(a) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979)---

----S.19(2)(a)---Income from house property---Income-tax is payable by the real owner of the property---Since assessee had failed to prove by independent documentary evidence that the real owner of the property was not the assessee rental value was rightly assessed in the hands of assessee.

(b) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979)---

----Ss.134 & 56---Appeal to Appellate Tribunal---Raising new law point--- Admissibility---Assessee though had not canvassed the point relating to validity of issuance of notice under S.56, Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner or in the memo. of appeal before Appellate Tribunal, nevertheless, that being purely a legal issue, assessee had the right to raise same even at appeal stage before the Tribunal.

(c) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979)---

----Ss.1(3) & 166(2)---Date of enforcement of Income Tax Ordinance, 1979---Principles---All the provisions of the Ordinance shall come into force after its promulgation---Provisions of the Ordinance would not be applicable to any assessment year prior to assessment year 1979-80 except the eventualities provided under different clauses of S.166(2) of the Ordinance.

Subsection (3) of section 1 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 vividly envisages that all the provisions of this Ordinance shall come into force after its promulgation. So, it means that the provisions of this Ordinance would not be applicable to any assessment year prior to assessment year 1979-80 except to the eventualities provided under different clauses of subsection (2) of section 166 of the Ordinance. Subsection (2) of section 166 of the Ordinance is a saving clause and it provides the machinery for initiating and concluding the proceedings for any year prior to assessment year 1979-80. No statute shall be construed to have a retrospective operation unless such a construction appears very clearly in the terms of the Act or arises by necessary and distinct implication. In the absence of a Constitutional or General provisions or a provision in the statute itself relating to the effective dates, the statute will take effect from the date of its passage or enforcement. Once an Act expired or was repealed it was always regarded that it never existed except as to matter and transaction past and closed. Where an Act or an Ordinance is expressed to come into operation on a particular day, it is to be construed as having come into operation at the first moment of that day.

Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, by P. St. J. Langan Twelfth Edn., p.215 and Statutory Construction by Crawford, p.152 ref.

(d) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979)---

----S.56---Notice for furnishing return of total income---Scope and object of S.56, Income Tax Ordinance, 1979---Intent and purpose of enacting S.56, Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 cannot be stretched to the extent that no qualification and limitation has been imposed for issuance of notice under S.56 of the Ordinance---Applicability of S.56, commences from the day the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 has come into existence---Principles.

In no way one can stretch the intent and purpose of enacting section 56 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 that no qualification and limitation has been imposed for issuance of notice under section 56 of the Ordinance. There is always some limitation period or cut off date for initiating proceeding against a person whose income, in the opinion of the Assessing Officer, is chargeable to tax and he has failed to furnish a return of total income for such year. If subsection (1) of section 166 is read with the provisions of section 6 or 24 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (X of 1897) it is patently clear that (repealed) Income-tax Act, 1922 never existed in the field after promulgation of Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, except as saved in clauses (a) to (q) of subsection (2) of section 166 of the Ordinance. So, the words used in section 56 "at any time" and "for any income year" would never mean that the intent of this section can cross the effective date of enforcement of the Income Tax Ordinance as specified in subsection (3) of section 1 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979.

As the Legislature has not expressly saved in subsection (2) of section 166 of the Ordinance, the situation that where the income of a person was chargeable to tax, even prior to promulgation of the Income Tax Ordinance, he shall be served with notice under section 56 of the Ordinance to furnish a return of his total income for such income year, the intent of section 56 of the Ordinance cannot be extended to the period prior to the promulgation of the Income Tax Ordinance. Applicability of section 56 commences from the day the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 has come into existence.

