, he would be liable to be registered and pay sales tax. At the remotest possibility it could be construed that the petitioner could manufacture from the raw material cement slabs and/or bricks, which he could sell in the market. My mind even if this possibility was there, a tax can only be levied if it is shown that the person was involved in such a sale. No tax should be levied on an individual only on the ground that since a semi‑manufacture goods is capable of independent sale in the market, therefore, that semi‑manufactured goods is taxable and falls within the ambit of taxable activity.
In the instant case the slabs were manufactured to specification, which as a rule would not be saleable in the market as the slabs were created upon given formula.
41. In para. No.23 of the Supreme Court judgment referred to have two points were noted for application of the deeming provision. The first one was that the deeming provisions come into operation only in a case where the final product was exempted from Sale Tax because the sale tax is a one‑point levy. The second point is that according to deeming provisions only such goods are liable to sales tax at the intermediary stage, which are identifiable as separate goods and are subject to sale tax as such goods. In the instant case, both the conditions do not exist. Firstly, the provisions of Sales Tax Act, 1990 show that it is a value‑added tax, which is levied at every stage, the value addition takes place at the time of supply. It is, therefore, no more a one‑point levy. So far as second condition is concerned the pre cast material in this case is not separately identifiable goods, which can be sold into market. The material pre cast by the petitioner is not marketable because of its particular design, size and specification and as it cannot be used in any other fly over, bridge building or construction work. It cannot be used anywhere except the fly over for which it was specifically designed in consideration of multivariable factors. The ratio in the above mentioned judgment is, therefore, not attracted to the present case.
42. I would like to refer to the case of Noori Trading v. Government of Pakistan (1992 SCMR 710) where the Hon'ble Supreme Court even while holding that the breaking of a ship tantamounts to manufacture did hold that the goods become excisable only when it moves from one place to another. The inference is very clear. The sales tax becomes leviable only when the transaction in which the person is involved is completed.
Under the circumstances mentioned above I am of the view that this petitioner and the prayer in the petition can be answered in the affirmative. I have looked exhaustively at the case‑law and the law itself and also minutely read the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and am of the opinion that this case is distinguishable from the case cited above. Accordingly the U Petition is granted as prayed.
(Sd.)
Zahid Kurban Alavi,
JUDGE.
For reasons recorded separately, I agree that the petition be allowed.
(Sd.)
Sabihuddin Ahmad,
JUDGE.
SABIHUDDIN AHMED, J.‑‑‑I have had the privilege of reading the elaborate and erudite draft judgment prepared by my learned brother Zahid Kurban Alavi, J. While subscribing to his conclusion and with great respect to his learning I am, nevertheless; constrained to express my reservation as to certain proposition of law laid down by his Lordship and have, therefore, appended this separate note.
2. With profoundest respect to my learned brother. I find it difficult, n the context of the law of Sales Tax that, has operated in Pakistan. i.e. the Sales Act, 1990 as well as the Sales Tax Act, 1951, and the authoritative pronouncement of the Honourable Supreme Court that levy of the tax on a transaction which does not amount to sale in ordinary parlance would militate against any basic concept of law. It may be recalled that section 3(6)(d) of the Sales Tax Act. 1951, expressly enabled the Sales Tax Officer to determine the value of goods produced or manufactured for the use of such producer or manufacturer and stipulated that all such transactions shall for the purposes of the Act be regarded as sales. In the well‑known case of Noorani Cotton Corporation v. Sales Tax Officer (PLD .1965 SC 161.). Kaikaus, J. speaking for the five‑member Bench, (then comprising the entire Supreme Court). While interpreting the charging section 3 of the Sales Tax Act, 1951 observed that the Sales Tax by its name should be tax on sale but that is not quite in accord with the provisions of this section. It is a tax on goods produced or manufactured or imported or exported.
3. In this case their Lordships proceeded to hold that Sales Tax was leviable on goods manufactured and used by the manufacturer himself for further manufacture of goods when the ultimate product was exempted from tax. However, it was observed that it would have been desirable to include self‑use in the definition of sale. Accordingly through the Finance Act, 1966. The definition of sale contained in section 2(15) was amended so as to include all such transactions and use of one's own good as are specified in subsection (6) of section 3. The view that through a legal fiction certain transaction not amounting to sales had been validly brought within the tax net under section 3(6) of the Sales Tax Act, 1951, was also upheld in the subsequent judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court, in Abbasi Textile Mills v. Commissioner of Sales Tax (PLD 1990 SC 422) and Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Hunza Central Asian Textile & Woolen Mills Ltd. (1999 SCMR 526).
4. In view of the above authoritative pronouncement I do not think it is possible for us. In view of the mandate of the Constitution binding us to follow the law declared by the Honourable Supreme Court, to apply any general principle of interpretation and held that no Sales Tax can be levied when a transaction does not involve transfer of property from a one person to another. When the legislative intent is clear. Whereby the tax net has been extended through creation of legal fiction. The Court, in my humble view, are not entitled to nullify it by resorting to an undefined concept of law and justice. It is well‑settled that a statutory provision can only be struck down after it is found to be repugnant to any provision of the Constitution and not otherwise.
