COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX VS ASPINWALL & CO. LTD.
1999 P T D 2400
[227 I T R 916]
[Kerala High Court (India)]
Before V. V. Kamat and K. Narayana Kurup, JJ
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX
Versus
ASPINWALL & CO. LTD.
Income-tax References Nos.43 and 44 of 1993, decided on 25/09/1996.
Income-tax---
----Investment allowance---Manufacture or production of article or thing-- Meaning of "manufacture "---Curing of coffee---Not manufacture ---Assessee not entitled to investment allowance---Indian Income Tax Act, 1961, S.32-A.
The assessee-company was engaged, inter alia, in the curing and sale of coffee and claimed investment allowance under section 32-A of the income Tax Act, 1961, in relation to plant and machinery used for curing coffee. The Tribunal inspected the factory premises of the assessee-company and found that the process of curing was done in nine stages: (1) receipt of coffee from the estates; (2) storing of coffee in covered godowns; (3) drying of coffee to the required standards prescribed by the Coffee Board in drying yards; (4) hulling/pealing/polishing; (5) grading of coffee mechanically; (6) colour sorting; (7) garbling and manual grading; (8) out-turning of garbled coffee and (9) bulking. The Tribunal allowed the assessee's claim for investment allowance. On a reference:
Held, that the Court had to see whether in the concerned process, from stage to stage, there was any change of such character that a commercially different article was available. The nine stages set down by the Tribunal did not show any kind of change, nor was a commercially different commodity seen to be passing through the various stages of the curing process. In common parlance "coffee" means coffee powder, a beverage consumed as either a hot or cold drinks. The facts, found by the Tribunal did not show that the activity could be understood either as manufacture or as production. The assessee was, therefore, not entitled to investment allowance.
CIT v. N.C. Budharaja & Co. (1993) 204 ITR 412 (SC); Deputy CST v. Pio Food Packers (1980) 46 STC 63 (SC); Delhi Cold Storage (P.)
Ltd. v. CIT (1991) 191 ITR 656 (SC) and Sterling Foods v. State of Karnataka (1986) 63 STC 239 (SC) applied.
Chowgule & Co. (P.) Ltd. v. Union of India (1981) 47 STC 124 (SC); CIT v. Aspinwall & Co. Ltd. (1994) 207 ITR 353 (Ker.) and Longhurst v. Guildford Godalming and District Water Board (1961) 3 All ER 545 (HL) ref.
P.K.R. Menon, Senior Advocate and N.R.K. Nair for the Commissioner.
C.N. Ramchandran Nair for the Assessee.
JUDGMENT
V.V. KAMAT, J.--- These references relate to the assessment years 1980-81 and 1983-84, respectively. However, the questions that we are required to consider on reference is identical and the same is as follows:--
"Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal is right in law and fact in holding that the assessee's activity of curing coffee amounts to manufacturing and the assessee is entitled to relief under section 32-A of the Income-tax Act?"
The assessee is a public limited company. Undisputedly, it is engaged in the export of coir products, distribution of insecticides and pesticides, running and managing of estates on service contracts, coffee curing and sale and also agency activities for certain shipping lines. We are concerned with the activity of the assessee-company in coffee curing and its sale.
This activity has become the subject-matter of "investment allowance" under section 32-A of the Income-tax Act, in relation to machinery or plant installed in a small scale industrial undertaking for the purpose of business of manufacture or production of any article or thing. This activity of coffee curing and sale for the assessment year 1978-79 of the same assessee-company has been the subject-matter of an earlier judgment, dated August 12, 1993, in I.T.R. No.46 of 1991 (CIT v. Aspinwall & Co. Ltd. (1994) 207 ITR 353, wherein this Court, being unable to answer properly and satisfactorily the factual position, declined to answer the situation as to whether any manufacturing activity or process is involved in curing coffee.
Learned counsel has produced before us a copy of the judgment of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal to know exactly as to what is "curing coffee" and the factual position in regard thereto.
