2001 P T D 3625

[241 I T R 152]

[Delhi High Court (India)]

Before R. C. Lahoti and C. K. Mahajan, JJ

K.K. LOOMBA and another

versus

COMMISSIONER OF INCOME‑TAX and others

C.W.P. Nos.3710, 2983 of 1997, Civil Miscellaneous Nos.7138 and 5877 of 1998, decided on 30/11/1998.

(a) Income‑tax‑‑‑

‑‑‑‑Assessment‑‑‑Jurisdiction‑‑‑General principles‑‑‑Scope of Ss. 124 & 127‑‑ Reassessment ‑‑‑Notice‑‑‑Assessee shifting business and residence from Amritsar to New Delhi‑‑‑Notice under 5.148 issued by A.O. of New Delhi‑ Notice was valid‑‑‑Indian Income Tax Act, 1961, Ss.2, 120, 124, 127 & 148.

(b) Writ‑‑‑

‑‑‑‑ Delay in filing writ petition‑‑‑Writ petition may be dismissed‑‑ Constitution of India, Art.226.

There is no fundamental right of the assessee to be assessed in a particular area or locality. An assessee is entitled to be assessed by the Income‑tax Officer of the particular area where he resides and carries his business. If a question arises as to the place of assessment it is to be determined by the Commissioner. The principles underlying determination of jurisdiction on which the provisions are based are (i) convenience of the assessee and (ii) efficiency of the Department (i.e. the exigencies of tax collection). Both the ends would be achieved by conferring jurisdiction on the Assessing Officer of an area where the assessee resides ‑and carries on business. Section 120 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, deals with the jurisdiction conferred on the Income‑tax Authorities to exercise the powers and perform the functions conferred by the Act. The jurisdiction between different authorities can be divided by reference to (i) territorial area; (ii) person or persons; (iii) income and classes of income; and (iv) cases or classes of cases. Section 1240) has relevance to territorial jurisdiction. If area-wise jurisdiction has been conferred on the Assessing Officer then a. person carrying on business or profession must rind out the Assessing Officer having jurisdiction over the place within which business or profession is being carried on. If the assessee is a person not carrying on a business or profession then he is subject to the jurisdiction of the Assessing Officer vested with jurisdiction over the area where he is residing. Section 127 does not speak of power to transfer jurisdiction; it speaks of transfer of "case" as defined in the Explanation enacted to section 127. It is relevant to note that the term assessment as defined in clause (8) of section 2 of the Act includes reassessment.

KKL was a doctor by profession. He was deriving income from Loomba Clinical Laboratories, as a sole proprietor since 1974 and was also a partner in N.B. Hospital up to May, 1984: With effect from May, 1984, he retired from the partnership. In July, 1984, during the assessment year 1985‑86, he started his profession in' New Delhi in rented premises. However, he continued to file his return of income at Amritsar. He claimed that he had filed returns for the assessment years 1980‑81 to 1992‑93 with the Income‑tax Officer, Amritsar. No return had been filed for the assessment year 1993‑94 onwards.

UL was an individual having tuition income at Amritsar since the assessment year 1982‑83 With effect from July 4, 1984, relevant to the assessment year 1985‑86, she started her independent proprietary business at Delhi. According to her, returns of income for the years 1982‑83 to 1992‑93 had been filed with the Income‑tax Officer. No return of income had been filed for the assessment year 1993‑94 onwards. On July 18, 1989, and February 8, 1990 search and seizure operations within the meaning of section 132(1) of the Act were carried out by the D.I. (investigation), upon both the petitioners. Based on such search and seizure operations the Assistant Commissioner of Income‑tax, Investigation Circle. 11(1), New Delhi, issued notices under section 148 of the Act in February, 1993, for the assessment years 1988‑89 to 1990‑91 to both the petitioners. Notice under section 148, dated March 22, 1994, for the assessment years 1985‑86 to 1987‑88 and dated March 31, 1995, for the assessment year 1992‑93 were also issued to the petitioners. The petitioners filed their returns under protest and also objected to the jurisdiction of the Assistant Commissioner of Income‑tax:

Held, dismissing the petitions, that in view of the fact that ever since July, 1984, the two petitioners were having, their business/profession and also residence at Delhi, the issuance of notices under section 148 of the Act by the Assessing Authority having jurisdiction to make the original assessment on the date of issuance of the notice was valid. Moreover, the notices were issued in the years 1993 and 1995. These petitions had been tiled in the year 1997, i.e. after a lapse of more than four and two years, respectively, from the dates of the notices. Assessments had been finalised The question of jurisdiction having received the attention of the Commissioner of Income‑tax (Appeals) was left at large to be dealt with by the Assessing Officer pursuant to the orders of remand. At such a belated stage the petitioners could not be shown indulgence in exercise of the writ jurisdiction of the Court.

