BOLAN CHEMICALS (PVT.) LIMITED VS COLLECTOR, SALES TAX, COLLECTORATE OF SALES TAX,, 1998 PTD-QUETTA-HIGH-COURT-BALOCHISTAN 3064 (1998)

(a) Interpretation of statutes---

---- Basic rule of construction is that it is to be assumed that words and phrases of technical nature have been used in their technical meaning if they have acquired one, and, otherwise in their ordinary meaning and, secondly, that phrases and sentences are to be construed according to rule of grammar, and in all cases to adhere to words of statute giving to them that sense which is their natural import in the order in which they are placed.

(b) Sales Tax Act (IX of 1990)---

----Ss.33(7) & 47---Exemption from tax payable under Sales Tax Act, 1990, granted on goods produced or manufactured by those industries which were set up between 1st July, 1988 and 30th June, 1991 for period of eight years commencing from 1st July, 1988----Essentials---Date of setting up industry would be deemed when it had gone into production, including trial production, which date would be intimated, in writing, by intended manufacturer to Authorised. Officer of Central Excise and Sales Tax; at least fifteen days before commencement of such production---Industry in question, admittedly had gone into production within specified period---Earlier notification clearly mentioned period of eight years, available to manufacturer of goods produced, with effect from 1st July, 1988 while subsequent notification by way of amendment only defined expression "set up"---No construction could be put on the Explanation (added to subsequent notification) so as to construe that it had extended period of eight years, available to manufacturer of goods produced.

The Broach District Cooperative Cotton Sales Ginning and Pressing society Ltd. v. The Commissioner of Income-tax, Ahmedabad AIR 1989 SC 1493; Bajaj Tempo Ltd., Bombay v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City III, Bombay AIR 1992 SC 1622; Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Messrs Zelid Ltd., Karachi PLD 1967 Kar. 341; Messrs Tank Steel and Re-Rolling Mills (Pvt.) Ltd., Dera Ismail Khan and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 1996 SC 77; Bashir Ahmad v. Member (Colonies), Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore and 2 others PLD 1997 SC 294; Shahid Nabi Malik and another v. Chief Election Commissioner, Islamabad and 7 others PLD 1997 SC 32; Interpretation of Laws by Crawford, p.451; Muhammad Hussain Patel v. Habib Wali Muhammad etc. PLD 1981 SC 1; Naveed Textile Mills Ltd. v. Assistant Collector (Appraising), Custom House, Karachi and others' PLD 1985 SC 92; Rehman Corporation, Hyderabad v. The Income Tax Officer, Mirpurkhas and another 1985 PTD 787; Orient Straw Board and Paper Mills Limited, Karachi v. Commissioner of Income tax, Hyderabad 1992 PTD 1369; Western India Vegetable Products Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City AIR 1955 Born. 13; Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Madras v. Ramaraju Surgical Cotton Mills Ltd. AIR 1967 SC 509, Pakistan Tobacco Co. Ltd. v. Pakistan through the Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Islamabad and 4 others 1991 PTD 359; Flying Kraft Paper Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Central )3oard of Revenue, Islamabad and 2 others 1997 SCMR 1874; Haji Qadir Bux and others v. Government of Sindh and others 1982 SCMR 582; Noori Trading Corporation PTC Limited and others v. Federation of Pakistan through the Ministry of Finance, Islamabad and 3 others PLD 1989 Quetta 74; Nishat Tek Limited, Lahore v. The Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Education, Islamabad and 3 others PLD 1994 Lah. 347 and Interpretation of Statutes by Maxwell, 10th Edn., p.68 ref.

(c) Interpretation of statutes---

---- Statute which deals with recovery of taxes, incentives provided therein should be liberally construed---Words employed in such statute, however, need not be defined under forced, strained or unnatural meaning or to warrant extension of statute to suppression of supposed evils, or effectuation of conjectural objects and purposes neither referred to, nor indicated in any of the terms used or should be carried to the extent of always trying to discover dormant or patent legislative policy to sustain arbitrary powers conferred on Executive Authorities.

(d) Interpretation of statutes---

---- Latter laws repeal earlier laws inconsistent therewith.