(e) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979)---

----Ss.56 & 65------Interpretation, scope and application of S.56, Income Tax Ordinance, 1979---Notice for furnishing return of total income---Such notice cannot be issued for any and all assessment years covered by the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979---Principles---Expression "at any time" and "for any income year" as used in S.56 would definitely mean a definite period of time which when read with S.55, Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 would mean within the current assessment year and not for the past years---Where any income for past years had escaped assessment, whether partially or totally, the Assessing Officer can assume jurisdiction and initiate proceedings only by issuing a notice under S.65 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979---If, however, the income of an assessee was assessable under the law and the Assessing Officer had proper jurisdiction for making assessment or passing an order and the limitation period had not expired under S.65 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, issuance of wrong form of notice is immaterial and the assessment framed or the order passed consequent upon that notice, warrant or other document would not vitiate that assessment order.

Notice under section 56 of the Ordinance requiring any person to furnish a return of total income, cannot be issued for any and all assessment years covered by the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979. It is so scheme of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, envisages that the income of the "income year" should normally be assessed in the corresponding "assessment year". According to chronological scheme of sections of the Ordinance, section 56 follows section 55 of the Ordinance. Clauses (a) and (b) of subsection (1) of section 55 lay down that every person whose total income or the total income of any other person "for any income year" exceeds the maximum amount which is not chargeable to tax under this Ordinance, or who has been charged to tax for any of the four income years immediately preceding the said income year shall furnish a return of total income or the total income of such other persons, as the case may be, for the said income year. And subsection (2) of the said section requires every person to furnish his return of total income on a specified date as mentioned in the said subsection. Here the words used by the Legislature "for any income year" in clause (a) of subsection (1) of section 55, when read with subsection (2) of the said section, the intention of the Legislature would become vividly clear that every person whose total income or the total income of any other person is chargeable to tax under this Ordinance, he shall furnish his return of income for the current assessment year only and not for the past income years. If the phrase "for any income year" as used in clause (a) of subsection (1) of section 55 is interpreted as applicable to past income years as well, then subsection (2). of section 55, which contains certain specific dates for filing of return every year by different categories of taxpayers, would become redundant. It is an established principle of law that every word used in the statute carries some meaning and it has to be interpreted in the way it has been referred/used in that section.

In fact by fixing a cut off date in subsection (2) of section 55 for furnishing a return of total income by a person it would imply filing of, a return for current assessment year only otherwise the Legislature would not have specified such dates for filing of income-tax returns in the said subsection of section 55 of the Ordinance.

Looking this issue from another angle that the word "any" when read with "income year" it would mean an income year which falls in any one of the income years as specified in clause (26) of section 2 of the Ordinance. Thus, according to section 55 the return has necessarily to be furnished suo motu by a person on a specified date in respect of profits made (luring any income year falling in clause (26) of section 2 of the Ordinance. Hence, section 55 does not oblige any person to file a return regarding any past income year.

Referring to section 56, it provides that where no return has been filed by a person on the due dates as specified under subsection (2) of section 55 of the Ordinance, the assessing officer, "at any time", may require that person who, in his opinion, is chargeable to tax "for any income year" to furnish a return of total income for such year as may be specified in such notice. Now, one has to see what was the intention of the Legislature by using the words "at any time" and "for any income year" in section 56 particularly when the meaning of the words "for any income year", as used in section 55, is meant as 'current assessment year'. In view of chronological scheme of various sections of the Ordinance, one cannot assign different meanings to one and the same words for the simple reason that, if both the sections i.e., 55 and 56 are read together, the cumulative effect of these sections would be that where a person who was otherwise required to file suo motu a return of income for current assessment year had failed to do so, the DCIT may issue him a notice under section 56 for the said income year. Had the intention of the Legislature in using the words "for any income year" in section 56 been referable to any past income year then these words would not have been repeatedly used by the Legislature in this section. Thus, different meanings to one and the same words, even if used in different sections, cannot be implied.