Bidi Supply Co. v. Union of India (1956) 29 ITR 717 (SC); Industrial Trust Ltd. v. CIT (1973) 91 ITR 550 (SC); Kanji Mal & Sons v. CIT (1982) 138 ITR 391 (Delhi); Pannalal Binjarj v. Union of India (1957) 31 ITR 565 (SC); Paramjit Singh (Lt. Col.) v. CIT (1996) 220 ITR 446 (P&H); Ramasamy Asari (M.) v. Second ITO (1964) 51 ITR 57 (Mad.) and Sardar Baldev Singh v. CIT (1961) 40 ITR 605 (SC) ref.

C.S. Aggarwal with Salil Aggarwal and Anil Sharma for Petitioners.

Sanjeev Khanna with Ms. Premlata Bansal for Respondents.

JUDGMENT

C. K. MAHAJAN, J.‑‑‑ Mrs. Uma Loomba, the petitioner, in C.W.P. No.3710 of 1997 is the wife of Dr. K.K. Loomba, the petitioner in C.W.P. No.2983 of 1997. These writ petitions have been filed by them seeking quashing of an order under section 124(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, passed by the Commissioner of Income‑tax, Delhi‑VII, and also seeking quashing of the notices under section 148 of the Act issued by the Assistant Commissioner of Income‑tax (Investigation Circle 11(1)) New Delhi for the assessment years 1987‑88 to 1992‑93. The relevant facts in both the petitions are common and are briefly stated hereinafter.

Dr. K.K. Loomba is an individual, a doctor by profession. He was deriving income from Loomba Clinical Laboratories, Amritsar, as a sole proprietor since 1974 and was also a partner in New Bhandari Hospital Amritsar, up to May, 1984. With effect from May, 1984, he retired from the partnership and started his independent practice as doctor at Amritsar. He claims to have filed returns for the assessment years 1980‑81 to 1992‑93 with the Income‑tax Officer, Arnritsar.

In July, 1984, during, the assessment year 1985‑86, he started his profession at 17 West Patel Nagar, New Delhi, in rented premises. However, he continued to file his return of income at Amritsar. No return of income has been filed for the assessment year 1993‑94 onwards.

Mrs. Uma Loomba is an individual having tuition income at Amritsar since the assessment year 1982‑83. With effect from July 4, 1984, relevant to the assessment year 1985‑86, she started her independent proprietary business at Delhi under the name and style of Loomba Clinic Laboratory and Genetic Centre.

According to her returns of income for the years 1982‑83 to 1992‑93 having been filed with the Income‑tax Officer, Amritsar. No return of income has been filed for the assessment year 1993‑94 onwards.

On July 18, 1989, and February 8, 1990, search and seizure operations within the meaning of section 132(1) of the Act were carried out by the D.I. (Investigation), Delhi upon both the petitioners. Based on such search and seizure operations, the Assistant Commissioner of Income‑tax, Investigation Circle 11(1), New Delhi, issued notices under section 148 of the Act in February, 1993, for the assessment years 1988‑89 to 1990‑91 to both the petitioners. Notice under section 148, dated March 22, 1994, for the assessment years 1985‑86 to 1987‑88 and dated March 31, 1995, for the assessment year 1992‑93 were also issued to the petitioners. The petitioners tiled their returns under protest and also objected to the jurisdiction of the Assistant Commissioner of Income‑tax respondent No.2.

The Assistant Commissioner of Income‑tax Delhi, finalised the assessments for the years 1987‑88 to 1992‑93. The petitioners preferred appeals. The appeals have beer. allowed by the Commissioner of Income‑tax (Appeals) on December 20, 1995, for the assessment year 1988‑89 and 1989‑90 and on March 15, 1995, for the assessment years 1991‑92 and assessments remanded to the Assessing Officer with a direction to afford the petitioners opportunity of hearing on the question of jurisdiction.

