I.T.A. NO.809(IB) OF 1997-98 VS I.T.A. NO.809(IB) OF 1997-98
2001 P T D (Trib.) 1040
[Income-tax Appellate Tribunal Pakistan]
Before Karamat Hussain Niazi, Judicial Member and Mahmood Ahmed Malik, Accountant Member
I.T.A. No. 809(IB) of 1997-98, decided on 16/10/2000.
(a) Income-tax--
----Appeal---Limitation---Delay in filing appeal---Condonation of delay-- Sufficient cause---Determination---Principles---Plea of "rush of work" for condonation of delay by no stretch of imagination was a "sufficient cause".
Chamber's Dictionary; Oxford Dictionary; Black's Law Dictionary; 1990 CLC 206 and PLD 1984 SC (AJ&K) 51 ref.
(b) Words and phrases--
----"Sufficient cause"---Meaning.
Chamber's Dictionary; Oxford Dictionary; Black's Law Dictionary; 1990 CLC 206 and PLD 1984 SC (AJ&K) 51 ref.
Abdul Shakoor, D.R. for Appellant.
Nemo for Respondent.
Date of hearing: 26th September, 2000.
ORDER
KARAMAT HUSSAIN NIAZI (JUDICIAL MEMBER).---This departmental appeal relates to assessment year .1996-97 and is directed against the order, dated 25-8-1997 recorded by the learned AAC of the Income Tax, Islamabad.
2. This appeal was decided ex parte by the learned Single Bench of this Tribunal vide order, dated 29-11-1999 wherein it was held that the appeal is barred by tune and was rejected. Upon the application filed by the Department under section 156 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 that application for condonation of delay was filed alongwith the appeal by the Department, and therefore, without considering the application for condonation of delay, the order passed by Single Bench was rectifiable. This application was allowed and the main appeal was directed to be fixed for hearing on merits.
3. The learned DR admits that the appeal is barred by 7 days and could not be filed in time due to rush of work and other assignments. The application for condonation of delay, dated 11-12-1997 is on the file wherein it is stated that due to rush of work, the appeal could not be filed within time. The learned D.R. contends that it is a sufficient cause and prayed the delay to be condoned and the appeal be considered to be within time.
4. The respondent-assessee has failed to appear in spite of service of notice. We proceed to decide this appeal on merits on the basis of material available on file.
5. The main controversy revolves around the determination regarding what is sufficient cause or what facts are sufficient which caused the delay in filing the appeal within time, and thus, satisfies the conscious of the Court to make order for condonation of delay. The words "sufficient cause" has not been defined either in the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 or in ITAT Rules, 1981, which has been made in pursuance of the provisions of subsection (8) of section 133 of the Ordinance. It is a well-settled rule of interpretation of statutes that the "words" not defined in the relevant enactment, its ordinary meaning has to be, adopted. It is to be noted that word "cause" is qualified with an adjective "sufficient" which means that a cause, must be sufficient so as to form the basis of condonation of delay. According to Chamber's Dictionary the word "sufficient" means "adequate" or "effective". It means good enough, powerful enough or adequate enough according to Concise Oxford Dictionary in Black's Law Dictionary, word "sufficient" means, adequate, enough, as much as may be necessary. Thus, the word "sufficient" I may include any honest, just, fair, due or lawful cause which in the circumstances of a given case, a Court regards as sufficient to explain the absence or default on the part of a person to the proceedings' (1990 CLC 206). However, it is difficult and undesirable to attempt to define precisely the meaning of the words "sufficient cause". To do so would be to crystallize into a rigid definition of that judicial power and discretion which the Legislature has, for the best of all reasons, left undetermined and unfettered. It has now been well-settled that what is or is not "sufficient cause" for the purposes of an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act, it is that 'no hard and fast rule can be laid doyen nor it is desirable that it should be done. Each case has to be considered on its own facts. The discretion given by this provision should not be defined and crystallized so as to convert a discretionary matter into a rigid rule of law. But the discretion in each particular case should be exercised on its own facts, with a view to secure furtherance of justice. "Sufficient cause" means circumstances beyond control of party concerned (PLD 1984 SC (AJK) 51). Sufficient cause seems to mean not only those circumstances (such as the Court being closed on or time spent for obtaining copies) which the law recognizes as sufficient but also such circumstances as are not expressly recognised but which appear to the Court to be reasonable, looking to all the facts of the case. In finding a sufficient cause, a man's good faith would have to be kept in view, as valuable right accrues to the other party by lapse of time. Hence it has been settled that each day's delay has to be satisfactorily explained as of necessity. In the present case the Department has stated that due to rush of work the appeal could not be filed within time. The plea of "Rush of Work" by no stretch of imagination, is a "sufficient cause" to be condoned by the Court. The term 'rush of work' is of a general nature and if the plea of department is admitted we have to admit all the time-barred appeals on this ground, Moreover, the person has to explain the delay of each and every day, to order to make out a case for condonation. In our view rush of work is not a cause beyond the control of the party concerned and thus does not constitute a "sufficient cause" which prevented the Department from filing of the appeal within time. The Department has failed to make out a case fog condonation. Accordingly, the application for condonation of delay is rejected, The appeal being barred by time, is rejected in limine.
M.B.A./50/Tax/(Trib.)Appeal dismissed.