JAYAMAL JAYANTILAL THAKORE VS CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX
1999 P T D 3407
[230 I T R 142]
[Gujarat High Court (India)]
Before R.A. Mehta, Actg. C.J. and R.K. Abichandani, J
JAYAMAL JAYANTILAL THAKORE and another
Versus
CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX and others
Special Civil Applications Nos. 7417 with 9390 of 1996, decided on 18/06/1997.
(a) Income-tax---
----Writ---Powers of High Court under Art. 226---Allegation regarding concealment of income by public authority and failure of I.T. Authorities to investigate it---High Court can issue writ compelling I.T: Authorities to conduct investigation---Finding that investigation had been initiated---High Court cannot issue direction to Special Investigative' Agency or monitor the investigations---Indian Income Tax Act, 1961---Constitution of India, Arts. 142 & 226.
(b) Income-tax.
----Income-tax Authorities---Powers of Assessing Officer---Power coupled With duty to exercise them where necessary---Indian Income Tax Act, 1961.
The Assessing Officer has important statutory functions to discharge. In the very nature of the things empowered to be done, and in the very nature of the object for which the provisions of the Income Tax Act, 1961, are enacted, as also the conditions in which the powers are to be exercised by the Assessing Officers under the Act, it is clear that these powers are coupled with a duty to exercise them when the statutoryprovisions warrant their exercise. If a statute invests a public officer with an authority to do an act in a specified set of circumstances, it is imperative upon him to exercise his authority in a manner appropriate to the things when a party interested and having a right to apply, moves in that behalf, and circumstances for exercise of that authority are shown to exist. Even if the words used in the statute are prima facie enabling, the Courts will readily infer a duty to exercise power which is invested in aid of enforcement of a right, public or private, of a citizen or for the safeguard of public revenue. It is implicit in the nature of power and its entrustment to the authority invested with such functions of assessment under the Act to exercise the power when the conditions for its exercise are shown to exist and refusal to exercise the powers when required to be exercised under the law, would amount to failure of duty. If there is failure of duty on the part of the Income-tax Authority in discharging its statutory functions, then the High Court will have jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution for issuing a writ of mandamus. This has nothing to do with the powers of the Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, since the High Court would in such a case be exercising its own Constitutional powers under Article 226 and will not be assuming the plenary powers of the Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution However, it is not for the High Court to do any day today monitoring of any statutory investigations which are being carried out by the authorities. The High Court cannot substitute its own opinion for the opinion of the statutory authorities or prescribe its own mode in place of the mode of investigation and enquiry prescribed under the law. The statutory functions of those Assessing Officers culminate in certain statutory orders against which appeal and revision provisions are made under the Act and beyond which there are provisions for making references to the High Court and filing appeals to the Supreme Court. In the very nature of these statutory provisions, there is no scope for the High Court to monitor the proceedings by day-to-day supervision of the manner in which the statutory authority exercises its function.
The petitioners, in writ petitions, sought a direction to the Income tax Authorities to enquire into and investigate the sources of income in the light of huge expenses alleged to have been incurred by the Chief Minister of the State when several M.L.As. of a certain political party were taken to Khajuraho in October, 1995, and during t'tte marriage reception of the Chief Minister's son and in holding "Mahasammelan' at Ahmedabad on August 22. 1996. A direction was also sough; that the Central Bureau of Investigation should be directed to investigate into the incident and ,file a complaint against the Chief Minister of the State, and another person:
Held, (i) that the preliminary objection to the power of the High Court to entertain the writ petition was not valid. Public interest was involved when the nature of the controversy was of public nature and the public would be vitally concerned and legally interested in the results of the inquiry into the allegations. Both ways it would be in public interest to find out the truth or falsity of allegations. The contention that there were allegations in the petition which indicated that political rivalry was the basis of the petition, was not sufficient to hold that the petition was not maintainable on that count.