5. With regard to the constitutionality of the levy it may be appropriate, once again, to refer to the judgment in, Collector of Sales Tax v. Hunza Central Asian Textile & Woolen Mills (1999 SCMR 526) where such a. challenge was made by one of the most eminent counsel in the country and repelled by their Lordships. It may also be worthwhile to mention that Item No.49 of the Fourth Schedule two the Constitution initially spoke of tax on sales and purchase. Subsequently, however, through the Fifth Amendment Act, 1976, its ambit was extended to provide for taxes on sales and purchases of goods imported exported produced manufactured or consumed. In my humble view, the object was to pre‑empt a challenge on the ground that a tax on manufacture, import, export or consumption, as distinguished from a sale, also came within the ambit of the Federal legislative power. In any event the Honourable Supreme Court in the mentioned case has taken the view that entries in the Fourth Schedule have to be liberally construed and Item No.49 is not merely confined to transactions which come within the purview of the expression "sale" but also those treated as sale by way of legal fiction created by statute. It is not possible for me to take a contrary view even for the purpose of interpreting the provisions of the Sales Tax Act, 1990.
6.The charging section i.e. section 3 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 reads as under:‑‑
"3.Scope of tax.‑‑‑‑(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, there shall be charged, levied and paid a tax known as sales tax at the rate of fifteen per cent of the value of.‑‑‑
(a)taxable supplies made in Pakistan by a registered person in the
(b)goods imported into Pakistan. "
Clause (b) is not relevant in the present context but certainly indicates that the tax is leviable merely on the incident of import and it is inconsequential whether the goods are imported for onward sale or for the personal use of the importer. Clause (a), however, makes the tax leviable on taxable supplies made in the course of any taxable activity carried on‑by a registered person i.e. One who is registered or is liable to be registered under Act in terms of section 14 read with section 2(25). Taxable supply, as candidly acknowledged by my learned brother, has been given wide import and the expression in view of the definition of 'supply' includes putting into private, business or non‑business use of goods acquired, produced or manufactured in the course of business. In view of those provisions I am of the opinion that goods used by an importer or manufacturer for his own use as distinguished from transfer to another person have not been excluded from the tax net been under the 1990 Act. Therefore, as long as a taxable supply is made in furtherance of a taxable activity sales tax would be leviable."
7. Indeed my learned brother has correctly observed that the Sales Tax payable under the 1990 Act is an value‑added tax as I distinguished from the 1951 Act where it was a one point levy. This X distinction in my humble opinion, however, does not necessarily lead I to the inference that only such activities as may amount to sale of goods in common parlance would fall within the tax net. As pointed out by his Lordship the preamble to the Act, itself does not merely speaks of a tax on sales simpliciter but includes importation, exportation, production or consumption of goods. The expression "sale" has also been excluded from the charging section and under section 3(1)(b) of Sales Tax is leviable on all goods imported into Pakistan, even when no element of transfer of another person is involved and the goods are imported only for the personal use or consumption of the importer. The value‑addition aspect is taken care of by section 7 which enables a registered person to deduct the input tax paid from the output tax that he is liable to pay.
8. With all respects I am also unable to discern any apparent inconsistency between the expression "taxable supply" and "taxable activity" occurring in section 3 so as to attract the principles of harmonious construction so ably referred to by my learned brother. In my humble opinion both these expressions operate in their own respective fields. The quantum of tax liability is determined on the basis of the value of taxable supply, but the liability to pay tax under the charging section would arise only when such supply is made in furtherance of a taxable activity. The expression "taxable activity" has been defined to mean in section 2(35) any activity involving in whole or in part, the supply of goods to any other person. Applying these provisions to the facts of the instant case, I am clearly, of the view that the petitioner in manufacturing the goods in question and using them for' the construction of a bridge, was, engaged in making taxable supplies. The next question, however, would be whether such supplies were made in furtherance of a taxable activity i.e. supply of goods to any, other person. The expression "goods has been defined it section 2(12) to include every kind of movable property other than money, stocks etc., obviously, the bridge which was eventually handed over to the K.D.A. cannot be treated as goods by any stretch of imagination. This reason I am of the view that the supply was not made in furtherance of a taxable activity and therefore, the petitioner could not be saddled with the liability to pay Sales Tax. Hac1 he supplied any goods to the K.D.A. or another person, the position might will have been different. For this reason I would agree that the petition is liable to be allowed.
(Sd.)
Sabihuddin Ahmed, JUDGE.
For reasons recorded separately, I agree that the petition may be allowed.
(Sd.)
Zahid Kurban Alavi, JUDGE.
ORDER OF THE COURT
For reasons recorded separately, we have allowed the petition.
(Sd.)
Sabihuddin Ahmed JUDGE.
(Sd.)
Zahid Kurban Alavi, JUDGE.
Q.M.H./M.A.K./Y‑12/KPetition allowed.