The words "at any time" used in section 56 do not mean that there is no limitation of time within which a notice under section 56 can be issued for any assessment year by. the Assessing Officer. The expression "at any time", as used in section 56, when read with reference to the context of section 55, would mean period of time limited by circumstances. Here the reasonable time for the I.T.O. to issue a notice under section 56 commences from the last date for filing of income-tax returns, as specified in subsection (2) of section 55, and terminates on the last day of the financial year in which the return of total income is to be furnished i.e. the current assessment year. It is so because income of a person beyond that date falls within the expression "escaped assessment". Therefore, one cannot adopt the meaning of the words "at any time" and "for any income year" used in section 56 of the Ordinance as any period of time without any limitation. If such interpretation is adopted it would produce anomalous results and there would be no end to income-tax proceedings against a person. Where a person had made concealment of income, his grandsons as his legal heirs, could be served with a notice under section 56 read with section 74 of the Ordinance. This state of affairs would certainly sound ridiculous because how could the second generation explain the sources of investment, income etc. of the deceased person after the lapse of many years. Thus, the expressions "at any time" and "for any income year" as used in section 56 would definitely mean a definite period of time which, when read with section 55, would mean within the 'current assessment year'.

Section 56 of the Ordinance is not a complete provision of law. It only authorizes the Assessing Officer to issue a notice to a person to file a return of income who had failed to furnish, his return of income on the due date. This section does not provide as to how the returns furnished for the past assessment years would be processed and what would be the rate of tax chargeable and what other statutory benefits, allowances etc. would be allowed, while framing assessments for those years. Hence, this section does not create tax liability of a person. On the contrary, where calling of return is required by the I.T.O. in other sections of the Ordinance, such as sections 65, 72 and 81, the Legislature has laid down complete procedure to assess or determine total income of the assessee and the tax payable by him and it has also been specifically mentioned therein that all the provisions of this Ordinance shall, so far as may be, apply accordingly. Had it been the intention of the Legislature that section 56 would also deal with the returns filed by a person after the lapse of the current assessment year then some procedure would have been provided for by the Legislature for processing of such return under this section.

The Legislature has used in section 56 certain words in singular form such as "a return" and "income year". Where the returns for more than one year are required by law, the Legislature has provided plural words as well in those sections such as "a return" or "returns" and "income year" or "income years". In this regard reference to sections 72 and 81 are made to illustrate our observation. From this distinction one can safely draw the inference that where the returns for more than one year could be required, the Legislature had used the expression in singular as well as in plural form. In the absence of any such words in section 56, section 56 requires a person to furnish a return of total income for "current" assessment year only and not for .the past years. Section 56 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 empowers the I.T.O. to call for a return of income for the current assessment year only. Where any income for past years had escaped assessment, whether partially or totally, the assessing officer can assume jurisdiction and initiate proceedings only by issuing a notice under section 65 of the Ordinance.

If the income of an assessee was assessable under the law and the Assessing Officer had proper jurisdiction for making assessment or passing an order and the limitation period has not expired under section 65 of the Ordinance, issuance of wrong form of notice is immaterial and the assessment framed or the order passed consequent upon that notice, warrant or other document, would not vitiate that assessment order.

Legally due tax, if any, is payable by an assessee to the State, it should be recovered from him. But this does not mean that Tax collecting machinery should remain dormant for years to collect its legally due tax from an assessee. They should also be vigilant to initiate income-tax proceedings against a person within a reasonable time, whose income has escaped to tax. In fact, for this purpose the Legislature has fixed time limit of five years for issuance of notice under section 65 of the Ordinance which in terms of subsection (3) of section 65 of the Ordinance starts from the end of the assessment year in which the total income of the said income year was first assessable. In this manner, the Tax Department have almost six years at its credit for initiating proceedings against a person or an assessee whose income had escaped assessment. Actually, such period seems to be quite reasonable to bring a person into tax net.

1987 P TD (Trib.) 314; 1987 PTD (Trib.) 325; 1987 PTD (Trib.) 1; 1988 PTD (Trib.) 437 and 1990 PTD (Trib.) 260 ref.

(f) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979)---

----Ss. 56 & 65---Notice for furnishing return of total income---Assessing Officer, instead of issuing notice under S.65 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 where previous approval of I.A.C. concerned in writing to do so was mandatory and which was missing, issued two notices under S.56 of the Ordinance requiring the legal heirs of the assessee to furnish their returns of income---Validity---Held, in circumstances, proceedings initiated by the Assessing Officer under S.56 were to be treated as coram non judice as he had committed an error of jurisdiction while passing a consolidated order under S.62 of the Ordinance---Appellate Tribunal consequently annulled the impugned assessment order for having been made without lawful jurisdiction.

