COMMISSIONER OF INCOME?TAX (AJ&K COUNCIL), MUZAFFARABAD VS ASIAN D ENTERPRISES
2000 P T D 892
[Supreme Court (A J & K)]
Present: Sardar Said Muhammad Khan, G.J. and Basharat Ahmad Shaikh, J
Civil Appeal No.74 of 1999
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX (AJ&K COUNCIL), MUZAFFARABAD
and another
versus
ASIAN D ENTERPRISES through Ejaz Qureshi, Managing Director and 5 others
(On appeal from the judgment of the High Court dated 29-1-1999 in Writ Petition No. 386 of 1997).
Civil Appeal No.75 of 1999
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX (AJ&K COUNCIL), MUZAFFARABAD
and 2 others
versus
Messrs CADE CREETS ASSOCIATES through Managing Partner, Diwan Ali
Khan Chughtai and another
(On appeal from the judgment of the High Court dated 26-2-1999 in Writ Petition No.353 of 1998).
Civil Appeals Nos.74 and 75 of 1999, decided on 16/12/1999.
(a) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979)-
----S.50(5) & First Sched., Para. E, cl.(i), sub-para. (i), cl. (iii) ---Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act (VIII of 1974), Fundamental Right No. 14---Deduction of tax at source---Execution of contract- --Increase in advance income-tax rate on deduction at source from 3 % to 5 % by amendment through Finance Act, 1995 which was made operative from the date of its enforcement in Azad Kashmir by Ordinance No. I of 1998, dated 13-7-1998---Assessing Officer assessed advance income-tax at the enhanced rates from the assessee by virtue of amendment by Finance Act, 1995 as enforced in Azad Kashmir ---Assessee assailed the said demand ---Validity-- High Court had observed that fiscal law could not be made operative retrospectively and thus, Ordinance No. I of 1998 was no legal consequence so far as the same made the assessee liable to the payment of advance tax at enhanced rate---Deduction of 5% advance income-tax prior to 13-7-1998 was not warranted by law when Ordinance No. I of 1998 was promulgated and the said Ordinance and Circular, dated 5-7-1995 were violative of Fundamental Right No. 14 of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974 which related to protection of property---Validity---Fiscal law could be made operative retrospectively and there was no such embargo imposed upon the Legislature by the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974---Finding of the High Court that Finance Act, 1995, which was adopted retrospectively by Ordinance No. I of 1998 was declared legally incorrect and without any legal substance by the Supreme Court and advance income-tax at the increased rate, held, was rightly demanded by the Assessing Officer from the assessee.
Ms. Spintex Limited, Mirpur v. Income-tax Officer, Government of AJ&K, Mirpur 1998 PTD 2567; Khyerbari Tea Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam AIR 1964 SC 925; Novelty Enterprises Limited v. Deputy Collector, Excise and Taxation/Sales Tax Officer, Mirpur 1993 CLC 1165; Government of Azad Jammu and Kashmir v. M/s. Kashmir Tobacco Industries Ltd. 1992 SCR 20; Constitution of India by Basu, 6th Edn., p.24; M/s. Chhotabhai Jethabhai Patel v. Union of India AIR 1962 SC 1006 and M/s. Yaseen Sons v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1989 Kar. 361 ref.
Azad Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir v. Syed Muhammad Akbar Shah 1996 PLC (C.S.)) 838; Messrs Flying Board and Paper Products v. Central Board of Revenue, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad PLD 1996 Lah. 718; Abdul Sattar Noor Muhammad & Co. v. Government of Pakistan 1999 SCMR 2345; Al-Samrez Enterprise v. The Federation of Pakistan 1986 SCMR 1917; Government of Pakistan v. Messrs Pesticide Air Services Ltd. PLD 1993 SC 132; Molasses Trading & Export (Pvt.) Limited v. Federation of Pakistan 1993 SCMR 1905 and Federation of Pakistan v. Punjab Steel Limited 1993 SCMR 2267 distinguished.