Before dealing with the factual position on the basis of the said fact finding by the Appellate Tribunal, it would be beneficial to know what is understood by "coffee" as is generally known in commercial parlance The said general material is made available to us by learned senior tax counsel by referring to Encyclopaedia Britannica, volume 6 (1972 Edition) page 26 onwards and we get a general idea that "coffee' is a beverage made from roasted seeds (beans) of the coffee plant. The said beverage is consumed as either a hot or cold drink and is considered to be having an invigorating effect. This effect is produced by caffeine as it functions as a stimulant and diuretic through its actions on the central nervous system. Coffee is prepared by either a dry or a wash process. In the dry process, known as natural process, the coffee cherries are thoroughly rinsed in water and then spread out on cement patios in the open air and sun to dry. After drying, the coffee is repeatedly run through fanning and hulling machines to remove the hulls, dried pulp and parchment. The wash process is quite different. In this process, the cherries are first put through a pulping machine that breaks them open and virtually squeezes the beans out of the pulpy skin. Such beans go into large tanks where they are left for about 24 hours. Fermentation in the process is avoided, because it loosens what is known as a jelly-like substance understood as "honey" in regard thereto. Even in this process, after washing, the coffee is spread out in patios to dry. It takes two to three weeks in the sun for the coffee to become thoroughly dried and during this time, needless to say that this requires reshuffling in the process by turning over in the process of giving sufficient natural heat depending on the climatic conditions.
It is to be noted that the usual expected aroma is available only after the process of roasting. Up to this stage of roasting, even the test that is generally associated with the mouth, watering effect is also not associated therewith. Roasting also changes the colour giving it a brown colour and a consequent process of chemical change also. This process of roasting brings with its splendid aromatic qualities and pleasing' taste.
The factual material to enable us to know what is "curing of coffee" is, available to us with regard to the activity of the assessee-company as a result of the material in pursuance of the earlier order. There should not be any dispute in regard thereto because the factory premises were inspected by the Tribunal to have a first hand knowledge of the operations carried on by the assessee-company. The Tribunal has also noted that this was embarked upon by it so as to enter x' finding of fact. This was also done in the presence of both the parties through their representatives. The factual observations of the Tribunal as a result of the inspection found necessary deal with the following nine aspects in the curing of coffee:--
"(1) Receipt of coffee from the estates;
(2) Storing of coffee in covered godowns;
(3) Drying of coffee to the required standards prescribed by the Coffee Board in drying yards;
(4) Hulling/pealing/polishing;
(5) Grading of coffee mechanically;
(6) Colour sorting;
(7) Grabling and manual grading;.
(8) Out-turning of garbled coffee and
(9) Bulking."
The Tribunal has also found that to deal with the nine aspects, the assessee has the factory area where godowns for storage of uncured/clean coffee, coffee drying yards, machine rooms, garbling sheds, etc. are located.
In the curing of coffee, certain processes are involved and they are also spread over by the Tribunal. The first is the process of drying. Thus, curing operations star with the drying of coffee in the drying yards in bright sunlight. Then comes the stage of hulling. It means the outer husk of the coffee bean has to be carefully removed, if necessary, by mechanical operations to obtain coffee seeds, which can further be processed. This hulling process is also considered by the Tribunal in relation to particulars thereof, such as pre-cleaning, destining, elimination of husk, separation of un-hulled beans, and polishing. In other words, this process of hulling, if understood to the light of the different facets discussed in regard thereto, in common parlance, would have to be understood as separating chaff from the wheat. The Tribunal has also dealt with the further steps as a result of the process of hulling It is a process of gradation. This process of gradation requires separation of good coffee for the purpose of grading by a process of what is known as garbling/manual grading. As time advances and necessity demands, this work, as is Wily known, is done by the process of mechanical men in regard thereto.
Thereafter, the next stage is the process of polishing on the basis of grading. It is at this stage, the Tribunal describes the entire process as garbling, out-turning, bulking and then exportation thereof. This is at the stage of raw material, which is graded dry still in the shape of coffee cherry. In this process, as it would be seen even otherwise, impurities are removed, the husk is removed from the coffee cherry and cured seeds are obtained finally in graded varieties, if necessary, after polishing and needed colouring. As far as-the assessee-company is concerned, this coffee cherry is the final product with reference to their activity. We must record that in view of the earlier judgment of this Court, wherein a fact finding was expected and accordingly directed, we have chosen to accept the said factual approach which otherwise also received finality in regard thereto, whether the proceedings relate to the assessment year 1978-79 or even with regard to other two years which are the subject-matter of application of the law in regard thereto. It must be noted that for all these assessment years, in the absence of a specific finding of fact, this Court had to adopt the course of inviting necessary fact finding. When we find that the necessary fact finding that the product is a product after inspection by the members of the Tribunal in the presence of both the sides, taking into account the elements of finality in regard thereto, even with regard to other assessment years, we proceed with our further reasoning as to whether any relief under section 32-A of the Income-tax Act would be available, dwelling upon the above fact finding, which is specified by us hereinbefore with the benefit of the copy thereof placed for our consideration by learned counsel.