(ii) that it was stated that the income-tax Department had initiated investigation and the same was being pursued thoroughly and that on completion thereof, necessary action would be taken in accordance with law. There was no reason to doubt these averments made on oath on behalf of the respondent authorities which clearly indicated that these Income-tax Authorities were quite aware of their functions under the Act in the context of the allegations made and that they had been doing the investigations in accordance with law. There was, therefore, no need to issue any directions to them or to keep the petitions pending. Absolutely no ground was made out at this premature stage where not even offences were alleged, to issue any directions to the Central Board of Investigation. No direction as required by the petitioners could be given.
Chhetriya Pardushan Mukti Sangharsh Samiti v. State of U.P. AIR 1990 SC 2060; Hirday Narain (L.) v. ITO (1970) 78 ITR 26 (SC); Mohammed Anis v. Union of India (1994) Suppl. 1 SCC 145; State of Gujarat v. Shankarji Chaturji (1996) 3 GLR 755; State of Punjab v. Surinderkumar AIR 1992 SC 1593; State of West Bengal v. Sampat Lal AIR-1985 SC 195; Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India AIR 1992 SC 248 and (1991) 4 SCC 584 ref.
K.A. Puj for Petitioner (in S.C.A. No.7417 of 1996).
Y.N. Oza for Petitioner (in S.C.A. No.9390 of 1996).
S. N . Shelat, Additional Advocate-General with Manish R. Bhatt for Respondents Nos. l and 2 (in S.C A. No.7417 of 1996 and for Respondent No.5 (in S. C. A. No. 9390 of 1996).
H.M. Mehta, Senior Advocate with Ms. Avni S. Mehta for Respondent No.3 (in S.C.A. No.7417 of 1996).
S.B. Vakil with R.S. Sanjanwala for Respondent No.4 (in S.C.A. No.7417 of 1996) and for Respondent No.3 (in S.C.A. No.9390 of 1996).
H.M. Mehta, Senior Advocate with Ketan A. Dave for Respondent No. l (in S.C. A. No. 9390 of 1996).
Amit J. Shah for Respondent No.2 (in S.C.A. No.9390 of 1996).
JUDGMENT
R. K. ABICHANDANI; J.---In these two writ petitions which were heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment, the petitioners have sought a direction to the income-tax authorities to enquire into and investigate the sources of income in the light of huge expenses alleged to have been incurred by respondent No.4 when several B.J.P. M.L.As. were taken to Khajuraho in October, 1995, and during the marriage reception of the son of respondent No.4, Mr. Shankarsinh Lakshmansinh Waghela, and in holding "Mahasammelan" at Ahmedabad on August 22, 1996. A direction is also sought in Special C.A. No.9390 of 1996 that the C.B.I. should be directed to investigate into the incident and file a complaint against Mr. Shankarsinh Lakshmansinh Waghela, the Chief Minister of the State, and Shri C.K. Raolji.
Notice was issued on October 15, 1996, in Special C.A. No.7417 of 1996, and on November 7, 1996, in Special C.A. No.9390 of 1996.
According to the petitioners in Special Civil Application No.7417 of 1996, petitioner No. 1 is a reputed chartered accountant and a social worker, while petitioner No.2 is an Advocate as well as a social worker. According to them, -they are crusaders against public wrongs done by politicians, in the larger interest of public life and they have preferred this petition as public interest litigation to safeguard the interest of the public exchequer. The petitioner in Special C.A. No.9390 of 1996 has stated that he is a social worker and he has filed the petition to point out the illegality and irregularities committed by Mr. Shankarsinh Waghela (who is respondent No.3 in that petition) in collusion with respondent, No.4, Shri C.K. Raolji and others. According to this petition, these respondents have done public wrongs and have acted against the interest of the public and huge amounts were paid by them to the M.L.As. for supporting them to acquire power in the State of Gujarat.