(b) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979)---
----S.50(4) & First Sched., para. E, cl.(i) sub-para. (i), cl. (iii)---Circular, dated 5-7-1995---Deduction of tax at source---Increase in advance income-tax rate by Finance Act, 1995 after agreement between the parties executing the contract---Assessing Officer demanded advance income-tax at the enhanced rate from the date of payment made on account of execution of contract from the assessee by virtue of amendment by Finance Act, 1995 as enforced in Azad Kashmir by Ordinance No. I of 1998---Assessee contended that amendment brought about through the Finance Act, 1995 on 5-7-1995 was violative of Fundamental Right No.14 granted by the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974---Validity---Provision of sub -para. (2) of Fundamental Right No.14 regarding protection of property visualised compulsory acquisition of property or taking over its possession for public purposes without fixing any compensation but when income-tax was demanded from an assessee, there was no question of fixing any compensation for that---Even if it was assumed for the sake of argument that demand of additional income-tax was 'deprivation' of the 'property' of the assessee within the meaning of para. (1) of Fundamental Right No. 14, that had been done in pursuance of law, i.e. the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 and the Finance Act, 1995 and, thus, the tax demanded could, not be held violative of Fundamental Right No. 14 according to which a person could be deprived of his property according to law---Demand of additional advance income-tax from the assessee was made in pursuance of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 which had been validly adopted in Azad Jammu and Kashmir---Fact of the matter was that by impugned provision of law, the rate of income-tax had not been retrospectively increased; only the rate of deduction of advance tax had been increased---Deduction of advance tax was only a tentative deduction which had to be adjusted when the final assessment of income-tax to be paid by the assessee was made---Findings of High Court that demand of additional advance income-tax was violative of Fundamental Right No. 14 guaranteed by the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974, were devoid of any force and were not sustainable.
Ch. Muhammad Afzal, Advocate for Appellants.
Ghulam Mustafa Mughal, Farooq Hussain Kashmiri and Noorullah Qureshi, Advocates for Respondents (in both the Appeals).
Date of hearing: 17th November, 1999.
JUDGMENT
SARDAR SAID MUHAMMAD KHAN, C.J.---The above entitled appeals have been directed against the judgments of the High Court, dated 29-1-1999 and 26-2-1999, whereby the writ petitions filed by the respondents were accepted. As common questions of law are involved in the above entitled appeals, we propose to dispose of the same through this single judgment.
2. The facts giving rise to Civil Appeal No.74 of 1999 are that respondents Nos. l and 2 are Government contractors and were allotted various construction works between 1991 to 1995. The Income-Tax Ordinance, 1979, in force in Pakistan which was adapted in Azad Kashmir vide Act No. IX of 1979, was amended through the Finance Act, 1995, whereby an amendment was brought in paragraph E, clause (i), sub-para. (i), clause (iii) in Ist Schedule of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, and the rate of advance income-tax to be deducted was increased from 3 % to 5 % . It may be observed that initially the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, was adapted by the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council with effect from 1-7-1979 with all its amendments and orders etc. which were made in Pakistan till the date of its adaptation and those which might be made in future. Consequently, the increase in the advance income-tax from 3 % to 5 % by the Finance Act, 1995, also stood adapted in the State According to the appellants, a genera; circular was issued on 5-7-1995 for information of the concerned to comply with the statutory provisions contained in the Finance .Act, 1995. Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 assailed the demand of the advance income-tax at the enhanced rates on the following grounds:---
(i) That the increase in the advance income-tax by 2% could not be demanded because the agreements between the concerned parties were executed prior to the said increase;
(ii) that the Finance Act, 1995; is prospective in nature and, thus, the aforesaid circular which indirectly postulates to give retrospective effect to the said Act was illegal:
(iii) that the Legislature was not competent to make the amendment which adversely affects the vested rights accrued to the petitioners respondents as a result of the relevant agreements;
(iv) that the amendments brought through the Finance Act on 5-7-1995 are violative of Fundamental Right No.14, guaranteed by the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974;
(v) that the deduction of income-tax was violative of section 31(5) ofthe Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974;
(vi) that Ordinance No.l of 1998 was promulgated during the pendency of the writ petition in -the High Court so as to bring the relevant law in consonance with the judgment given by the Supreme Court in Spintex case was of no legal effect so far as the same operates retrospectively; and ,
(vii) that in view of dictum of the Supreme Court in case entitled M/s. Spintex Limited, Mirpur v. Income-tax Officer Government of AJ&K, Mirpur 1998 PTD 2567, the amendments made in terms 'amendment made in law in future' are of no legal consequence as being hit by the doctrine of 'abdication and self-effacement'.