(e) Interpretation of statutes---

----Explanation to a provision in a statute---Object and function---Ordinary function of an explanation is to clarify and to facilitate the proper under standing of provision---Explanation added to statute/notification contained legal fiction to provide simple and workable test directed at facilitating operation of statute itself---Explanation therefore, would not create or add anything into the main paragraph but would only define specific expression used in the main body of section/paragraph.

Statute Law by Craies, 6th Edn., p. 394 and Interpretation of Statutes by Maxwell, 12th Edn., p.224 ref.

(f) Sales Tax Act (IX of 1990)---

----Ss.33(7) & 47---Exemption from tax granted on goods produced or manufactured by those industries which were set up between 1st July, 1988 and 30th June, 1991 for period of eight years---Such exemption was granted through earlier notification---Subsequent notification was issued by way of amendment wherein term "setting up" was defined and explanation to that effect was added thereto---Subsequent amending notification being not in conflict with earlier notification, but intended to explain the earlier one, could not be deemed to have extended period of exemption of eight years-- Demand notice of respondents, after eight years of setting up of industry was, thus, valid and binding.

Haider Ali Pirzada and Sultan Ahmed Sheikh for Petitioner.

M. S. Rakhshani for Respondents.

Date of hearing: 12th March, 1998.

JUDGMENT

IFTIIKHAR MUHAMMAD CHAUDHARY, J.---This is an Appeal under section 47 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') wherein orders dated April 12, June 10 and October 6, 1997, passed by Assistant Collector (Adjudication) Sales Tax, Hub, Collector (Appeals), Central Excise and Sales Tax, Western Zone Karachi and Customs Excise and Sales Tax, Appellate Tribunal, Karachi Bench, respectively, have been assailed.

Precisely the facts of the appeal, as stated, are that appellant Messrs Bolan Chemicals (Pvt.) Limited, set up a plant on 15th January, 1990, at Sirki Road, Quetta, to manufacture a product, under the brand name of Magic Epoxy Steel and Magic Depoxi Steel. On 24th March, 1997, Assistant Collector (Adjudication) Sales Tax (respondent No.3 issued a show-cause notice, calling upon the appellant, to start payment of sales tax at the rate of 18% on their local supplies with immediate effect and also to pay sales tax on their local supplies, already made, with effect from 1st July, 1996, a letter in respect whereof, was already issued on 2nd February, 1997. At this stage, it may be noted that Federal Government vide S.R.O. 529(1)/88, dated 26th June, 1988, notified that the goods produced or manufactured by such Industries, which will be set up between the 1st July, 1988 and the 30th June, 1991, located in the area of Province of Balochistan, except in Hub Chowki and the North-West Frontier Province, shall be exempted from the tax payable under the Sales Tax Act, 1951. Notification further clarified that it shall remain effective for a period of 8 years, commencing from 1st July, 1988. Therefore, appellant to satisfy itself, in respect of the date on which the sales tax will be payable, on its behalf, on June 29, 1996, addressed a letter to the respondent No.3, to clarify the date of payment of sales tax. Statedly no response to this letter was given promptly. However, on 2nd February, 1997, appellant was informed that exemption was for the period clearly mentioned in paragraph 3 of the Notification, referred to hereinbefore. It was further pointed out that said period had expired on 30th June, 1996, therefore, appellant should start payment of sales tax with effect from 1st July, 1996 and explain the reason, why it was not paid from that date. On receipt of clarification, appellant resisted the claim of department, by putting forth its own point of view, with a request to defer the matter for a period of 30 days, so it may seek clarification from the Central Board of Revenue. Accordingly clarification was sought from the C.B.R., who vide letter, dated 18th March, 1997, informed the appellant that the exemption had expired on June 30, 1996. Accordingly respondent No.3, vide impugned order, dated April 4, 1997, directed the appellant to pay sales tax within seven days Q 18 % from 1st July, 1996 to 27th March, 1997 and a 12 from 28th March, 1997 to onward, on its local supplies, alongwith additional sales tax and penalty at 5 % of its tax liability under section 33(7) of the Act. The said order was challenged before the Collector (Appeals) Western Zone, in appeal, which was dismissed on 10th June, 1997. Both these orders were questioned by appellant before the Customs, Excise and Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, Karachi Bench, but this appeal was also rejected on 6th October, 1997. As such, instant appeal has been preferred, wherein, on behalf of appellant, Messrs Haider Ali Pirzada and Sultan Ahmad Sheikh, learned Advocates, have raised following questions of, law, for determination:

(1) Whether the appellant is entitled to the benefit of exemption under S.R.O. No.529 (1)/88, dated 26-6-1988 read with S.R.O. 857(1)/88 dated 26-9-1988?

