COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX VS BACHRAJ DUGAR
2000 P T D 581
1232 I T R 2901
[Gauhati High Court (India)]
Before V. D. Gyani, Actg. C. J. and D. Biswas, J
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX
versus
BACHRAJ DUGAR
Income-tax Reference No. 5 of 1997, decided on 06/05/1998.
Income-tax---
--Expenditure on rural development programmes---Withdrawal of approval granted to association or institution---Can only be prospective and cannot be given retrospective effect---Indian Income Tax Act, 1961, S.35CCA.
The withdrawal of approval granted to an association or institution under section 35CCA of the Income Tax Act, 1961, can only be prospective and cannot be given retrospective effect.
Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. v. Irving (1905) AC 369 (PC); Garikapati Veeraya v. Subbiah Choudhry (N.) AIR 1957 SC 540 and Escort:: Ltd. v. Union of India (1993) 199 ITR 43 (SC) ref.
G. K. Joshi and U. Bhuyan for the Commissioner.
Nemo for the Assessee
JUDGMENT
V. D. GYANE, ACTG. C. J.---In compliance with the order passed by this Court in C. R. No. 8(M) of 1993, the following question has been referred for this Court's opinion: .
"Whether the Tribunal's observation that there was no provision either in the Act or in the rules regarding the withdrawal of approval retrospectively was justified when section 21 of the General Clauses Act confers such power to the authority concerned?"
The facts, as can be gathered from the Tribunal's order, are as follows,
The assessee-respondent claimed deduction under section 35CCA on account of donation of Rs.2 lakhs to a society for integrated development. In view of the withdrawal of approval granted to the society by the prescribed authority for the purpose of section 35CCA with retrospective effect, tile claim for deduction was disallowed by the Assessing Officer. The order passed by him was confirmed in appeal by the Commissioner of Income (Appeals). The Appellate Tribunal, however, observed that there being to provision either in the Income-tax Act or in the rules framed there under regards withdrawal of approval with retrospective effect, the Assessing Officer was directed to reconsider the assessee's claim.
Aggrieved by the same, the Revenue had approached this Court for calling for a statement of the case in C. R. No. 8(M) of 1993. Accordingly, as directed by this Court, the statement of case has been placed with the question as quoted above for this Court's opinion. Section 21 of the General. Clauses Act reads as follows:
"(21) Power to issue, to include power to add to, amend, vary or rescind, notifications, orders, rules or bye-laws. ---Where, by any Central Act or Regulation, a power to issue notifications, orders, rules, or bye-laws is conferred, then that power includes a power, exercisable in the like manner and subject to the like sanction, and conditions Of any), to add to, amend, vary or rescind any notifications, order, rules or bye--laws so issued. "
There is no dispute so far as the power to vary, amend or rescind a notification is concerned. The crucial question that arises for consideration is whether any such withdrawal can be given retrospective effect?
Mr. Joshi, learned standing counsel for the Revenue, placing strong reliance on Escorts Ltd. v. Union of India (1993) 199 ITR, 43 (SC), contended that the observations made by the Tribunal are wholly unwarranted and uncalled for.
Section 35CCA was inserted by the Finance Act, 1978. It is evident there from that, before any deduction could. be made in respect of donation, certain conditions, as spelt out by this section, are required to be fulfilled. The deduction is permissible on account of an expenditure incurred by way of payment of any sum to an association or institution, which has as its object to under take and support programmes of rural development. Giving retrospective effect to withdrawal of approval, granted to a society for the above purposes, offends against the basic rules of construction.
Even in Escorts Ltd.'s case (1993) 199 ITR 43, the Supreme Court has not given retrospective effect. It has merely explained the existing position as is evident from the following passage (page 66):
"(28) It is evidently on the basis of this recommendation that clause (iv) of subsection (2) of section 35 was amended to make express what was implicit in it. The amendment introduced the words 'or any other' in the said clause. After amendment, clause (iv) of section 35(2) reads as follows: 'Where a deduction is allowed for any previous year under this section in respect of expenditure represented wholly or partly by an asset, no deduction shall be allowed under clause (ii) of subsection (1) of section 32 for the same or any other previous year in respect of that asset.' In our opinion, the said amendment is merely clarificatory in nature. It makes explicit what was implicit in the provisions. The question of its constitutionality, therefore, does not arise. Though purporting to be retrospective, it does .not take away any rights which had legally vested in the assessee. "
The above judgment cannot be read as upholding the retrospectivity of operation of an order. Withdrawal of approval can only be prospective, which cannot be given retrospective effect. Interfering with the existing rights contrary to the well-known general principle that statutes are not to be held to act retrospectively, is propounded by the Privy Council in Colonial Sugar Refining Company Ltd. v. Irving (1905) AC 369, wherein Lord Machaghten observed (page 372):
"To deprive a suitor in a pending action of an appeal to a superior Tribunal which belonged to him as of right is a very different thing from regulating procedure. In principle, their Lordships see no difference between abolishing an appeal altogether and transferring the appeal to a new Tribunal. In either case there is an interference with existing rights contrary to the well-known general principle that statutes are not to be held to act retrospectively unless a clear intention to that effect is manifested."
This principle, as laid down in
Colonial Sugar Refining Company Ltd. v. Irving (1905) AC 369 (PC), has been followed by the Supreme Court in Garikapati Veeraya v. Subbiah Choudhry (N.), AIR 1957 SC 540. Of course, this judgment relates to right of appeal but the underlying principle is the same. Any alteration of substantive rights in existences is not to be readily construed to affect adjudication of pending proceedings by giving retrospective effect to the statute. The Supreme Court in Garikapati Veeraya v. Subbiah Choudhry (N.) AIR 1957 SC 540 has pointed out (page 553):
"The golden rule of construction is that, in the absence of anything in the enactment to show that it is to have retrospective operation, it cannot be so construed as to have the effect of altering the law applicable to a claim in litigation at the time when the Act was passed."
If the statute cannot be given retrospective effect, withdrawing an order of approval of a society and withdrawing the same with retrospective effect is still on a weaker footing. ,
The question as referred, is answered in the affirmative, that is to say, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. Th6 reference stands finally disposed.
M.B.A./3227/FC Reference answered