3. The High Court accepted the writ petition, inter alia, on the ground that the fiscal law cannot be made operative retrospectively and, thus, Ordinance No. 1 of 1998 (which was subsequently approved by the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council and became an Act) was of no legal consequence so far as the same makes the respondents-petitioners liable to the payment of advance income-tax at enhanced rates; and that the aforesaid Ordinance and Circular dated 5-7-1995 are violative of Fundamental Right No. 14.
4. The facts of Civil Appeal No.75 of 1999 are that M/s. Cade Creets Associates who were given the contract for the construction of the State Bank Building, Muzaffarabad, vide agreement, dated 13-6-1995 filed a writ petition assailing the legality of Finance Act 1995, and Circular issued on 5 7-1998 more or less on the same grounds was done by respondents Nos. l and 2 in Civil Appeal No.85 of 1999, entitled above. The High Court, after taking necessary proceedings, accepted the writ petition on the short ground that in view of the dictum of the Supreme Court in case entitled M/s. Spintex Limited, Mirpur v. Income Tax Officer Government of AJ&K, Mirpur 1998 PTD 2567, and the dictum given by the High Court in the judgment which is subject of Civil Appeal No.74, entitled above, deduction of 5% advance income-tax prior to 13-7-1998, when Ordinance No. 1 of 1998 was promulgated, was not warranted by law for the reasons enumerated in the aforesaid judgment of the High Court. The Commissioner of Income-tax has come up in appeals against the aforesaid judgments of the High Court.
5. Ch. Muhammad Afzal, Advocate, the learned counsel for the appellants, has argued that the impugned judgment of the High Court is based upon the assumption that fiscal laws cannot be given retrospective effect. He has argued that there is no bar in the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act. 1974, to give retrospective effect to a fiscal statute; he has maintained that only the Constitution can place such an embargo on the powers of the Legislature. He has submitted that there is no such bar even in the Constitutions of India and Pakistan; the learned counsel has submitted that statutes have been frequently given retrospective effect by most of the Legislatures of the World. The learned counsel has contended that the authorities on which the learned Judge in the High Court has relied in support of the view that a fiscal law cannot be given retrospective effect do not say so; rather the same deal with different propositions of law and have no relevancy to the facts of the cases In hand. The learned counsel has taken us through, some of the authorities which were referred to by the High Court and contended that the said authorities do not support the view that a fiscal law cannot be given retrospective effect. Thus, the learned counsel has vehemently argued that Ordinance No. 1 of 1998 whereby the Finance Act of 1995 was made operative from the date of its enforcement in Azad Kashmir and which was also a validating legislation, did not suffer from any legal infirmity. The learned counsel for the appellants has strenuously argued that there was no justification to declare that the aforesaid Ordinance and circular issued in pursuance of the same, were ineffective so far as the demand of advance income-tax at the increased rates from the respondents was concerned. He has also submitted that the High Court has committed an error in holding that as the increase in the rates of advance income-tax was made after the agreements between the parties had been executed, the demand at the increased rates cannot be made from the respondents; the same can be done only in cases where the transactions took place after 13-7-1998, the date of promulgation of Ordinance No. 1 of 1998. He has also maintained that the contention of the respondents-petitioners that the tax cannot be realised in cases where the agreements were executed before 13-7-1998 is devoid of any force because the agreements between the parties cannot place such an embargo on the powers of the Legislature in derogation of the Interim Constitution Act. The learned counsel has cited following authorities in support of his contentions:---
In case reported as Khyerbari Tea Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam (AIR 1964 SC 925), it was observed that the mere fact that a validating statute operates retrospectively, does not justify the contention that character of tax sought to be recovered by such retrospective operation is necessarily changed and that Assam Act 10 of 1961 which was a validating and taxing Act could not be given retrospective effect.