In Special Civil Application No.7417 of 1996, it is alleged that respondent No.4, Mr. Shankarsinh Waghela, earlier belonged to the Bharatiya Janata Party and with a view to over-throw the elected council of ministers, he had revolted "with muscle and money power..." and misusing black money, enticed the elected B:J.P. legislators and lured them by illegal means taking them to Khajuraho in Madhya Pradesh by a chartered plane and treating them in a five star hotel, thereby incurring expenses of lakbs of rupees with a view to destabilise the ruling Government. It is -further alleged that respondent No.4 had arranged an expensive marriage reception for his son's wedding wherein more than 50,000 persons attended and were treated sumptuously to dinner, the cost of which was not less than Rs.200 per head. According to the petitioners, the said respondent is expected to explain the sources of the huge expenditure incurred in the marriage reception of his son and at Khajuraho. It. is further alleged that Mr. Shankarsinh Waghela, respondent No.4, with a view to demonstrate his grip and impact on the legislators, arranged a Mahasammelan on August 22, 1996, spending a huge. amount for collecting people to attend the Sammelan at Ahmedabad. It is also alleged that respondent No.4 thereafter, had taken about 25 legislators of the Bharatiya Janata Party to Diu, housing them in a five star hotel and tempting them with money which they could not have earned in their whole life.
According to petitioner No.2, he had made several representations to the Chief Commissioner of Income-tax, respondent No. 1, for investigating and making inquiries into the sources of acquisition of the amounts which were incurred as expenses on such huge scale, but no action was taken under the provisions of sections 131, 132, 132-A, 133, 133-A, 133-B and 135 of the Income-tax Act, which, he ought to have taken in the interest of public exchequer. According to the petitioners, the reports published in the newspapers also provided this information to the Income-tax Department. However, the Chief Commissioner of Income-tax and the Director-General of Income-tax, who are respondents Nos. l and 2, did not take any action against respondent No.4 because he was a political leader.
The petitioners have set out so-called admissions made by respondent No.4 in an interview telecast by Zee T.V. at 10-00 a.m. on September 22, 1996. A typed version of the interview said to have been telecast on September 22, 1996, is annexed at Annexure-C to the petition. Certain statements paid to have been given by Dr. K.C.' Patel, Girish Parmar, Pratapsinh Patel, Ramjibhai Parmar, and published in the Indian Express of September 9, 1996, were relied upon in support of the allegation that they were offered huge amounts of money and position for crossing over to the "Waghela camp". On these allegations, a direction is sought on respondents Nos. l, 2 and 3 income-tax authorities, to thoroughly investigate into the financial aspects of Shri Shankarsinh Waghela and his associates.
In Special Civil Application No.9390 of 1996 it is alleged that a letter was written on September 1, 1995, by Shri C.K. Raolji to Shri Shankarsinh Waghela, which indicated that the payments were made to five persons named therein. According to the petitioners, more than 2 crores of rupees were given for "purchasing" the M.L.As. to support Shri Shankarsinh Waghela to become the Chief Minister of Gujarat. It is alleged that by using illegal means" with muscle and money power, being black money extracted from the industrialists, black-marketeers, builders, school management racketeers, etc." Mr. Shankarsinh Waghela "purchased" the M.L.As. for supporting him to become the Chief Minister of Gujarat. Allegations of offers being made to various M.L.As. at the behest of Mr. Shankarsinh Waghela have been made in the petition and as noted above, a direction is sought for an investigation through the C.B.I. and for a complaint being filed against Shri Waghela and Shri Raolji.
Mr. Shankarsinh Waghela (respondent No.4 in Special C.A. No.7417 of 1996 and respondent No.3 in Special C.A. No.9390 of 1996) has, in his affidavit in reply, strongly refuted the allegations made by the petitioners. According to him, the allegations made against him are false assertions and are politically motivated. The letter, dated September 1, 1996, allegedly written by Shri C.K. Raolji to him is, according to him and Shri Raolji, clearly forged and fabricated. Shri Raolji in his affidavit in reply filed in Special C.A. No.9390 of 1996 has categorically denied the averments about his having written the alleged letter, dated September 1, 1996. It is stated that an immediate denial of that letter on the very next day was published.