(g) Interpretation of statutes---

---- Every word used in a statute carries some meaning and it has to be interpreted in the manner it has been referred/used in the section.

(h) Interpretation of statutes---

--Different meanings to one and the same words, even if used in different sections, cannot be implied.

Mian Saifullah, F.C.A. for Appellant.

Abdul Jalil, D.R. for Respondent.

Date of hearing: 8th April, 1997.

ORDER

RASHEED AHMED SHEIKH (JUDICIAL MEMBER).-----This order will dispose of above titled thirty appeals filed by the appellant-assessee against a consolidated order dated 23-12-1991 of the learned A.A.C., Range-IV, Rawalpindi in respect of assessment years 1959-60 to 1988-89.

2. Actually, this Full Bench was constituted to conclusively set at rest the controversy as to whether section 56 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 applies to any assessment year in which return of income is required to be filed under the Ordinance or its application is confined only to the current assessment year. Necessity for constituting this Full Bench arose owing to the fact that earlier a Larger Bench, consisting of five Members, was constituted to answer the above question. The decision of that Bench is reported as 1990 PTD (Trib.) 260. Out of the five Members, there were at variance in their decisions with regard to the question referred to above. So, there was no majority decision in the field. In that judgment Mr. A.A. Zubari, Accountant Member, held that notice under section 56 for calling of a return of income could be issued for any assessment year which is covered by the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 while Mr. Ibrar Hussain Naqvi, Judicial Member and Mr. Farhat Ali Khan, the then Chairman, were of the view that section 56 of the Ordinance is 'applicable only in respect of the current assessment year and that if any proceeding in respect of an earlier year is intended to be initiated, it can be done only under the provisions of section 65 of the Ordinance. Mirza Muhammad Waseem, Accountant Member, was of the view that section 56 of the Ordinance would apply to any year without any qualification or limitation i.e. even to the period prior to the promulgation of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979. The 5th Member Mian Abdul Khaliq, Judicial Member, said that the he agreed with the Accountant Members. The agreement of the 5th Member with the Accountant Members without noticing the inter se difference in their opinions further confused the issue regarding the assessing officer's power to initiate proceedings under section 56 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979. Since, the issue regarding the scope of section 56 is still in the fluid form hence, this Full Bench is constituted to set at rest the controversy with regard to the legislative intent of enacting sections 56 and 65 of the Ordinance.

3. Briefly, the facts of the case are that the assessee was a Government employee, who till his death on 17-8-1988, was enjoying salary income Although during all the assessment years referred to above, the assessee's income exceeded the maximum amount which was not chargeable to income tax under the (repealed) Income-tax Act, 1922 or the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 (the Ordinance) yet he did not furnish his returns of income in respect of any of these assessment years. Through a consolidated notice issued under section 56 of the Ordinance, dated 11-5-1989, the assessing officer required the legal representatives of the assessee to file returns of income in respect of the assessee's income for assessment years 1977-78 to 1988-89. In response to the said notice, returns were filed by the deceased assessee's wife on 11-7-1989 declaring salary income only. She also stated in writing that a1S the legal representatives reserved their rights to challenge the validity of issuance of the abovesaid notice. Subsequently, the assessing officer also found that the assessee had failed to file returns of his income pertaining to assessment years 1959-60, 1961-62, 1963-64 to 1965-66, 1967-68, 1969-70 to 1972-73 and 1974-75 to 1976-77. Accordingly, another notice under section 56 of the Ordinance was issued on 4-10-1989 requiring the assessee's legal representatives to file returns for the abovesaid assessment years as well: In due course the returns for these assessment years were also filed by the deceased assessce's wife protesting that issuance of each one of the notices under section 56 was without lawful jurisdiction, limitation period having already expired. This plea was not accepted by the assessing officer for the reason that he in terms of section 56 was within his jurisdiction to require any person, at any time, whose income in his opinion was chargeable to tax for any income year, to furnish a return of total income for such year. No details of salary income were submitted along with the returns as those were not available with the legal heirs. Instead, it was mentioned on the face of the returns "as reported by the Central Military Accounts". Even no Wealth Statements of the deceased assessee could be furnished by the legal heirs on the plea that they were not in a position to prepare the same.