Section 32-A of the Income-tax Act deals with the question of investment allowance. It is in respect of the ship or aircraft or machinery or plant specifically spoken of in section 32-A (2) thereof. In the proceedings before us, obviously, the investment allowance would be with reference to machinery or plant. The further step that is required in regard thereto is the ownership by the assessee and an additional requirement that it is wholly used for the purpose of the business carried on by the assessee-company. If these things are established, deduction can be allowed with regard to the machinery or plant installed in the immediately succeeding previous year. The percentage of the said investment allowance, unnecessary for our purpose, is also stated in the said statutory provision.
The above statutory provision has exceptions which are provided in the proviso to section 32-A(1) of the Act. They are relating to (a) any machinery or plant installed in any office premises or any residential accommodation, including any accommodation also in the nature of a guest house; (b) any office appliances or road transport vehicles; (c) machinery or plant in respect of which the deduction is also allowable under section 33 of the Act by way of development rebate; and, lastly, (d) any machinery or plant in regard, to which the whole of the actual cost is allowed as a deduction by way of depreciation in computing the income chargeable under the head "Profits and gains of business of profession".
Similarly, this machinery or plant is also particularised as stated above in section 32-A(2). For the purpose of these proceedings, installation is necessary after March 31, 1976, and also has to be found in section 32-A(2)(b)(ii) that the machinery or plant is required to be in a small scale industrial undertaking for the purposes of business of manufacture or production of any article or thing. This is the necessarily required statutory provision of section 32-A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, requiring us to determine that the installed machinery or plant satisfies that it is for the purposes of business of manufacture or production of any article or thing. In other words, on the basis of the above factual matrix spread over, we have to determine the activity, whether it is for the purposes of business of manufacture or production of any other article or thing.
Learned senior tax counsel submitted that the occasion to determine the installation of the machinery or plant for the purposes of the business of manufacture or production of any article or thing is required to be considered by the Courts not only in the context of the above provisions of the Income tax Act, but also in regard to other statutory provisions of the said Act. illustratively such as section 80-J of the Act relating to deduction in respect of profits and gains from newly established industrial undertakings which begin to manufacture or produce articles or to operate their cold storage plant or plants after March 31, 1976. Learned senior tax counsel also brought to our notice a situation of similar occasion in the statutory provision of section 80-HH of the Income-tax Act, relating to profits and gains derived from an industrial undertaking or hotel business requiring the Court to determine the exact nature of the activity, whether it relates to a situation of manufacture or production in relation to the process undertaken by the assessee concerned.