It is stated that there is no public interest involved in the petition. It is further alleged that "the petition has been filed only with a view to settle political vendetta and to further the political interest of B.J.P.". According to this respondent; the petition is an attempt to bring the political fight into the Court and the petitioners are not acting bona fide and have no locus standi to maintain the petition. It is contended that the sole basis of the petition is the letter, dated October 5, 1995, allegedly addressed by petitioner No.2 to the Chief Commissioner of Income-tax and that the said letter was politically motivated. According to this respondent, the request made to the Income-tax Authorities to take direct action under section 132 of-the Income-tax Act, was on the face of it untenable. Respondent No.4 has refuted the allegations made against him in the petition and prayed for dismissal of the petition, which according to him contains fabricated and unwarranted allegations against him, with a view to tarnish his image. It is contended that exemplary costs should be awarded to this respondent, so as to discourage mala fide abuse of process of this Court.
Mr. C.K. Raolji in his affidavit filed in Special C.A. No.9390 of 1996 has refuted the various allegations made in the petition and prayed for the dismissal of the petition with exemplary costs.
Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners have contended that the petitioners have no personal interest in these matters and these petitions are filed only with a view to ensure that the Income-tax Department does not shield the leaders and investigates into the allegations made in the press and brought to their notice by one of the petitioners, to ensure that the interest of the public exchequer does not suffer. According to him, the petitioners strongly apprehend that unless the investigation and inquiry are directed and monitored by this Court to their logical conclusion, the Income-tax Authorities may not discharge their public duty and functions. It was also submitted that the C.B.I. being an independent Investigating Agency, should be directed to investigate and prosecute if any offences are found to have been committed under the Income-tax Act and any other laws. It was submitted that various press cuttings and copies of other documents on which reliance was placed by the petitioners were already brought to the notice of the Income-tax Authorities by the petitioners but no action has been taken which has created an apprehension in the minds of the petitioners that the authorities will not discharge their duties under the law.
Learned counsel appearing for respondent No.4 raising a preliminary contention against the maintainability of this petition, strongly contended that this Court should not entertain a petition of this nature, which according to him, was filed with an. oblique political motive by the petitioners who had a personal axe to grind against respondent No.4. It was contended that the High Court cannot exercise its powers under Article 226 by directing such enquiries and investigations as are sought for in these petitions which are not bona fide public interest litigation, but are political blackmail. Learned counsel argued that the direction for exercise of power which can be given by the Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India cannot be given by the High Court while exercising powers under Article 226. It was submitted that the cases decided by the Supreme Court in exercise of its powers under Article 142 cannot afford any guidance to the High Courts while exercising their powers under Article 226.
Relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Muhammad Anis v. Union of India (1994) Suppl. 1 SCC 145, it was contended that since the power of the apex Court under Article 142(1) cannot be diluted merely because of the provisions of a statute such as grant of State Government's permission under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, the Supreme Court could issue directions to the C.B.I. in exercise of its plenary powers under Article '142(1) which the High Court does not possess. Reliance was also placed on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India, AIR 1992 SC 248, 4 SCC 584 and State of West Bengal v. Sampat Lal, AIR 1985 SC 195, to emphasise that the power under Article (42(1) was at an entirely a different level and of different quality. It was, therefore, submitted that directions cannot be given by the High Court under Article 226 to the C.B.I. to make investigation in the matter, since the Delhi Special Police was constituted under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, and could function only under that Act. Learned counsel for the respondent also relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Chhetriya Pardushan Mukti Sangharsh Samiti v. State of U.P. AIR 1990 SC 2060, in which it was held in the context of P.I.L., that, "this weapon as a safeguard must be utilised and invoked by the Court with a great deal of circumspection and caution. Where it appears that this is only a cloak to 'feed fact ancient grudge' and enmity, this should not only be refused but strongly discouraged." It was contended that the Income-tax Act provided for powers to the Income-tax Authorities and those powers were not powers coupled with duty and, therefore, no question of failure of duty cari arise under the Act so as to warrant issuance of a writ of mandamus under Article 226 of the Constitution. Learned counsel relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in L. Hirday Narain v. ITO (1970) 78 ITR 26 in this regard, submitting that the concept of power and the concept of duty were different concepts and duty was not necessarily to be implied in all cases where power is conferred.