4. Apart from furnishing returns of income of the deceased assessee, his widow also filed her tax returns separately declaring rental income from two residential properties, one bearing No.470-D, Satellite Town, Rawalpindi and the other No. 146-B, Murree Road, Rawalpindi Cantt. Ownership of the said properties was claimed by her on the strength of late assessee's annual Statement of Assets and Liabilities as on 30-6-1973, which was filed by the assessee with G.H.Q. during his lifetime, wherein he had disclosed the ownership of these properties in the name of his wife. However, the assessing officer, after obtaining information from the offices of the Cantonment Board, Rawalpindi, and the Excise and Taxation, Rawalpindi, that these properties were still registered in the late assessee's name, refused to accept the ownership of these properties in the name of assessee's wife. It was, thus, held by the assessing officer that in terms of section 19 of the Income Tax Ordinance income from house property was assessable in the hands of the owner of the property. As the deceased assessee's wife could not adduce any conclusive proof regarding ownership of these properties in her name, the assessing officer assessed the salary as well as rental income in the hands of the late assessee by passing a consolidated order under section 62 of the Ordinance on 31-5-1990.

5. Before the first appellate authority the legal representatives did not challenge the legality of the assessment order. They, however, opted to challenge the assessment order with regard to treating the deceased assessee as the real owner of the properties and assessing the rental income in his hands rather than in his wife's name. The plea taken in this regard was rejected by the learned A.A.-C. by observing that, in the absence of any documentary evidence that the assessee's wife was the real owner of the said properties, he had no reason to disagree with the findings of the assessing officer on this point. It was accordingly held by him that the rental income had rightly been assessed by the assessing officer in assessee's hands.

6. At this juncture we would also like to observe that according to clause (a) of subsection (2) of the section 19 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, income-tax is payable by the real owner of the property. As .the learned A.R. of the assessee had failed to produce before us or the Authorities below any independent documentary evidence to prove that the real owner of those properties was not the assessee, we endorse the findings of both the Authorities below on this point as well. In the circumstances, the Assessing Officer did no wrong in assessing the rental income in the hands of the assessee.

7. Coming to the other objection, though the assessee had not canvassed the point relating to validity of issuance of notice under section 56 of the Ordinance before the learned A.A.-G. or in the memo. of appeals filed before us, nevertheless, this being purely a legal issue, the learned counsel has the right to raise it even at appeal stage, We are, therefore, admitting the additional grounds of appeal submitted by the learned counsel before us because this goes to the very root of the assessment.

8. We have heard Mian Saifullah, F.C.A., the learned A.R. appearing on behalf of the legal heirs of the deceased assessee and Mr. Abdul Jalil, the learned D.R. for the Department on the legal Issues as well.

9. After having gone through the abovementioned facts of the case, following questions of law arise for our consideration:

(1) Whether notice under section 56 of the Ordinance calling for return of income can be issued for any assessment year, prior to the commencement of Income Tax Ordinance, 1979?

(2) Whether section 56 of the Ordinance empowers the I.T.O. to call for a return of income for the current assessment year only?

(3) Whether notice under section 65 of the Ordinance can be issued only with regard to past assessment years where income of en assessee has escaped assessment or under assessed etc?