Learned senior tax counsel also submitted before us that the Courts are required to consider the nature of the activity whether it amounts to manufacture and/or production in regard to the process involved in regard thereto, also for the purposes of levy of tax and duty of excise. He submitted that in regard to necessary and relevant statutory provisions of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act (section 5-A thereof) and the Central, Sales Tax Act (section 5(3)), the concerned authorities are required to determine the nature of the process as to whether there is any element of manufacture and/or production in regard to the process undertaken by the person claiming deduction on the basis thereof. Illustratively in the context, learned senior tax counsel pointed out the provisions of section 5-A of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act and submitted that apart from the question of levy of tax, the Courts otherwise also are required to determine the nature of the activity for the purpose of levy of excise duties under the provisions of the Central Excises and Salt Act. Referring to the above legislations, learned senior tax counsel submitted that in fact, for application of the principle as to what is to be understood with regard to the process as to whether it is manufacturing and/or production activity, whether it is for the purpose of deduction under section 32-A of the Act, whether it is for the purpose of benefits under sections 80-HH and 80-J of the Act or even whether it is for the purpose of sales tax or even levy of excise duty, the situation in the context would be wholly immaterial because with regard to the concerned activity, it would be for the Court to determine the nature of the activity with reference to the factual matrix, in regard to Which there should not be any dispute. Learned senior tax counsel submitted that as to what amounts to manufacture or production has been declared not by one, but as many as four decisions of the apex Court in CIT v. N.C. Budharaja & Co. (1993) 204 ITR 412; Delhi Cold Storage (P.) Ltd. v. CIT (1991) 191 ITR 656, Sterling Foods v. State of Karnataka (1986) 63 STC 239 and Deputy CST v. Pio Food Pockers (1980) 46 STC 63 of its subsequent packing whether any manufacture or production activity is involved. Suffice it to state that the attempt of learned senior tax counsel was that once it is available through these four decisions of the apex Court to tell us what would be the nature of the activity, it has to be applied to the problem at hand and there is no scope for disturbing the principles declared by the apex Court. It is also submitted that there is no scope to find out special peculiarities in regard thereto. After giving our anxious thought to the submissions of learned senior tax counsel, we feel that it would be of abundant benefit to us in dealing with the situation of identical character to consider with care and caution these four decisions of the apex Court. Naturally, we would start with the reverse chronological process by referring to the latest decision in the first instance. It is N.C. Budharaja's case (1993) 204 ITR 412 (SC), dealing with a new industrial undertaking in a backward area, where the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider as to whether construction of a dam would be understood as manufacture or production of article in regard to a claim of the assessee therein for relief under section 80-HH of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
In the first instance, the apex Court has dealt with the situation of interpretation of taxing statutes. A question is given that the words used in the concerned taxing statute take colour from the context and it is not possible- to ignore the plain language, when the object is to be gathered on reasonable interpretation of language on taking colour in the context of the situation. The apex Court was considering this in regard to the association of the words "manufacture and production" in the context used in the statutory provisions of section 80-HH of the Act.
In fact, the apex Court has considered all the cognitive related terms, such as "manufacture, production, produce, article" to understand the meanings thereof. It is observed in the process of reasoning that the test for determining whether manufacture can be said to have taken place is, whether the commodity which is subjected to the process of manufacture can no longer be regarded as the original commodity, but is recognised in the trade as a new and distinct commodity. In this process of reasoning, reliance is placed by the apex Court on its earlier decision in Pio Food Packers (1980) 46 STC 63 (SC).
Then, the word "production" is considered to be of a wider connotation than the word "manufacture". It is observed that while manufacture can be characterised as production, every production need not amount to manufacture. The word "production" or "produce", when used in juxtaposition with the word "manufacture", takes in bringing into existence. Learned senior tax counsel, placing reliance on the above decisions of the apex Court with reference thereto, has submitted that the apex Court in unequivocal terms, leaving no manner of doubt, has declared the law in regard to the situation as to what is to be understood as manufacture and/or production in the context of the situation under consideration to be applied to the various statutory provisions, not only of the Income-tax Act, 1961, but also with regard to the provisions of the Sales Tax Act and Excise Act in regard thereto. Learned senior tax counsel also brought to our notice, by referring to these decisions in extenso, that even the apex Court, while dealing with the situation under the Income-tax Act, has not considered to be under any fetters to refer to its earlier decisions under the provisions of the ' Sales Tax Act, because it is the determination of the nature of activity whether it is for consideration of the benefits of the Sales Tax Act or for the benefits of the Central Sales Tax Act or Central Excise Act, the situation would not be of a different character in regard to its application. Learned senior tax counsel made us conscious and aware of Article 141 of the Constitution of India to the effect that the declaration of law made by the Supreme Court has an absolute binding character, on all Courts within the territory of India and on the basis thereof contended that even if in a given situation, a distinction is made out to the effect that the decisions of the apex court rendered under the provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961, would not govern the situations required to be considered with reference to proceedings either under the Sales Tax Act or under the Central Excise Act, such a situation can never be meaningful in terms of Article 141 of the Constitution. Learned senior tax counsel submitted that the question is completely answered by the above decisions of the apex Court. Learned senior tax counsel also submitted that reading the factual peculiarities of the said four decisions of the apex Court, the question would not be leaving any doubt in regard thereto, because the apex Court had an occasion to consider the situation with reference to the meaningful nature of activities and that the apex Court had considered the situation with regard to the problem relating to the claim for deduction by a contractor engaged in the construction of a dam. He also submitted that the question has also been considered by the apex Court, in fact, to a situation in regard to shrimps, prawns and lobsters appearing in the process without heads and tails thereof, whether could be considered as a manufacture or production activity in regard thereto. Learned senior tax counsel also submitted that again in the same spirit the apex Court had considered a situation as to whether in the processing of pineapples peeling the rough skin and cutting the fruit for the purpose new goods by a process which may or may not amount to manufacture. It also takes in all the by products, intermediate products and residual products which emerge in the course of manufacture of goods. It is also observed that the expressions "manufacture" and "produce" are normally associated with movable articles and goods, big and small but they are never employed to denote the construction activity of the nature involved in the construction of a dam or a building.