(2) Whether the Appellate Tribunal and the respondents misconstrued the provisions of the Notifications by misinterpreting the word "set up" by ignoring the "Explanation"?

(3) Whether the Appellate Tribunal and the respondents misconstrued the provisions of Notification by merely referring to para. 3 of S.R.O. No.529(1)/88 in isolation?

Mr. M.S. Rukhshani, learned Advocate, urged on behalf of respondents, that in impugned orders, S.R.O., dated 26th Julie, 1988 and its Explanation vide S.R.O. dated 26th September, 1988, have been interpreted correctly declaring thereby that exemption from the Sales Tax Act, 1951, shall be for a period of 8 years, commencing from 1st July, 1988, irrespective to the fact; whether the Industry in specified zone has been established during the period, stipulated in S.R.O. and the life of Notification cannot be stretched beyond 30th June, 1996, the date on which, said period has come to an end. Therefore, Appeal merits dismissal, as it does not involve any question of law, requiring determination in instant proceedings.

It would be appropriate to reproduce hereinbelow, in extenso, the Notification S.R.O. 529(f)/88, dated 26th June, 1988: --

"Exemption from sales tax on all goods produced or manufactured by such industries set up between 1st July, 1988 and 30th June, 1991.

Notification No. S.R.O. 529(1)/88, dated 26th June, 1988.---In exercise of the powers conferred by subsections (1) and (2) of section 7 of the Sales Tax Act, 1951 (III of 1951), the Federal Government is pleased to direct that all goods produced or manufactured by such industries which are set up between the 1st July, 1988, and the 30th June, 1991, in the following areas shall be exempt from the tax payable under the said Act:---

(i)Province of Balochistan except in Hub Chowki area;

(ii)The North-West Frontier Province.

(2)Sales tax under the said Act shall also not be levied on such goods produced or manufactured by the industries set up in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, Northern Areas administered by the Administrator, Northern Areas and Azad Kashmir during the period specified above.

(3) This Notification shall be effective for a period of eight years commencing from the 1st July, 1988."

Later on, above S.R.O. was amended vide Notification No. S.R.O. 857(1)/88, dated 26th September, 1988, whereby after paragraph 3, an Explanation was added. For sake of convenience, this Notification is also reproduced herein below:

"Exemption from sales tax on all goods produced or manufactured by such industries set up between 1st July, 1988 and 30th June, 1991.

[Amending Notification. For original Notification see PTCL 1988 St. 684(ii)].

Notification No S.R.O. 857(1)/88, dated 26th September, 1988.---In exercise of powers conferred by subsections (1) and (2) of section 7 of the Sales Tax Act, 1951 (III of 1951), the Federal Government is pleased to direct that the following further amendment shall be made in this Ministery's Notification No.S.R.O. 529(1)/88, dated the 26th June, 1988, namely: --

In the aforesaid Notification, after the paragraph 3, the following explanation shall be added, namely: --

Explanation. ---For the purposes of this Notification the expression set up shall mean the date on which the industry goes into production including trial production, which date shall be intimated, in writing, by an intending manufacturer to the authorised officer of Central Excise and Sales Tax at least fifteen days before commencing such production'. "