In case reported as Novelty Enterprises Limited v. Deputy Collector, Excise and Taxation/Sales Tax Officer, Mirpur 1993 CLC 1165, it was held that the Salt Act of 1944 which was adapted in Azad Kashmir through an Ordinance (which subsequently became an Act of the Assembly) contained a validating provision whereby all acts performed, powers exercised etc. would be deemed to have been validly performed and exercised; the said provision was held as a valid legislation, despite the fact that the statute was fiscal one.
In case reported as Government of Azad Jammu and Kashmir v. M/s Kashmir Tobacco Industries Ltd. (1992 SCR 20), it was observed that the factum of demanding the excise duty cannot be challenged on the ground that Salt Act, 1944, was given retrospective effect.
In commentary on the Constitution of India by Basu, 6th Edition, it has been observed at page 24 that taxing laws are no exception to the competence of the Legislature to give the same retrospective effect and that there was no bar to give retrospective effect to such a law, even if the same impairs the existing contractual rights and obligations of the parties.
In case reported as M/s. Chhotabhai Jethabhai Patel v. Union of India (AIR 1962 SC 1006), it has been observed that under Finance Act, 1951, there was no bar to impose excise duty with retrospective effect.
In case reported as M/s. Yaseen Sons v. Federation of Pakistan (PTCL 1990 CL 438), it has been observed that the Legislature is competent to make laws during the pendency of proceedings in the Court or after its decision so as to validate the recovery which the Government could not make at the material time; it was further observed that the Legislature is also empowered to legislate any remedial or curative legislation after the discovery of a defect in the existing law. It was further observed that it is not the function of the judiciary to legislate or question the wisdom of Legislature in making a particular law nor it can refuse to enforce it even if the same results in nullifying the decision of a Court. Thus, it was held that section 31-A of Customs Act cannot be challenged on the ground that the same nullifies the judgment of a superior Court.
6. In reply, Mr. Ghulam Mustafa Mughal, Advocate, the learned counsel for the respondents, has controverted the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants that the High Court has committed an error in holding that retrospective effect could not be given to the law whereby advance income-tax was being demanded from the respondents on the basis of Finance Act, 1995, which stood adapted in Azad Kashmir with retrospective effect by Ordinance No. 1 of 1998. The learned counsel has argued that when the parties entered into the agreement, they were to pay advance income-tax at the rate of 3 % but the rate was enhanced to 5 % by the concerned authorities to the detriment of the respondents-petitioners which could not be done. He has submitted that a law could not be given retrospective effect so as to take away a vested right of a party. According to the learned counsel for the respondents, it was a vested right of the respondents-petitioners to pay advance income-tax at the rates which were prevalent at the time when they entered into the agreement regarding the construction work indicated in the beginning of this judgment. The learned counsel has argued that as adaptation of Finance Act, 1995, with retrospective effect by virtue of Ordinance No. 1 of 1998 was illegal, the subsequent circular issued on 5-7-995 was also rightly held to be of no legal consequence by the High Court. The learned counsel has cited following authorities in support of his contention:---
"In case reported as Azad Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir v. Syed Muhammad Akbar Shah 1996 PLC (C.S.)) 838, the facts were that the provisions of Civil Servants Act were retrospectively amended by the appellants with the result that legal defect in the order of retirement of respondents stood removed and the same became valid. It was observed that when the order of Government was passed it was without any legal cover, and therefore, void but stood validated by way of the aforesaid amendment in the Civil Servants Act.'
In case reported as Messrs Flying Board and Paper Products v. Central Board of Revenue, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad (PLD 1996 Lab. 718), it has been observed- that vested right which accrued to the importers could not be interfered with retrospectively by an executive order because there was no corresponding provision in the Sales Tax Act to the one which is contained in section 31-A of the Customs Act. Thus, it was observed that withdrawal of exemption in the payment of Sales Tax Act could not be given retrospective effect so as to interfere in the vested right already accrued to the concerned party.