It is then the word "article" is taken up for consideration noting that the said word is not defined in the Income-tax Act or the Rules and, therefore, must be understood in its normal connotation, in the sense in which it is understood in the commercial world. In the said process, it is observed that the word "article" cannot comprehend or take within its ambit a dam, a bridge, a road, a canal and so on.
In all these processes of reasoning, a warning has been given by the apex Court that the temptation to adopt a liberal interpretation advancing the purpose and object of beneficent provisions cannot be carried to the extent of doing violence to the plain and simple language used in the enactment. It is not possible and permissible to rewrite the section or substitute words of its own for the actual words employed by the Legislature in the name of giving effect to the supposed underlying object.
We have carefully gone through the entire judgment in N.C. Budharaja 's 'case (1994) 204 ITR 412 (SC). Although the apex Court was dealing with the claim under section 80-HH of the Income-tax Act, 1961, at the instance of the assessee engaged in constructing a dam, we find that in the process of reasoning, the apex Court has placed reliance on its earlier decision in Pio Food Packers' case (1980) 46 STC 63 (SC), which was a case with regard to levy of sales tax, in the spirit that the meaning of the expression "manufacture" was considered earlier by the apex Court. Not content with this, we also find that it was the approach on the basis of the test determined in the said decision of Pio Food Packers' case (1980) 46 STC 63 (SC) dealing with levy of sales tax that the apex Court has followed the said test in its application to a claim under the Income-tax Act. At page 423 of N.C. Budharaja 's case (1993) 204 ITR 412 (SC), in fact a passage from the earlier decision of the Apex Court Pio Food Packers' case (1980) 46 STC 63 (SC), at page 65 thereof has been quoted ad verbum. We find that what is relied upon is the foundation laid by the said earlier decision that commonly, manufacture is the end result of one or more process through which the original commodity is made to pass and to record thereafter that with each process suffered, the original commodity experiences a change and it is only when the change, or a series of changes, take the commodity to the point where commercially it can no longer be regarded as the original commodity but instead is recognised as a new and distinct article that a manufacture can be said to take place.
It is in this process, the word "manufacture" is understood as bringing into existence new goods by a process which may or may not amount to manufacture.
Thereafter, it is emphasised that all by products, intermediate products and residual products which emerge in the course of manufacture of goods are also to be taken into consideration. Thereafter, the question is posed as to what does "article" mean, being conscious that the word "article" 'is not defined in the Act or in the Rules. The apex Court has emphasised that, therefore, the word "article" would have to be understood in its normal connotation---That the sense in which it is understood in the commercial world. In the context, it is observed that the word "article" is preceded by the words "it has begun or begins to manufacture or produce". A question is posed as to whether the word "article" comprehends and takes within its ambit a dam, a bridge or a building.
Thus, we find that the apex Court, in regard to the question that what should be understood with reference to the words "manufacture, production, produce and articles", has even considered not only the decisions of other High Courts, but also the decision of the House of Lords in Longhurst v. Guildford Godalming and District Water Board (1961) 3 All ER 545.
In our judgment, practically, all that is needed as required to be applied to the factual matrix before us is available in the decision of N.C. Budharaja's case (1993) 204 ITR 412 (SC). Although a claim of the contractors with regard to the provisions of section 80-HH of the Income-tax Act, 1961, was required to be considered therein, in our judgment that makes no difference to the situation.