10. As regards question No. 1, subsection (3) of the section 1 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 vividly envisages that all the provisions of this Ordinance shall come into force after its promulgation. So, it means that the provisions of this Ordinance would not be applicable to any assessment year prior to assessment year 1979-80 except to the eventualities provided under different clauses of subsection (2) of section 166 of the Ordinance. Subsection (2) of section 166 of the Ordinance is a saving clause and it provides the machinery for initiating end concluding the proceedings for any year prior to assessment year 1979-80. With regard to the date of commencement of the provisions of a new Act, it has been laid down at page 215 of the book "Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes", Twelfth Edition, by P. St.J. Langan, that no statute shall be construed to have a retrospective operation unless such a construction appears very clearly in the terms of the Act or arises by necessary and distinct implication. At page 152 of "Statutory Construction by Crawford", it has been mentioned that, in the absence of a Constitutional or General provisions or a provision in the statute itself relating to the effective dates, the statute will take effect from the date of its passage or enforcement. From the above, it is quite clear that once an Act expired or was repealed it was always regarded that it never existed except as to matter and transaction past and closed. It is, thus, held that where an Act or an Ordinance is expressed to come into operation on a particular day, it is to be construed as having come into operation at the first moment of that day.

11. As far as section 56 is concerned, the tax department interprets this section in a way that whenever the I.T.O. finds that the income of a person is chargeable to tax for any income year, whether such income year falls prior to or after the promulgation of Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, he may at any time require, that person to furnish a return of total income for such year within the time limit as may be specified in the said notice. The words used by the Legislature in this section "at any time" and ''for any income year" appear to be the root cause of the whole controversy. In no way we can stretch the intent and purpose of enacting section 56 that no qualification and limitation has been imposed for issuance of notice under section 56 of the Ordinance. There is always some limitation period or cut off date for initiating proceedings against a person whose income in the opinion of the Assessing Officer is chargeable to tax and he has failed to furnish a return of total income for such year. If subsection (1) of section 166 is read with the provisions of section 6 or 24 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (X of 1897) it is patently clear that (repealed) Income-tax Act, 1922 never existed in the field after promulgation of Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, except as saved in clauses (a) to (q) of subsection (2) of section 166 of the Ordinance. So, the words used in section 56 "at any time" and "for any income year" would never mean that the intent of this section can cross the effective date of enforcement of the Income Tax Ordinance as specified in subsection (3) of section 1 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979.

12. As the Legislature has not expressly saved in subsection (2) ofsection 166 of the Ordinance, the situation that where the income of a person was chargeable to tax, even prior to promulgation of the Income Tax Ordinance, he shall be served with notice under section 56 of the Ordinance to furnish a return of his total income for such income year, the intent of section 56 of the Ordinance cannot be extended to the period prior to the promulgation of the Income Tax Ordinance. We are, therefore, of the considered opinion that applicability of section 56 commences from the day the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 has come into existence.

13. Regarding question No.2, i.e., the issue whether an assessing officer can call for a return of income under section 56 for any assessment year from assessment year 1979-80 onwards or only for the current assessment year, and question No.3, as to whether notice under section 65 of the Ordinance can be issued only with regard to past assessment years where income of an assessee has escaped assessment or under-assessed etc., both these questions came under consideration before various benches of the Tribunal but it could not be decided conclusively for the reason stated above in the earlier part of this order. All those cases in which this question was exhaustively discussed are as under:

(1) 1987 PTD (Trib.) 314 (Single Bench)

(2)1987 PTD (Trib.) 325 (Single Bench)

(3) 1987 PTD (Trib.) 314 (Division Bench)

(4) 1987 PTD (Trib.) 1 (Full Bench)

(5) 1988 PTD (Trib.) 437 (Full Bench)

(6)1990 PTD (Trib.) 260 (Larger Bench)