It may be observed that under section 7(2)(1) of the Sales Tax Act, 1951 -(now repealed by Sales Tax Act, 1990 (corresponding provision 13(2)(a)), the Federal Government is authorised to exempt any goods or class of goods, or any person or class of persons, from the tax payable under the said Act, or make a reduction in the rate of tax leviable-in respect of any goods or class of goods or any person or class of persons, by issuing Notification in the official Gazette. In exercise of these powers, above Notification was issued, whereby the goods produced 'or manufactured by such Industries, between 1st July, 1988 and 30th June, 1991, were exempted from payment of sales tax. Paragraph 3 of the Notification, has specified that, it shall be effective for a period of eight years, commencing from 1st July, 1988. Probably there was some confusion in respect of calculating the period of eight years, therefore, the Federal Government, added explanation to this para by defining the expression 'set up' in the terms that it shall mean; the date on which, the Industry goes into production, including the trial production, which date shall be intimated, in writing, by an intending manufacturer to the authorised officer of the Central Excise and Sales Tax, at least 15 days, before commencement of such production. It is to be seen that amending Notification has added Explanation, after paragraph 3 instead of inserting the same in any other part of the Notification, particularly in paragraph 1, immediately after the main text of Notification. Ther4ore, the Explanation would deemed to be a defining provision, enacted with paragraph 3 of the under-consideration Notification. It may also be noted that, as far as the original text of paragraph 3 of the S.R.O. is concerned, it has not been changed. Undoubtedly, it is a golden principle of interpretation, as it has been defined by Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, that the first and most elementary rule of construction is that it is to be assumed that the words and phrases of technical legislation are used in their technical meaning if they have acquired one, and, otherwise, in their ordinary meaning and, secondly, that the phrases and sentences are to be construed according to the rule of grammar. In this behalf, it has been further desired that in all cases to adhere to the words of an Act of Parliament, giving to them that sense which is their natural import in the order in which they are placed. Keeping in view, this principle of Interpretation of Statutes, we would observe that, notwithstanding the fact that in paragraph 1 of the S.R.O, dated 26th June, 1988, exemption from the tax payable under the Act, has been granted on the goods produced or manufactured by such Industries, which were set-up between the 1st July, 1988 and the 30th June, 1991. (Emphasis supplied by underlining). This para is to be read in contra-distinction to paragraph 3, alongwith Explanation, added thereto subsequently, according to which, the Notification has been allowed to remain effective for a period of eight years, commencing from 1st July 1988, and the date of setting up the Industry, shall be deemed when it has gone into production, including the trial production, which date shall be intimated, in writing, by an intended manufacturer to an Authorised Officer of the Central Excise and Sales tax; at least fifteen ,days, before commencement of such production There is no dispute between the parties, that appellant Industry has not gone into production with effect from 15th January, 1990.

Mr. Haider Ali Pirzada, learned counsel for appellant, stressed that period of eight years, for the purpose of appellant-Industry, shall commence from the date when the Industry has gone into production. Therefore; on 30th June, 1996, appellant was not under obligation to make payment of sales tax and period of exemption of eight years, will be available with effect from 15th January, 1990. To elaborate his contention, first of all he referred to AIR 1989 SC 1493 (The Broach District. Cooperative Cotton Sales Ginning and Pressing Society Ltd. v. The Commissioner of Income tax, Ahmedabad). In this citation, section 81(i)(c) of the Income of Cooperative Societies Act, was interpreted, declaring thereby that object of these proceedings is to encourage and promote the growth of Cooperative Societies, and consequently a liberal construction must be given to the operation of that provision and the proviso to section 81(i) operates to exclude from the exemption, those activities which can be regarded as separate and distinct from the activities enumerated in clauses (a) to (f) of section 81(i). If the activity in question is incidental or ancillary to one of the activities mentioned in those clauses, the proviso, will not apply. In this behalf, he also referred to AIR 1992 SC 1622 Bajaj Tempo Ltd., Bombay v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City III, Bombay). In this citation as well, the Supreme Court of India, referred to the judgment cited earlier by appellant's counsel and held that a proviso in a Taxing Statute, granting incentives for prompting growth and development, should be constructed liberally. Learned counsel next contended that the provision of Statute's last enactment will prevail, by virtue of the assumption, that it is the last expression of the legislative will or intent. In this behalf he relied on Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Messrs Zelid Ltd., Karachi (PLD 1967 Kar. 341). Learned counsel also argued that effect of amendment in original S.R.O. by adding Explanation would be that earlier part of paragraph 3 shall be deemed to have been repealed by applying the principle enshrined in the Maxim 'Leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant' for purpose of stretching period of eight years of exemption, beyond 30th June, 1996. In this behalf he referred to Messrs Tank Steel and Re-Rolling Mills (Pvt.) Ltd., Dera Ismial Khan and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others (PLD 1996 SC 77). It was also argued by him that when on a true construction of two provisions of the same statute, two views are possible, the Court must adopt the latter and not the former Reliance was placed by him on Bashir Ahmad v. Member (Colonies), Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore and 2 others (PLD 1997 SC. 294) and Shahid Nabi Malik and another v. Chief Election Commissioner, Islamabad and 7 others (same volume, p.32).