The following excerpts from the order, dated March 21, 1997, passed by the Commissioner of Income‑tax, Delhi, under section 124(2) of the Act in respect of both the petitioners are relevant and, are therefore, extracted and reproduced hereunder:‑‑

"3. It was in July, 1984, that both Shri and Smt. Loomba shifted to Delhi and started living in 17, West Patel Nagar, New Delhi, which were rented premises and started their business/profession at this place. This was after they had closed their business/profession at Amritsar. However, as the facts are, the two persons continued filing their returns at Amritsar despite their business/profession being carried on in Delhi.

11. In the instant case, as the facts are and which have been admitted by the assessees also, it was in July, 1984, that the two assessees shifted their business/profession from Amritsar to New Delhi. They also shifted their residence from Amritsar to New Delhi. Since 1984, they have been carrying on their business/profession in Delhi. Their business/profession in Amritsar stands closed since 1984. In view of this, their natural jurisdiction lies with the Assessing Authority in Delhi who holds jurisdiction over the area where the assessees are carrying on their business/profession. Here, his jurisdiction is clearly determined by section 124(1) of the Income tax Act.

13. In view of the facts disussed above, I am convinced that the natural jurisdiction over the two assessees lies with the Assessing Officer at Delhi after July, 1984, the period when they shifted their business/profession to New Delhi and the Assessing Officer at Delhi automatically hold jurisdiction over them. There was absolutely no need of making an order under section 127 for transferring the jurisdiction over these two assessees from Amritsar to Delhi even though they had been filing their income‑tax returns at Amritsar. Actually, it was incumbent upon the two assessee themselves to file their returns at Delhi once they had shifted their business/profession from Amritsar to this place. Filing of returns at Amritsar does not in any way alter the correct position of jurisdiction. The assessees have regularly tiled their returns at Amritsar, which is their fault and the Department could not be blamed for that. The Assessing Officer, therefore, directed to make the assessments on the two assessees as he is legally holding jurisdiction over them."

Here itself we would like to make it clear that the finding of fact recorded by the Commissioner of Income‑tax in his order under section 124(2), dated March 21, 1997, is that both the petitioners had shifted their business and profession to New Delhi after they had closed their business/profession at Amritsar. Exercising writ jurisdiction we will not enter into disputed questions of fact. At the same time we see no reason to doubt the correctness of the facts and the finding recorded by the Commissioner of Income‑tax in his order, dated March 21, 1997. We would proceed on the factual premises as recorded in the order of the Commissioner of Income‑tax above-said.

So also in the counter‑filed before this Court, the respondents do not admit the petitioners having filed any return of income at Amritsar for the assessment year 1988‑89 onwards. We will, therefore, proceed on the premises that for the assessment year 1988‑89 and onwards the petitioners have not tiled any return of income at Amritsar. However, this finding, as will be seen in the later part of the judgment, is not very material.

Learned counsel for the petitioners has attacked the validity of the impugned order under section 124(2) and the notices under section 148 of the Act issued by the Assessing Officer At Delhi on two grounds. Firstly, it is submitted that once the jurisdiction over the assessee was assumed by the Assessing Officer at Amritsar the same would continue year after year and the assessee would continue to tile his return at Amritsar and as a corollary any proceedings under the Act can be initiated against the assessee only by the Assessing Officer at Amritsar, unless and until the cases of the petitioners were transferred from Amritsar to Delhi by an order passed under section 127 of the Act. Secondly, if the assessments have been finalised or could have been finalised only at Amritsar no officer of income‑tax at Delhi can issue notice under section 148 to the petitioners.

On behalf of the respondents the stand taken is that the jurisdiction is to be decided by reference to sections 120 and 124 of the Act. Each year's case is a separate case. The assessee must file the return by finding out the jurisdiction of the Assessing Officer by reference to these provisions on the date of filing of the return. On the same principles would be determined the jurisdiction to initiate any proceedings under the Act against an assessee. Merely because an assessee was assessed by an Assessing Officer having jurisdiction in earlier years he would not continue to exercise jurisdiction over the assessee though he has lost the same by reference to sections 120 to 124 of the Act. If jurisdiction (called natural jurisdiction), changes between the years by reference to sections 120 and 124 of the Act, no order under section 127 is called for.