14. We do not subscribe to the views expressed by the learned D.R. that, notice under section 56 of the Ordinance, requiring any person to furnish return of total income, can be issued for any and all assessment years covered by he Income Tax Ordinance, 1979. It is so because basic scheme of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, envisages that the income of the "income year" should normally be assessed in the corresponding "assessment year". According to chronological scheme of sections of the Ordinance, section 75 follows section 55 of the Ordinance. Clauses (a) and (b) of subsection (1) of section 55 lay down that every person whose total income or the total income of any other person "for any income year" exceeds the maximum amount which is not chargeable to tax under this Ordinance, or who has been charged to tax for any of the four income years immediately preceding the said income year shall furnish a return of total income or the total income of such other persons as the case may be for the said income year. And subsection (2) of the said section requires every person to furnish his return of total income on a specified date as mentioned in the said subsection. Here the words used by the Legislature "for any income year" in clause (a) of subsection (1) of section 55 when read with subsection (2) of the said section, the intention of the Legislature would become vividly clear that every person whose total income or the total income of any other person is chargeable to tax under this Ordinance he shall furnish his return of income for the current assessment year only and not for the past income years. For arguments sake, if the phrase "for any income year" as used in clause (a) of subsection (1) of section 55 is interpreted as applicable to past income years as well, then subsection (2) of section 55, Which contains certain specific dates for film, of return every year by different categories of taxpayers, would become redundant. It is an established principle of law that every word used in the statute carries some meaning and it has to be interpreted in the way is has been referred/used in that section.

15. In fact, by fixing a cut off date in subsection (2) of section 55 for furnishing a return of total income by a person it would imply filing of a return for current assessment year only otherwise the Legislature would not have specified such dates for filing of income-tax returns in the said subsection of section 55 of the Ordinance.

16. Looking this issue from another angle that the word "any" when read with "income year" it would mean an income year which falls in any one of the income years as specified in clause (26) of section 2 of the Ordinance. Thus, according to section 55 the return has, necessarily, to be furnished suo motu by a person on a specified date in respect of profit made during any income year falling in clause (26) of section 2 of the Ordinance. Hence, section 55 does not oblige any person to file a return regarding any past income year.

17. Referring to section 56, it provides that where no return has been filed by a person on the due dates as specified under subsection (2) of section 55 of the Ordinance, the Assessing Officer, "at any time", may require that person who, in his opinion, is chargeable to tax "for any income year" to furnish a return of total income for such year as may be specified in such notice. Now, we have to see tat was the intention of the Legislature by using the words "at any time "for any income year" in section 56 particularly when the meaning of the words "for any income year", as used in section 55, is meant as 'current assessment year': In view of chronological scirme of various sections of the Ordinance, we cannot assign different meanings to one and the same words for the simple reason that, if both the sections i.e., 55 and 56 are read together, the cumulative effect of these sections would be that where a person who was otherwise required to file suo motu a return of income for current assessment year had failed to do so, the DCIT may issue him a notice under section 56 for the said income year. Had the intention of the Legislature in using the words "for any income year" in section 56 been referable to any past income year then these words would not have been repeatedly used by the Legislature in this section. Thus, different meanings to one and the same words, even if used in different sections, cannot be implied.

18. The words "at any time" used in section 56 do not mean that there, is to limitation of time within which a notice under section 56 can be issued for any assessment year by the assessing officer. The expression "at any time', as used in section 56, when read with reference to the context of section 55, would mean period of time limited by circumstances. Here the reasonable time for the I.T.O. to issue a notice under section 56 commences from the last date for filing of income-tax returns, as specified in subsection (2) of a section 55, and terminates on the last day of the financial year in which the return of total income is to be furnished i.e. the current assessment year. It is so because income of a pers41 " beyond that date falls within the expression "escaped assessment". We, therefore, cannot adopt the meaning of the words "at any time" and "for any income year" used in section 56 of the Ordinance as any period of time without any limitation. If such interpretation is adopted it would produce anomalous results and there would be no end to income-tax proceedings against a person. For example, where a person had made concealment of income, his grandsons as his legal heirs, could be served with a notice under section 56 read with section 74 of the Ordinance. This state of affairs would certainly sound ridiculous because how could the second generation explain the sources of investment, income etc. of the deceased person after the lapse of many years. Thus, the expressions "at any time" and "for any income year" as used in section 56 would definitely mean a definite period of time which, when read with section 55, would mean within the 'current assessment year.