In case reported as Abdul Satter Noor Muhammad & Co. v. Government of Pakistan (-1999 SCMR 2345), it was observed that the 13:11 of Entry on the basis of which the tax was payable was filed before 30-6-1995 whereas the rate of advance income-tax from 2 % to 4 % was increased on 1-7-1995, by virtue of the Finance Act, 1995. Thus, it was observed that as tax had already been calculated and deposited by the assessee concerned according to the previous rates, additional tax could not be demanded at the rate of 4 % ; the contention of the authorities that the income-tax payer had not yet paid all the instalments of customs duty and, thus, he was liable to pay income-tax according to increased rates was repelled by observing that it would not make the assessee liable to pay the tax at enhanced rates, as the matter had already been crystalised and fell within the ambit of 'transaction past and closed'.
In case reported .as Al-Samrez Enterprise v. The Federation of Pakistan (1986 SCMR 1917), it was observed that as the binding contract had already been concluded between the parties when the notification giving exemption from the payment of the customs duty was amended to the detriment of the importer by another notification, the same was not sustainable; it was held that a vested right had been created by a contract which could not be taken away and destroyed by modifying the earlier one on the ground that under section 21 of the General Clauses Act, the Government could exercise the power of modification. It was observed that the effect of exemption from payment of tax or duty presupposes a liability; 'non-liability' and 'exemption' are different concepts, the former connotes that the subject was never, in the tax net while the latter connotes that it was, but was permitted to escape. Thus, it was held inequitable and unjust to deprive a person of the benefits of an exemption by suddenly withdrawing the same in exercise of powers under section 21 of the General Clauses Act. It was further observed that retrospective operation cannot be given to the executive orders so as to destroy the contractual rights and obligations which had already accrued.
In case reported as Government of Pakistan v. Messrs Pesticide Air Services Ltd. (PLD 1993 SC 132), it was held that as the customs duty payable had already been crystalised when the bill of Entry was presented in pursuance of section 30 of the Customs Act, the subsequent amendment in law by introducing section 30-A in the Customs Act would not make any difference because the customs duty had already been paid and the
matter had become past and closed transaction as was held by the Supreme Court in case of Al-Samrez Enterprise v. The Federation of Pakistan (1986 SCMR 1917).
In case reported as Molasses Trading & Export (Pvt.) Limited v. Federation, of Pakistan (1993 SCMR 1905), it was observed that the Legislature, within the bound of the Constitutional limitation, has the power to make such law and give it retrospective effect so as to bind even past and closed transactions. Thus, it was held that the Legislature was competent to neutralize the judgment of the Supreme Court reported as Al -Samrez Enterprise v. The Federation of Pakistan (1986 SCMR 1917) by amending the Customs Act in form of section 31-A; it was further held that irrespective of the fact that contract was entered into by the parties before the withdrawal of exemption and letter of credit had also come into existence prior to such date, notification under section 31-A would take effect from the date of its issuance and the Court was bound to give effect to the amendment made.
In case reported as Federation of Pakistan v. Punjab Steel Limited (1993 SCMR 2267), it was observed that as the letter of credit had already been opened, the provisions of section 31-A of the Customs Act would not be attracted and the ratio decidendi of the case reported as Al-Samrez Enterprise v. The Federation of Pakistan (1986 SCMR 1917) would be applicable. Consequently, the appeals, filed by the Federation of Pakistan were dismissed.