Learned counsel appearing for the respondent authorities submitted that the authorities are discharging their functions under the Income-tax Act and there was no need for the petitioners to apprehend that the respondent authorities will not discharge their statutory functions merely because allegations were made against a person holding a high public office. An affidavit has been filed by the Director-General of Income-tax, showing the action that is being taken in the matter.
There can be no doubt about the proposition that the powers of the Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution empowering the Supreme Court to make any decree or order as may be found by it to be necessary for doing complete justice in any case or in a matter pending before it are of plenary nature and similar powers do not vest in the High Court and cannot be invoked from the concept of any inherent powers of the High Court nor can such powers be read in Article 226 of the Constitution. As held by the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Surinder Kumar, AIR 1992 SC 1593, the Constitution has, by Article 142, empowered the Supreme Court to make such orders as may be necessary "for doing complete justice in any case or matter pending before it", which authority the High Court does not enjoy. It was held that the jurisdiction of the High Court, while dealing with a writ petition, is circumscribed by the limitations discussed and described by the judicial, decisions, and it cannot transgress the limits on the basis of whims or a subjective sense of justice varying from Judge to Judge. Thus, the High Court would not be entitled to pass any order, which it thought fit in the interest of justice, but, which may be contrary to statutory provision. (see State of Gujarat v. Shankarji Chaturji (1996) 3 GLR 755).
However, from this proposition, one cannot contend that in the matters in which the Supreme Court has exercised powers under Article 142, those matters stand excluded from the ambit of powers of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The scope of the powers of the High Court to issue writs and like orders under Article 226 is to be considered in the context of the controversy that may arise before the High Court and the provisions of Article 226. Therefore, when a question regarding issuance of a writ of mandamus arises and the petitioner establishes failure of duty on the part of a public authority, the High Court in its discretion can issue a direction to the public authority to discharge its statutory functions. These directions would obviously, be given only within the ambit of the statutory provisions governing the powers of the public authority and cannot be given de hors the valid statutory provisions. In the present case, serious allegations are made against a high public functionary and it is apprehended that the public officers of the Income-tax Department have failed in their duties to look into the allegations of concealment of income which according to the petitioners, went into incurring of huge expenditure. This Court is not at all at this stage concerned with the truth or falsity of these allegations. The question is whether there is any failure of duty on the part of the income-tax authority as alleged. If there is failure of duty on the part of the income-tax authority in discharging their statutory functions, then obviously the High Court will have jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution for issuing a writ of mandamus. This has nothing to do with the powers of the apex Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, since the High Court would in such a case be exercising its own, Constitutional powers under Article 226 and will not be assuming the plenary powers of the Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution. Therefore, the preliminary contention against the High Court's power to entertain such public interest litigation on this count, fails. Moreover, it cannot be said that there is no public interest involved when the nature of the controversy is of public nature and the public will be vitally concerned and legally interested in the result of the inquiry into the allegations. Both ways it would be in the public interest to find out the truth or falsity of the allegations.