It is true that in a Statute, which deals with recovery of taxes, the incentives should be construed liberally, but it does not mean that while doing so, the words employed by the Statute-givers be defined under a forced, strained, or unnatural meaning, or warrant an extension of the Statute to the suppression of supposed evils or the effectuation of conjectural objects and purposes not referred to, nor indicated in any of the terms used or should be carried to the extent of always trying to discover a dormant or patent legislative policy to sustain an arbitrary powers conferred on Executive Authorities, as it has been held in Interpretation of Laws by Crawford at page 451. Relevant para therefrom is reproduced hereinbelow: ---

"But a liberal construction does not require that words be accorded a forced, strained, or unnatural meaning, or warrant an extension of the Statute to the suppression of supposed evils or the effectuation of conjectural objects and purposes not referred to, nor indicated in any of the terms used "

It is also well-recognized principle of Interpretation of Statutes that latter laws repeal earlier laws inconsistent therewith. In this principle of interpretation, the most important element to presume 'impliedly repeal' in the former and latter law, is regarding inconsistency. Therefore, in this very context, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Messrs Tank Steel and Re-Rolling Mills, had observed that if the provisions of latter Act are so inconsistent with or repugnant to those of an earlier Act that the two cannot stand together, the earlier stands impliedly repealed by the latter. Applying these tests, we are constrained to hold, that as far as liberal interpretation of S.R.O. dated 26th June, 1988 and amending S.R.O., dated 26th September, 1988 is concerned, both the provisions are to be interpreted liberally and it would be seen, as if there is any inconsistency, in both of them or otherwise? A plain meaning of the words, employed in both of them, suggest that there is no inconsistency, because the subsequent amendment has not changed the complexion of paragraph 3 of the former S.R.O. and had allowed to continue its contents in substance as they were, from the date of promulgation. As far as the Explanation by means of latter amendment is concerned, it has only defined the expression 'set up' No construction can be put on the Explanation, in order to construe that it has extended the period of eight years, available to the manufacturer of the goods produced, with effect from 1st July, 1988, nor any forced or unnatural meaning can be assigned to any of the words, used therein.

Mr. Haider Ali Pirzada, learned counsel for appellant, next contended that although the Federal Government in para-.3 of the original S.R.O. has given effect to it, for a period of eight years, commencing from 1st July, 1988, but subsequently by adding an Explanation, period of its operation, for a period of eight years, has been extended from the date when Industry goes into production. To elaborate his submission, reliance was placed by him on PLD 1981 SC 1, (Muhammad Hussain Patel v. Habib Wali Muhammad etc.), PLD 1985 SC 92 (Naveed Textile Mills Ltd. v. Assistant Collector (Appraising) Custom House, Karachi and others), 1985 PTD 787 (Rehman Corporation, Hyderabad v. The Income Tax Officer, Mirpurkhas and another) and 1992 PTD 1369 (Orient Straw Board and Paper Mills Limited, Karachi v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Hyderabad). According to learned counsel, expression 'set up' was not defined in the original S.R.O., dated 26th January, 1988, but subsequently to identify the period 'commencing of eight years' this Explanation was added to extend the period of exemption from sales tax, in the specified areas, on the date when the Industry was put to business. To elaborate his submissions, reliance was placed on AIR 1955 Bombay 13 (Western India Vegetable Products Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax Bombay City), AIR 1967 SC 509 (Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Madras v. Ramaraju Surgical Cotton Mills Ltd.) 1991 PTD 359 (Pakistan Tobacco Co. Ltd. v. Pakistan through the Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Islamabad and 4 others) and 1997 SCMR 1874 (Flying Kraft Paper Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Central Board of Revenue, Islamabad and 2 others).