7. We have considered the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties on the point as to whether the High Court was justified in holding that a fiscal statute cannot be made operative retrospectively. It is evident from the case law, referred to by the learned counsel for the appellants, that there is no proposition in support of the view that a fiscal law cannot be made operative retrospectively. Obviously, when there is no such embargo imposed upon the Legislature by the Interim Constitution Act, how such a restriction can be assumed. Thus, the very basis on which the findings of the High Court rest is without any legal substance. The authorities cited by the learned counsel for the respondents, are distinguishable. Al-Samrez's case (1986 SCMR 1917), has affected decisions reported in all authorities. The facts of the said case were that the exemption given from payment of customs duty was withdrawn by an executive order. The order of withdrawal of exemption was challenged by invoking the writ jurisdiction. It was held that exemption earlier given could not be withdrawn to, the detriment of the importers through an executive order purported to have been passed under section 21 of the General Clauses Act. It may be observed here that subsequently, the Customs Act was amended by insertion of section 31-A which primarily intended to nullify the pronouncements given by the Courts in Al-Samrez's case. Thereafter, it was held in case reported as Messrs Flying Board and Paper Products v. Central Board of Revenue, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad (PLD 1996 Lahore 718) that after the amendment of the Customs Act in form of section 31-A, the view taken in Al-Samrez's case was no longer valid because the Legislature was competent to amend the relevant statute giving the same retrospective effect. Similarly, in case reported as Abdul Sattar Noor Muhammad & Co. v. Government of Pakistan (1999 SCMR 2345), referred to above, it was observed that as the Bill of Entry on the basis of which the income-tax was payable was filed on 30-6-1995 and the tax had been paid, the increase in the rate of tax payable from 2 % to 4 % by virtue of Act of 1995 would not entitle the concerned authority to demand the income-tax at additional rates because the matter had already been crystalised and the income-tax had been paid before the said increase. It may also be pointed out that in the instant case neither it has been the case of the respondents nor there are any findings by the High Court that any of the respondents-petitioners had paid the advance income-tax at the previous rates prior to the enforcement of the Finance Act of 1995. It is evident from the abovementioned survey of case law that the findings of the High Court that the Finance Act, 1995, which was adapted retrospectively by Ordinance No.l of 1998, could not operate retrospectively, are not legally correct.
8. The next question which needs resolution is as to whether the High Court was legally justified in holding that demand of increased income-tax is violative of Fundamental Right No.14 guaranteed by section 4 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974. The High Court has taken the view that the increase in the rate of advance payment of income-tax by 2% is violative of Fundamental Right No.14 because the said increase would adversely affect the interest of the respondents-contractors in their 'property'; they would be illegally deprived of their 'property' by 2 % . For resolving the matter, it would be convenient to reproduce the Constitutional provisions of Fundamental Right No. 14 below:---
"14. Protection of property, ---(I) No person shall be deprived of his property save in accordance with law.
(2) No property shall be compulsorily acquired or taken possession of save for a public purpose and save by the authority of law which provides for compensation therefor and either fixes the amount of compensation or specifies the principles on which and the manner in which compensation is to be determined and given.
(3) ...................................................................................
(a) ...................................................................................
(b) ...................................................................................
(c) ...................................................................................
(d) ...................................................................................
(e)...................................................................................
(f)...................................................................................
Explanation.---In sub-paragraphs (2) and (3) 'property' shall mean immovable property, or any commercial or industrial undertaking, or any interest in any undertaking."
The perusal of the above provisions would reveal that sub paragraph (2) of Fundamental Right No. 14 is not attracted in the instant case because that visualises compulsory acquisition of the property or taking over its possession for public purposes without fixing any compensation. Obviously, when income-tax is demanded from an assessee, there is no question of fixing any compensation for that. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that demand of additional income-tax is 'deprivation' of the 'property ' of the respondents within the meanings of paragraph 1, that has been done in pursuance of law, i.e., the Income-tax Ordinance, 1979 and the Finance Act, 1995 and, thus, the tax demanded could not be held violative of the Fundamental Right No. 14 according to which a person can be deprived of his property according to law. Needless to say, as has been indicated above, the demand of additional advance income-tax from the respondents was made in pursuance of the aforesaid statutes which have been validly adapted in the State. However, the fact of the matter is that by the impugned provision of law, the rate of income-tax has not been retrospectively increased; only the rate of deduction of advance tax has been increased. The deduction of advance tax is only a tentative deduction which has to be adjusted when the final assessment of income-tax to be paid by the respondents-Companies is made. Thus, the findings of the High Court that demand of additional advance income-tax is violative of Fundamental Right No. 14 guaranteed by the Interim Constitution Act, are devoid of any force and are not sustainable.
In the light of what has been stated above, we accept the above entitled appeals, set aside the impugned judgments of the High Court and hold that additional advance income-tax was rightly demanded from the respondents-petitioners. Consequently, the writ petitions filed by the respondents are hereby dismissed. In the circumstances of the case we make no order as to the costs.
C.M.A./M.A.K./1/SC(AJ&K).Appeals allowed.