The relevant provisions are extracted and reproduced hereunder:‑‑

"120. Jurisdiction of Income‑tax Authorities.‑‑‑ (1) Income‑tax Authorities shall exercise all or any of the powers and perform all or any of the functions conferred on, or, as the case may be, assigned to such authorities by or under this Act in accordance with such directions as the Board may issue for the exercise of the powers and performance of the functions by all or any of those authorities.

(2) The directions of the Board under subsection (1) may authorise any other Income‑tax Authority to issue orders in writing for the exercise of .the powers and performance of the functions by all or any of the other income‑tax authorities who are subordinate to it.

(3) In issuing the directions or orders referred to in subsections (1) and (2), the Board or other income‑tax authority authorised by it may have regard to any one or more of the following criteria, namely:‑‑

(a) territorial area;

(b) persons or classes of persons;

(c) incomes or classes of income; and

(d) cases or classes of cases.

124. Jurisdiction of Assessing Officers.‑‑‑ (1) Where by virtue of any direction or order issued under subsection (1) or subsection (2) of section 120, the Assessing Officer has been vested with‑jurisdiction over any area, within the limits of such area, he shall have jurisdiction‑‑

(a) in respect of any person carrying on a business or profession, if the place at which he carries on his business or profession is situate within the area; or where his business or profession is carried on in more places than one, if the principal place of his business or profession is situate within the area, and

(b) in respect of any other person residing within the area.

(2) Where a question arises tinder this section as to whether an Assessing Officer has jurisdiction to assess any person, the question shall be determined by the Director‑General or the Chief Commissioner or the Commissioner; or where the question is one relating to areas within the jurisdiction of different Director‑General or Chief Commissioners or Commissioners, by the Directors- General or Chief Commissioners or Commissioners concerned or, if they are not in agreement, by the Board or by such Director‑General or Chief Commissioner or Commissioner as the Board may, by notification in the official Gazette, specify..

(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section or in any direction or order issued under section 120, every Assessing Officer shall have all the powers conferred by or under this Act on an Assessing Officer in respect of the income accruing or arising or received within the area, if any, over which he has been vested with jurisdiction by 'virtue of the directions or orders issued under subsection (1) or subsection (2) of section 120.

127. Power to transfer cases.‑‑‑ (1) The Director‑General or Chief Commissioner or Commissioner may, after giving the assessee a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the matter, wherever it is possible to do so, and after recording his reasons for doing so, transfer any case from one or more Assessing Officers subordinate to him (whether with or without concurrent jurisdiction) to any other Assessing Officer or Assessing Officers (whether with or without concurrent jurisdiction) also subordinate to him;

Explanation.‑‑‑In section 120 and this section, the word case', in relation to any person whose name is specified in any order or direction issued thereunder, means all proceedings under this Act in respect of any year which tray be pending on the date of such order or direction or which may have been completed on or before such date, and includes also all proceedings under this Act which may be commenced after the date of such order or direction in respect of any year. "

A detailed discussion and extensive analysis of the abovesaid provisions is not called for inasmuch as the field is covered by the law laid down by the Supreme Court. We would, therefore, straightaway proceed to refer to the decision.

In Bidi Supply Co. v. Union of India (1956) 29 ITR 717 (SC), the Constitution Bench has held that the notice and the return are to be confined to a particular assessment year and what is contemplated is the transfer of such a "case", i.e., the assessment case for a particular year.

In Pannalal Binjraj v. Union of India (1957) 31 ITR 565 (SC); AIR 1957 SC 397, their Lordships have vide para. 20 (page 580 of 31 ITR) analysed the scheme of the provisions in the Income‑tax Act relating to jurisdiction and transfer of cases. Their Lordships have held that an assessee is entitled to be assessed by the Income‑tax Officer of the particular area where he resides and carries on his business. If a question may arise as to the place of assessment it is to be determined by the Commissioner. The principles underlying determination of jurisdiction on which the provisions are based are; (i) convenience of the assessee, and (ii) efficiency of the Department (i.e. the exigencies of tax collection). Both the ends would be achieved by conferring jurisdiction on the Assessing Officer of an area where the assessee resides and carries on business. The law does not give a right to the assessee to have his assessment at a place but determines the Income‑tax Officer who is to have power to assess him (para.20).