A little earlier in Delhi Cold Storage's case (1991) 191 ITR 656, the apex Court had an occasion to consider the terms "manufacture or processing of goods" to determine as to whether the assessee could be understood as industrial company dealing with cold storage with regard to the direct question in, regard thereto as to whether it would amount to process or processing n the context of the activity. The apex Court has observed that in common parlance, "pressing" is understood as an action which brings forth some change or alteration of the goods or material subjected to the act of processing. This has been applied to the situation of the assessee-company being concerned with cold storage wherein vegetables, fruits and several other articles requiring preservation by refrigeration were stored. The apex Court ruled that the stored article could not be understood to have undergone a process which was the requirement within the meaning of section 2(7)(c) of the Finance Act, 1973, leading to the ultimate conclusion that running a cold storage could not lead to the conclusion that the assessee-company was an industrial company.
It would be found that therein also, the apex Court had an occasion to refer to the decisions of the various High Courts such as the Calcutta High Court, the Allahabad High Court and an earlier decision of the apex Court, Chowgule & Co. (P.) Ltd. v. Union of India (1981) 47 STC 124 yet another sales tax matter to find out the true meaning of the words "manufacturing and processing". In fact, paragraph from Chowgule's case (1981) 47 STC 124 (SC) is found quoted at page 659 of the report again to emphasise the experience of some change as a result of the processing. The apex Court also has relied on the said judgment accepting the proposition with regard to the experience of a change emphasising that the said aspect also received endorsement elsewhere. In fact, we find from the judgment that the Allahabad and the Calcutta High Courts, decisions had been overruled taking a contrary view relating to the process of air-conditioning as a process of storing articles showing a change in regard thereto. Thus, we find that the same principle has been considered with regard to the cold storage activity of the assessee under the Income-tax Act with the aid of its earlier decision dealing with the liability under the Sales Tax Act.
Still going back in the process, is a third decision of the apex Court in Pio Food Packers' case (1980) 46 STC 63 (SC). The apex Court in that case was concerned with a question of purchase tax deductions in relation to the activity of processing of pineapple fruits into pineapple slices for being sold in sealed cans. It is specifically observed that when pineapple fruit is processed into pineapple slices for the purpose of being sold in sealed cans, there is no consumption of the original pineapple fruit for the purpose of manufacture and the case does not fall within section 5-A (1)(a) of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963. The apex Court has observed that although a degree of processing is involved in preparing pineapple slices from the original fruit, the commodity continues to possess its original identity, notwithstanding the removal of inedible portions, the slicing and thereafter, canning it on adding sugar to preserve it. In the process of reasoning, the apex Court has also emphasised that commonly manufacture is the end result of one or more processes through which the original commodity is made to pass. The nature and extent of processing may very from one case to another and there may be several stages of processing and a different kind of processing at each stage. What is emphasised is that with each process suffered, the original commodity experiences a change and it is only where the change or a series of changes take the commodity to the point where commercially it can no longer be regarded as the original commodity but instead is recognised as a new and distinct article that a manufacture can be said to take place. It is emphasised that although it has undergone a degree of processing, it must be regarded as still retaining its original identity and the fact as to whether the original identity is retained, the situation has to be appreciated in the light of what is understood in the context of the commercial character of the nature of the process, meaning thereby what is necessary to understand is, as to how the commodity is understood, whether different from the original or an aspect of the same original commodity in terms of the concerned commercial commodity in the context of understanding the concerned commercial commodity. Thus, we find from the said judgment the application of the well-known accepted principles to the factual matrix. In the process of discussion, the apex Court has also considered the situation relating to raw tobacco necessary in the process of manufacture of bidis. It has also considered the situation of raw hides and skins which constituted a different commodity from dressed hides and skins with different physical properties. It has also considered the question of raw tobacco manufactured into chewing tobacco as well as paddy dehusked into rice, in order to deal with the situation and contention where the original commodity would appear to have undergone a change as a result of the degree of processing. A situation of hydrogenated groundnut oil whether to be regarded as groundnut oil or not as well as bristles plucked from pigs, boiled, washed with soap and other chemicals and sorted out in bundles according to their size could be considered as the same commercial commodity as pig bristles has also been considered leading to the proposition enunciated hereinbefore.