It will be noticed from the provisions of the Income-tax Act that the Assessing Officers have ample powers to proceed against tax evaders. An. assessee whose income exceeds the maximum amount which is not chargeable to income-tax has an obligation to file a return of his income in the prescribed form and verified in the prescribed manner, as provided by section 139 of the Act. The Assessing Officer is required to make enquiry before assessment, as provided under section 142 of the Act. With a view to ensure that an assessee has not understated the income or has not underpaid the tax in any manner, the Assessing Officer shall, if he considers it necessary or expedient, serve a notice on the assessee requiring him to attend his office and produce evidence as provided under subsection (2) of section 143 of the Act. Section 144 empowers the Assessing Officer to make the assessment to the best of his judgment in-the circumstances mentioned therein. Where the income reasonably appears to have escaped assessment, the Assessing Officer is empowered to issue notice to the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment. There are provisions regarding rectification of mistakes under section 154 and appeals and revision provisions under Chapter XX of the Act under which the aggrieved assessee or even the Department can approach higher forums mentioned therein. There are also provisions for making reference to the High Court and filing appeals to the Supreme Court, in that Chapter.
It will thus, be seen that the Assessing Officer has important statutory functions to discharge. It can never be said that his powers to make assessment or to ascertain whether there has been full and true disclosure are powers which are not coupled with duty, to discharge those functions. The Assessing Officer must in accordance with the statutory provisions discharge his functions and it cannot be said that an Assessing Officer can refuse to discharge his function even when the statutory provisions require him to act in a particular way. In the very nature of the things empowered to be done, and in the very nature of the object for which the provisions of the Income -tax Act are enacted as also the conditions in which the powers are to be exercised by the Assessing Officer under the Act, it is clear that these powers are coupled with a duty to exercise them when the statutory provisions warrant their exercise. If a statute invests a public officer with an authority to do an act in a specified set of circumstances, it is imperative upon him to exercise his authority in a manner appropriate to the things when a party interested and having a right to apply, moves in that behalf, and circumstances for exercise of that authority are shown to exist. Even if the words used in the statute are prima facie enabling, the Courts will readily infer a duty to exercise power which is invested in aid of enforcement of a right, public or private, of a citizen or for the safeguard of public revenue.
In Hirday Narain (1970) 78 ITR 26 (SC), where an application for rectification of a mistake apparent on record was made under section 35 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, it was held by the Supreme Court that it cannot be said that the jurisdiction of the Income-tax Officer under section 35 to -rectify mistakes was discretionary and, therefore, even if the conditions for its- exercise are shown to have existed, he can decline to exercise the power. It is, therefore, implicit in the nature of power and its entrustment to the authority invested with such functions of assessment under the Act to exercise the power when the conditions for its exercise are shown to exist and refusal to exercise the powers when required to be exercised under the law would amount to failure of duty. It can, therefore, never be said that a writ of mandamus cannot issue against an Income-tax Authority which may have failed in discharge of its statutory functions in a given case. This power clearly flows from the nature of the writ of mandamus which the High Court can issue under Article 226 of the Constitution.
The contention that there are allegations in the petition which indicate that political rivalry is the basis of the petition, is not sufficient to hold that the petition is not maintainable on that count. In a matter of this nature it is the political rivalry which would prompt certain facts to be brought to the surface, matters which otherwise in an atmosphere of complete harmony amongst political forces, would hardly come to light. One cannot expect such allegations coming from friends and well-wishers. Therefore, to throw the petitions out merely when some political slant may be there, would not be appropriate and the Court may have to ascertain prima facie the allegations which `have a bearing on the failure of duty on the part of public authorities while not being coloured by any exaggerations or incidental motives that may be underlying the matter. It would riot be the duty of the Court at all in such matters to verify or express any opinion. on the truth or otherwise of the allegations which would be the function of the concerned public authority required to investigate and decide the matter. The only aspect which is required to be examined is whether the concerned authority is taking into consideration the subject-matter which may bring about a situation where it is required to function in a particular way as statutorily enjoined.
For the above reasons, we are unable to uphold the preliminary objection raised on behalf of respondent No.4 against the maintainability of the petition and we are of the view that the petitions cannot be thrown out at the threshold without ascertaining whether the concerned Income-tax Authorities are alive to their duties under the Act in the context of the allegations made against a higher State functionary.