Vide para. 32 (page 587 of 31 ITR), their Lordships have held that there is no fundamental right of the assessee to be assessed in a particular area or locality.

Section 120 provides for jurisdiction conferred on the Income‑tax Authorities to exercise the powers and perform the functions conferred by the Act. The jurisdiction between different authorities can be divided by reference to (i) territorial area, (ii) person or persons, (iii) income and classes of income; and (iv) cases or classes of cases. Section 124(1) has relevance to territorial jurisdiction. If area‑wise jurisdiction has been conferred on the Assessing Officer then a person carrying on business or profession must find out the Assessing Officer having jurisdiction over the place within which business or profession is being carried on. If the assessee is a person not carrying on a business or profession then he is subject to the jurisdiction of the Assessing Officer vested with jurisdiction over the area where he is residing.

Section 127 does not speak of power to transfer jurisdiction; it speaks of transfer of "case" as defined in the Explanation enacted to section 127.

That‑ being the position of law, we are very clear in our mind that the petitioners having shifted their business/profession and residence‑‑both‑ in July, 1984, from Amritsar to Delhi, the return could have been filed only before an Assessing Officer having jurisdiction over the area where the business/profession of the petitioners was situated. If there was any doubt, the petitioners could have moved under section 124(2) for determining the question of jurisdiction which the petitioners have not done. The proceedings finalised at Amritsar after the petitioners had ceased to have their business/profession at Amritsar would be without jurisdiction. However, this observation would not obviously apply to such proceedings which have been taken without any objection as to the jurisdiction by either side and permitted to achieve a finality.

In Sardar Baldeve Singh v. CIT (1960) 40 ITR 605 (SC); AIR 1961 SC 736 the assessee was a resident of Lahore in the year 194.4. On October, 14, 1944, he was assessed at Lahore for the assessment year 1944‑45. After partition in 1947, the assessee shifted to Delhi. The Income -tax Officer, Delhi, on April 10, 1948, issued a notice under section 34 of the Indian Income‑tax Act, 1922, to the assessee then residing in Delhi requiring' him to file revised return for the year 1944‑45 as a part of his income for that year had escaped assessment. The assessee filed the return under protest. The question of jurisdiction arose. Their Lordships opined that the contention of the assessee was without foundation (page 611):‑‑

"Now the place where an assessment is to be made pursuant to a notice under section 22(2) has to be determined under section 64. Indeed that is the only provision in the Act for deciding the proper place for any assessment. There is nothing which makes section 64 inapplicable to an assessment made under section 34. Therefore, it seems to us clear, that the place where an assessment under section 34 can be made has to be decided under section 64. Now the appellant was not carrying on any business, profession or vocation, He was working as the Defence Minister of the Government of India and residing in Delhi. He could be properly assessed by the Income‑tax Officer, Delhi, under section 64(2) if the assessment was the original assessment. This is not in dispute. It follows that no objection can legitimately be taken by the appellant to his assessment under section 34 by the Income‑tax Officer, Delhi. "

Their Lordships applied the test‑‑who could properly assess the assessee if the assessment was the original assessment? It was held that the Income‑tax Officer, Delhi, could have made the Original assessment and, therefore, no objection can legitimately be taken to the assessment under section 34 (of the 1922 Act) by the Income‑tax Officer, Delhi.

It is relevant to note that the term "assessment" as defined in clause (8) of section 2 of the Act includes reassessment.

In view of the fact that eversince July, 1984, the two petitioners were having their business/profession and also residence at Delhi, the issuance of notices under section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, by the assessing authority exercising jurisdiction to make the original assessment on the date of issuance of the notice cannot be found fault with.

In M. Ramasamy Asari v. Second ITO (1964) 51 ITR 57 (Mad.) the Division Bench has held (headnote):‑‑

In regard to the business income of an assessee it is only the Income‑tax Officer having jurisdiction over the place where his business activities are concentrated who would have jurisdiction to assess; where the assessee has no business it is the place of residence thatdetermines jurisdiction. No other officer except the officer having territorial jurisdiction, either over the place where the assessee is carrying on business or over, the place where he is residing, if, there is no business, would have jurisdiction, and any assessment passed by any other officer would be illegal."