The fourth decision of the apex Court in Sterling Foods case (1986) 63 STC 239 relating to the applicability of section 5(3) of the Central Sales Tax Act statutorily requiring that the goods which are purchased by the assessee for the purpose of complying with the agreement or order for or in relation to export, must be the same goods which are exported out of the territory of India. In order to understand as to whether the goods exported are the same, the apex Court was concerned with the situation as to whether the said goods that are exported changed their identity so that commercially they can no longer be regarded as the original goods but instead become a new and. different kind of goods. The situation of processed or frozen shrimps, prawns and lobsters was taken up for consideration as to whether they could be commercially regarded as the same commodity as shrimps, prawns and lobsters. Again, in the process of reasoning, the apex Court has answered the question that they can still go under the description of shrimps, prawns and lobsters only, as raw shrimps, prawns and lobsters, even though 1-ro their heads and tails are separated for the purpose of storage and preservation. This was with reference to the provisions of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957. It is necessary to note that the apex Court here also has drawn from the observations in the context with approval made by it earlier in Pio Food Packers' case (1980) 46 STC 63 (SC). It is observed that if dressed and frozen chicken was a commercially distinct article from the original chickens, it must follow again with the reasoning that the processed or frozen shrimps, prawns and lobsters cannot be regarded as commercially distinct from the raw shrimps, prawns and lobsters.
Going through the above four decisions of the apex Court, there cannot be any doubt that whether the Court is to consider the proceedings under the Sales Tax Act or proceedings under the Central Sales Tax Act or proceedings with regard to the relevant statutory provisions under the Income-tax Act. Some of the features that are available from the above decisions of the apex Court would govern and rule the situation and it is not possible to understand the situation in the meaningful approach, especially in the context of specific question in regard thereto given by the apex Court in Budharaja's case (1993) 204 ITR 412.
It will have to be observed that the meaningful approach cannot do violence to the plain language. We emphasise that what is manufactured and/or produced has to be understood on the basis of the subsequent word taking colour from the earlier word. In this situation, it will have to be understood that it would be the duty of the Court as to whether in regard to the concerned process, may be from stage to stage, as required in the concerned process, is there any change of such a character that at that stage of the change, a commercially different article is available. In other words, the process concerned in the production of final product is such that during its pathway, there was no situation of change in the context of the commercial necessity as has been emphasised. The situation cannot be understood even as production related to the process of manufacturing taking obvious colour therefrom. The Court also will have to consider the situation right from the point of origin down to the final stage in the process under consideration to find out as to whether at any time any change appeared and from stage to stage in regard thereto, the change was such that it related to a commercially distinct article in the process with reference to the stage under consideration. If, on the basis of the examination of the factual matrix before it, the Court finds that in the process at different stages a change was perceptible in such a way that commercially from stage to stage different articles appeared and the process was terminated by the final product, the real article, meaningful in the context of its commercial character. In our judgment, whether it is a question of levy of sales tax, whether it is a question of deduction or claim under the Income-tax Act, 1961, or may be in regard to claim for levy of excise, the situation would not alter with regard to the application of the above principles, which are declared by the above four decisions of the apex Court. Therefore, it is not permissible for us to consider otherwise.
We have already spread over the factual matrix in necessary detail with the benefit of the entering of a finding of fact by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal in regard to the assessment year 1978-79 emphasising its finality. Carefully considering the process, we find that all the nine stages of the process do not show any kind of change or a commercially different commodity is not seen .to be passing through the various stages of the process. It cannot be ignored that in common parlance, "coffee" means coffee powder, a beverage consumed as either a hot or cold drink. At no stage, this colour combination between manufacture and production has its manifestation. We have already observed that the entire activity that is to be found from the factual matrix spread over by the Tribunal as a factual situation would not show that the activity can be understood either as manufacture or production in accordance with the law declared in the above four decisions of the apex Court. We would like to note that the judgment of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, dated July 18, 1994, recording the factual situation has been the basis, for the reasons already recorded by us in regard thereto. It is this situation that closes the gates with regard to the finding of fact in regard to the situation, may be with regard to another assessment year. We emphasise this because the finality of the situation rules out any necessity of a remand, again for the same purpose.
For all the above reasons, we answer the question in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee in both these references.
A copy of this judgment, under the seal of this Court and the signature of the Registrar, shall be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench, as required by law.
M.B.A./2055/FCReference answered.