Learned counsel for appellant, was also of the opinion that as now a controversy, in respect of the period of exemption has arisen, due to inconsistency in both the S.R.Os., therefore, to resolve it, beneficial construction is to be followed, instead of placing literal construction. To support his view point, he relied on 1982 SCMR 582 (Haji Qadir Bux and others Government of Sindh and others), PLD 1989 Quetta 74 (Noori Trading Corporation Ptc. Limited and others v. Federation of Pakistan through the Ministry of Finance, Islamabad and 3 others), and PLD 1994 Lahore 347 (Nishat Tek Limited, Lahore v. The Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Education, Islamabad and 3 others).

Mr. M.S. Rukhshani, learned counsel for respondents, argued that the Federal Government, vide Amending Notification, added explanation, in order to bound down the Industrialist/Manufacturer to give the specified date, when the manufacturing of the produce had commenced, by sending a notice, fifteen days prior to its actual operation, therefore, the Explanation added by the amending S.R.O. cannot be used for any other purpose, except to determine the date of manufacturing. As far as the question of setting up an Industry is concerned, it is also relatable to the date of commencement of operation of an Industry, in terms of the Explanation. He also stressed that as regards beneficial construction of a statute by the Court is concerned, there is no cavil with it, but such construction is to be placed on the statute, when its two parts have given rise to a dispute. According to him, apparently, there is no dispute in original and amending S.R.O., therefore, both are required to be interpreted, ordinarily.

First of all, it would be appropriate to consider the principle, relating to beneficial construction of a statute. In this behalf, in Mexwell on 'The Interpretation of Statutes', 10th edition at page. 68, it has been laid down that "it is said to be the duty of the Judge to make such construction of a statue, as shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy. Even where the usual meaning of the language falls short of the whole object of the Legislature, a more extended meaning may be attributed to the words, if they are fairly susceptible of it. The construction muse not, of course be strained to include cases plainly omitted from the natural meaning of the words". In the case of Haji Qadir Bakhsh, cited by learned counsel for appellant, it was held that 'Pakistani Courts are not prevented from adopting beneficial construction, as against literal, whenever a controversy arises. Whereas in the other Judgment of Noori Trading Corporation, also cited by appellant's counsel, it was held that 'fiscal statute should not be given wider meaning merely because on a narrow construction, the words might leave a loopehole for frauds against the Revenue. If, on the proper construction of the section, that is the result, it is not for Judges to attempt to cure it. That is the business of Parliament. Our duty is to take the words as they stand and to give them their true construction, having regard to the language of the whole section and, as far as relevant, of the whole Act, always preferring the natural meaning of the word involved, but nonetheless always giving the word its appropriate construction according to the context'. In Nishat Tek Limited, it was held that 'Court should make all efforts of upholding validity of enactment, as broad meaning as possible to the words used should be given and entries therein should not be read in anarrow or pandentic sense'.