It has been brought on record by the affidavit of the Director -General of Income-tax that a letter, dated October 5, 1995, was received even before filing of these petitions by the Chief Commissioner of Income tax from the free legal-aid society, a copy of which is at Annexure-A to the petition, regarding the expenses incurred on the stay of the B.J.P. M.L.As at Khajuraho. It is stated that the said letter which was sent by the petitioner No.2 was transferred to the Deputy Director of Income-tax (Investigation) who, in turn, after the verification of the complaint, wrote to his counterpart at Jabalpur for getting necessary enquiries conducted. It is stated that in view of the news story published in newspapers, Investigation was started on the subject in February 1996, and the enquiry was allotted to the concerned unit. On August 13, 1996, a meeting took place amongst the concerned officers of the Income-tax Department as to the mode of enquiry to be adopted. An urgent report was called for front the concerned units investigating the matter. Some of the reports were received on October 31, 1996. A report was also received on November 6, 1996, from the Deputy Director of Income-tax, Jabalpur, as regards the expenditure on the stay of the M.L.As. Khajuraho. It is also stated on oath that statements of various persons connected with the occasions stated in the petition, have been recorded under section 131 and/or section 133-A of the Income-tax Act. Statements of several persons who are named in the affidavit-in-reply have been recorded by the Department and summonses have been issued to certain M.L.As. named in the affidavit, to furnish particulars of their incomes and investments. Respondent No.4 was also issued a letter and after receipt of his reply a query list alongwith the summons was issued. After giving the necessary particulars; it has been stated that the Income-tax Department is Proceeding with the investigation. It is stated that since the alleged incidents have taken place at various places, the concerned Assistant Directors of Investigation are entrusted with the enquiry and investigation is proceeding. It is stated that the Income-tax Department has initiated the action of investigation and the same is being pursued thoroughly and that on completion thereof, necessary action will be taken in accordance with law.
We have no reason to doubt these averments made on oath on behalf of the respondent authorities which clearly indicate that these Income-tax Authorities are quite aware of their functions under the Act in the context of the allegations made and that they have been doing the investigations in accordance with law and this is not a case where there is any failure of duty on their part.
It was contended on behalf of the petitioners that these petitions should be kept pending and the particulars of the investigation should be examined from time to time by this Court. It is not for the High Court to do any day-to-day monitoring of any statutory investigations which are being carried out by the authorities. The High Court cannot substitute its own opinion for the opinion of the statutory authorities or prescribe its own mode in place of the mode of investigation and enquiry prescribed under the law. The statutory functions of these Assessing Officers culminate in certain statutory orders against which appeal and revision provisions are made under the Act and beyond which there are provisions for making references to the High Court and filing appeals to the Supreme Court. In the very nature of these statutory provisions, there is no scope for the High Court to monitor the proceedings by day-to-day supervision of the manner in which the statutory authority exercises its function. Obviously, the High Court cannot be expected to assume the powers of the statutory authorities or guide their hand and action in a particular direction. That surely is not the scope of mandamus. The only aspect which can merit the attention of the High Court is to ascertain whether the Income-tax Authorities have failed in their duty. In the instant case, we sire satisfied that the Income-tax Authorities are bona fide looking into the matter as is expected of them under the law and there is, therefore, no need to issue any directions to them or to keep the petitions pending.
As regards directions which are sought for investigation into the allegations through .the C.B.I., we find that there is absolutely no ground made out at this premature stage where not even offences are alleged, to issue any directions to the said special Investigating Agency. We, therefore, cannot accept the contention that directions should be given to the C.B.I. to investigate into the matter. Moreso, when the concerned authorities of the income-tax Department are investigating into the allegations, the outcome of h cannot be known at this stage.
For the above reasons, we hold that no directions are required to be given as sought for by the petitioners and the petitions fail. Notice is, therefore, discharged in both the petitions with no order as to costs. The Civil Application No.3589 of 1997 in Special Civil Application No.7417 of 1996 also stands disposed of with no order as to costs.
M. B. A./3111/FCOrder accordingly.