In Kanji Mal & Sons v. CIT (1982) 138 ITR 391, a Division Bench decision of the Delhi High Court makes an illuminating discussion of the several aspects relevant to jurisdictional issues arising under the Income‑tax Act. Out of the several principles laid down the relevant parts for our purpose are extracted and reproduced hereunder (head note):‑‑

"That the non obstinate clause in section 124(7) was very wide and made it clear that it was intended as a saving provision against the technical objections and disputes that might be raised in view of subsections (1) to (6)‑of section 124. If in a particular case the assessment could fall within the scope of section 124(7), then that assessment would be a valid assessment notwithstanding that it might have been completed by an officer who otherwise might have had no jurisdiction in the case and also in spite of the fact that the assessment might have been made by that officer without following the procedure outlined by section 124(4) in the face of a specific objection put forward by the assessee. The Tribunal was, therefore, correct in holding that the legality of the assessment should be determined on a harmonious reading of section 124(4) and section 124(7) and that unless the assessment could be said to be outside the purview of even section 124(7) it could not be said to be invalid merely because the Income‑tax Officer failed to make a reference and get the jurisdiction determined within the time outlined by section 124(4)...

If a case falls under section 124(4) then the question of jurisdiction can be resolved only in the manner outlined in that section and it cannot be challenged before or decided by the Appellate Authorities. If the assessment can be supported under section 124(7), the provisions of section 124(4) will ‑not apply and there is nothing to bar the jurisdiction of the appellate authorities to uphold the assessment on that ground. In such a case there is no conflict between the procedure outlined in subsections (4) and (6) and the appellate powers of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal.

Section 124(7) is very limited in its operation. All that it saves is an assessment made by an Income‑tax Officer (whether he has or not jurisdiction otherwise) provided that the assessment does not bring to tax any thing other than income accruing, arising or received within the area over which he exercises territorial jurisdiction. "

Once it has been found that the two petitioners had their business/profession situated at Delhi, the assessing authority having natural jurisdiction over the area would have jurisdiction to assess them, issue notices under section 148 as well, though referable to the period when they were assessed or were assessable' at Amritsar by virtue of sections 124(1) and 124(5) read with section 120(1). No order under section 127 or even section 124(2) was called for. Such an interpretation and the view of the law satisfies the twin test of (i) of convenience of the assessee, and (ii) the exigencies of tax collection.

Learned counsel for the petitioners placed reliance on Industrial Trust Ltd. v. CIT (1973) 91 ITR 550 (SC). For the assessment years 1946‑47, 1947‑48 and 1949‑50, the assessee‑company having its headquarters at Jaipur, was assessed by the Income‑tax Officer, Ajmer, where the returns were filed and who had jurisdiction to make an assessment then. The Income‑tax Officer, Central Circle IV issued notices under section 34. Proceedings initiated by the Income‑tax Officer, Central Circle, were held to be invalid on the ground that the notification conferring jurisdiction did so by reference to pending assessments only. However, their Lordships have very clearly held that an assessee has to be assessed by the Income‑tax Officer within whose territorial jurisdiction he resides and that the return submitted to the Income‑tax Officer who had no jurisdiction, territorial and otherwise over the assessee is not a valid return. In our opinion, the decision supports the respondents.

Lt.‑Col. Paramjit Singh v. CIT (1996) 220 ITR 446, a Division Bench decision by the Punjab High Court was relied on. This decision supports the plea of the petitioner inasmuch as the ratio is that a notice for reassessment can be issued only by the Assessing Officer who had concluded the proceedings. However, the decision by the Supreme Court in Baldev Singh's case (1961) 40 ITR 605 was not brought to the notice of the Punjab High Court. We express our respectful dissent with the view so taken for the reasons stated in para. 23 (page 161) above.

There is yet another reason why we are not inclined to interfere with the notices under section 148. The notices were issued in the years 1993 and 1995. These petitions have been filed in the year 1997, i.e. after a lapse of more than four and two years, respectively, from the dates of the notices. Assessments have been finalised. The question of jurisdiction having received the attention of the Commissioner of Income‑tax (Appeals) was left at large to be dealt with by the Assessing Officer pursuant to the orders of remand. At such a belated stage the petitioners cannot be shown indulgence in exercise of writ jurisdiction of this Court.

For the foregoing reasons, we find the petitioners not entitled to any relief in exercise of writ jurisdiction of this Court: Both the petitions are dismissed though without any order as to costs.

M.B.A./562/FC

Petitions dismissed.