As it has been observed hereinabove, that original paragraph 3 of the S.R.O. and the Explanation added later on to it, does not admit of any ambiguity or controversy, therefore, following the principle discussed by Maxwell in 'The Interpretation of Statutes' noted hereinbefore, we are of the opinion that in both the provisions, there is no mischief, as such, they are to be read and interpreted in usual ordinary language and there is no need to read them for merely extending the meaning, as the words employed in both of them, are not susceptible, thus, the construction cannot be strained to read the Explanation by means of amending S.R.O. and the definition of 'set-up' for purpose of enlarging the period of eight years of exemption from the date, when the Industry had gone into production. A careful and plain meaning of the Explanation, added by the latter S.R.O., dated 26th September, 1988, abundantly makes it clear that as in the original S.R.O. the word 'set-up' was not defined therefore, it was not possible for the Tax levying Authorities to determine the date, on which the Industry had gone into production, including the one, meant for trial production. As such, with a view to bound down the Industrialist/ manufacturer, the Explanation was added by way of clarification in paragraph 3 of the original Notification. At this juncture, it may be noted that in the judgment cited in the case of Muhammad Hussain Patel, the Hon'ble Supreme Court while taking into consideration Explanation added to section 13(2) of the Urban Rent, Restriction Ordinance, 1959, laid down that 'the object of Explanation in the present case is obviously the same, namely to remove any doubt as to the meaning of the term 'rent due' as used in clause (i) of section 13(2) and to clarify that in addition to the amount of rent, 'rent simplicitor' it can also include other charges and taxes agreed to by the parties and even in the present case the Explanation does .not create or add anything to the main section but merely illustrates as to what the term 'rent due' may include. Obviously, therefore, the explanation does not place any limitation on the type and number of other charges the payment of which the tenants many agree to pay and which would, thus, become due from him'. Applying this test to the case in hand, we are also of the opinion that by adding Explanation to paragraph 3 of the original Notification vide Amending Notification, dated 26th September, 1988, the same has not created or added anything, in respect of the period of exemption of eight years, commencing from 1st July, 1988. Similarly in the case of Naveed Textile Mills Ltd. the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that 'ordinary function' of an explanation is to clarify, to facilitate the proper understanding of a provision, to serve as a guide. Nevertheless, it does not exhaust or complete the function and the purpose of a provision. Explanation contains a legal fiction, to provide a simpler and workable test directed at facilitating the operation of the statute itself. In this very judgment, reliance on Privy Council case of Krishna Ayyangar was made, wherein it was held that the construction of the Explanation must depend upon its terms and no theory of the purpose can be entertained unless it is to be inferred from the language'. In Rehman Corporation, effect of Explanation annexed with section 50(7-A) of the Income-tax Ordinance, 1979, was considered, because said Explanation was added due to the decision of Lahore High Court, wherein 30 petitions were allowed, therefore, examining from this angle, the implication of Explanation, while placing reliance of Craies on Statute Law, 6th Edn. p.394, and Maxwell on 'Interpretation of Statutes', 12th Edn., p.224, it was held that ' due to Explanation, the Lahore High Court's decision in Muhammad Younas. v. Chairman, Municipal Committees, Sahiwal and others' case has lost its efficacy and the demand made by the Income-tax Department is valid and unexceptionable'. In the case of Orient Straw Board, the definition of 'Chip board' under Item 62 mention in Explanation was considered and it was opined that Explanation has given the definition of 'Chip board' and 'Particle-board' and such definition, could not be ignored as has been wrongly done by the Tribunal. With utmost respect, in our humble opinion, interpretations of the expression ' Explanation' provided by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Muhammad Hussain Patel and Naveed Textile Mills, are fully attracted, as far as instant case is concerned. Therefore, following the same interpretations, we are also of the view that in instant case as well, the Explanation added to paragraph 3 of the S.R.O. dated 26th June, 1988, has not created or added anything into the main paragraph, but had only defined the expression 'set-up' in order to know the date, on which, the Industry goes into production, including the trial production and had also bound down the Industrialist/Manufacture to intimate, in writing, the date to the Authorised Officer of the Central Excise and Sales Tax, at least fifteen days before commencing such production, so that the authorities, functioning under the Act, may calculate the period, on which, sales tax shall be due, because as per the paragraph 3, this facility of exemption from sales tax, can only be enjoyed by the intended manufacture up to 30th June, 1996, for the reason that paragraph 3 of the original Notification in explicit terms, has stated that this Notification shall be effective for a period of eight years, commencing from 1st July, 1988, therefore, we are of the opinion that notwithstanding the fact that when the Industry has gone into production, but as far as the effect of claiming exemption is concerned that cannot be extended by any methodology beyond 30th June, 1996, thus, the arguments advanced by learned counsel for appellant are accordingly repelled.

As for as the definition of expression 'set-up' made in various Authorities, cited by learned counsel Mr. Haider Ali Pirzada, is concerned, those are not required to be discussed, because in the case in hand, there is no dispute that appellant-Industry had not gone into production with effect from 15th January, 1990, whereas in the cited Judgments, there was a dispute regarding the date, when the Industry had gone into production.

For the foregoing reasons, we are of the considered opinion that no question of law is involved in the instant appeal and the respondents have passed impugned orders, in accordance with law. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed.

No order as to costs.

A.A./693/QAppeal dismissed.