19. We are also of the considered view that this section is not a complete provision of law. It only authorizes the Assessing Officer to issue a notice to a person to file a return of income who had failed to furnish his return of income on the due date. This section does not provide as to how the returns furnished for the past assessment years would be processed and what would be the rate of tax chargeable and what other statutory benefits, allowances etc. would be allowed, while framing assessments for those years. Hence, this section does not create tax liability of a person. on the contrary, where calling of return is required by the I.T.O. in other sections of the Ordinance, such as sections 65, 72 and 81, the Legislature has laid down complete procedure to assess or determine total income of the assessee and the tax payable by him and it has also been specifically mentioned therein that all the provisions of this Ordinance shall, so far as may be, apply accordingly. Had it been the intention of the Legislature that section 56 would also deal with the returns filed by a person after the lapse of the current assessment year then some procedure would have been provided for by the Legislature for processing of such return under this section.

20. We also notice that the Legislature has used in section 56 certain words in singular form such as "a return" and "income year". Where the returns for more than one year are required by law, the Legislature has provided plural words as well in those sections such as "a return" or "returns" and "income year" or "income years". In this regard reference to sections 72 and 81 are made to illustrate our observation. From this distinction we can safely draw the inference that where the returns for more than one year could be required, the Legislature had used the expression in singular as well as in plural form. In the absence of any such words in section 56, we are of the considered opinion that section 56 requires a person to furnish a return of total income for 'current' assessment year only and not for the past years. We, therefore, hold that section 56 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 empowers the I.T.O. to call for a return of income for the current assessment year only. We also hold that were any income for past years had escaped assessment, whether partially or totally, the Assessing Officer can assume jurisdiction and initiate proceedings only by issuing a notice under section 65 of the Ordinance.

21. We further hold that if the income of an assessee was assessable under the law and the Assessing Officer had proper jurisdiction for making assessment or passing an order and the limitation period has not expired under section 65 of the Ordinance, issuance of wrong form of notice is immaterial and the assessment framed or the order passed consequent upon that notice, warrant or other document would not vitiate that assessment order.

22. We, however, agree with the learned D.R. to the extent that Legally due tax, if any, is payable by an assessee to the State, it should be recovered from him. But this does not mean that tax collecting machinery should remain dormant for years to collect its legally due tax from an assessee. They should also be vigilant to initiate income-tax proceedings against a person within a reasonable time, whose income has escaped to tax. In fact, for this purpose the Legislature has fixed time limit of five years for issuance of notice under section 65 of the Ordinance which in terms of subsection (3) of section 65 of the Ordinance starts from the end of the assessment year in which the total income of the said income year was first assessable. In this manner, the Tax Department have almost six years at its credit for initiating proceedings against a person or an assessee whose income had escaped assessment. Actually, such period seems to' be quite reasonable to bring a person into tax net.

23. Reverting to the facts of the case, instead of issuing notices under section 65 of the Ordinance, where previous approval of the I.A.C. concerned in writing to do so was mandatory, which is missing in the present case, admittedly two notices under section 56, one dated 11-5-1989 for assessment years 1977-78 to 1988-89 and the other dated 4-10-1989 for assessment years 1961-62, 1963-64, 1964-65, 1965-66, 1967-68, 1969-70, to 1972-73 and 1974-75 to 1976-77, were issued by the assessing officer requiring the legal representatives of the assessee to furnish their returns of income. In this view of the matter, the proceedings initiated by the assessing officer under section 56 of the Ordinance for the assessment years under consideration, except for the assessment year 1988-89, are to be treated as coram non judice as he had committed an error of jurisdiction while passing a consolidated order under section 62 of the Ordinance. We, therefore, annul the assessment orders relating to assessment years, as mentioned in the instant para. for having been made without lawful jurisdiction.

24. So far as assessment year 1988-89 is concerned, a notice under section 56 was issued by the assessing officer during the relevant assessment year. It is, therefore, held that the proceedings for this assessment year were validly initiated by the assessing officer.

25. As a result, out of 30 appeals, 29 appeals pertaining to assessment years 1959-60 to 1987-88 succeed on legal ground while the one pertaining to assessment year 1988-89 stands rejected being bereft of any merit.

M.B.A./468/Trib. Order accordingly.