I.T.AS. NOS. 5931/LB OF 1991-92, 6785/LB AND 730/LB OF 1992-93 VS I.T.AS. NOS. 5931/LB OF 1991-92, 6785/LB AND 730/LB OF 1992-93
1997 P T D (Trib.) 1265
[Income-tax Appellate Tribunal Pakistan]
Before Nasim Sikandar, Judicial Member and Abdul Malik, Accountant Member
I.T.As. Nos.7927/LB, 7929/LB of 1996 and 7928/LB of 1992-93, decided on 02/04/1997.
(a) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979)---
----S.55---Return of total income---Filing of return for a period for more than 18 months was not proper---Whatever be the reasons to file a return for a period beyond one year, it certainly does not find support from any provision of Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 nor is it in accordance with the total scheme of law.
(b) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979)---
----Second Sched Part I, Cl. 125(b)---Industrial undertaking ---Exemption-- Entitlement---Whether or not an assessee is entitled to exemption is a mixed question of law and fact---Where assessee failed to rebut the allegation that it had understated certain quantities of imports, department would be legally justified4n doubting the fulfilment of the condition to avail the exemption.
Whether or not a person is entitled to exemption is mixed question of law and fact.
(c) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)---
----Arts.30 & 114---"Estoppel" and "admission"---Two different rules of evidence having different significances and consequences---Applicability of rules---Principles.
Estoppel and admission are two different rules of evidence having different significances and consequences. The rule of estoppel comes into play only when one person has by his declaration, act or omission caused or permitted another person to believe a thing to be true and to act upon such belief. In such situation neither the person holding out nor his legal representative is allowed to deny the truth of that thing which leads the other to act upon the same. No kind of promise or any other assurance in the case having been held out to the assessee the rule of estoppel is not at all attracted.
An admission on point of law by a party even before a Court of law is not covered by the kind of admissions which are relevant as a rule of evidence under the Qanun-e-Shahadat, Articles 30 to 36 and 45.
(d) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979)---
----S.66-A---Power of revision by Inspecting Assistant Commissioner-- Scope and extent---Rule of change of opinion---Application.
The powers of a revising authority as conferred under section 66-A are fairly wide and there are no restrictions the rule of change of opinion attributed is not attracted where order is made by, two different authorities. It applies only where one and the same authority changes the conclusion already drawn and expressed on certain facts. A difference of opinion on the other hand is crux of the matter when an authority exercising supervisory jurisdiction examines an order made by a subordinate authority. To accept that exercise of revisional jurisdiction on the basis of difference of opinion is illegal will mean, to reduce whole of the provisions providing for such power to be a nullity. A revising authority can proceed to exercise its jurisdiction both on points of law as well as on facts.
One of the main functions of the I.A.C. for which he is appointed is to detect tax evasion.
There is no restriction on the power of a revising authority except those contained in the provision itself nothing in the provision warranted to conclude that at this stage of case the revising authority must confine himself solely to the examination of the record of I.T.O. called by him or in other words in deciding to entertain the revision, be is permitted to rely on any other material or information not forming part of the record any such narrow interpretation of the opening part of section 66-A(1) was bound to unnecessarily curtail the power of superintendence and control vested in the I.A.C. to sit in revision against the order passed by the I.T.O. This power is liable to be rendered almost nugatory and meaningless if its exercise is confined to the correction of errors on the face of record. Therefore, in the course of his inquiry he could even go beyond the record if he found it necessary to do so.
C.I.T. Lahore v. M. Iqbal Saigal PLD 1976 Lah. 547 fol.
(1956) 60 ITR 24; C.I.T. v. Andhra Valley (1978) 114 ITR 283 (Bom.); Century Spinning Manufacturing v. C.W.T. (1978) 112 ITR 407; CIT v. Industrial Solvent (1.979)119 ITR 608; CIT v. Forging and Stamping Private Limited (1979) 119 ITR 616; CIT v. Rani, Raju Surgical Cotton Mills (1966) 62 ITR 21; 1994 PTD (Trib.) 858; 1992 PTD (Trib.) 612; 1990 SCMR 697; Gemini Loather Store v. I.T.O. (1975) 100 ITR 1; Jennings Private School v. I.T.O. 1990 PTD 873; Cartunes v. I.T.O. PLD 1989 Kar. 337 = 1989 PTD 478; 1990 PTD (Trib.) 914; I.T.A. No. 122/KB of 1996-97, (1984) PTD 137; C.I.T. v. Gabriel India (1993) 203 ITR 108; 1996 PTD (Trib.) 1069; 1990 PTD (Trib.) 524; 1987 PTD (Trib.) 863; 1990 PTD (Trib.) 415 and I. T. A. No. 113/KB of 1994-95 not relevant.
Athar Saeed and Nadeem Ahmad, I. T. P. for Appellant.
Shahbaz Butt, L.A. and Asad Ali Jan, D.R. for Respondent.
Date of hearing: 30th January, 1997.
ORDER
These three appeals call into question the correctness of a consolidated order recorded by I.A.C. Range-III, Companies Zone-I Lahore under section 66-A of the Income Tax Ordinance whereby the assessments framed in the years 1991-92 to 1993-94 were cancelled for de novo proceedings.
2. The assessee is a private limited company. First return in the year 1991-92 was filed for the period ending 31-12-1990 to declare "nil" income. The assessing officer found that the company dealt in manufacturing of internal combustion engines. Also that the claimed exemption under clause 125-B of the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Ordinance was available to the assessee inasmuch as it fulfilled the conditions contained under the said clause. It was further found that the Industrial Undertaking managed by the company was duly "set up" in the month of June, 1989 and the trial production was started and inauguration ceremony was also held in June, 1989. Therefore, through an order dated 12-12-1992 "nil" income for the year was accepted. In the rest of the two years viz. 1992-93 and 1993-94 the claimed exemption was again allowed for similar reasons. It appears that in the year 1992-93 the assessee company was found liable only to turnover tax under section 80-D on the disclosed sales at Rs.6,03,66,000. It is noted that no income whatsoever was declared in this year as well. In the year 1993-94 an income of Rs.18,90,644 was declared and was claimed exempt under the said provision of the Ordinance. As said above the exemption claimed was accepted and, therefore, the taxable income was assessed as nil.
3. On 24-3-1994 the aforesaid authority served the assessee with a notice expressing its intention to revise the assessment for the year 1991-92 on the following grounds:---
"(a) Return of total income has been filed for a period of 18 months whereas income year ordinarily comprises of 12 months. Legally return for the first 6 months should have been filed separately and for the income year ended on 31-12-1.990:
(b) Note No.9 to the audited accounts shows total imports of Rs.85,54,610 against 'Nil' opening stock tax paid under section 50(5) on imports as claimed in the return amounts to Rs.2,68,798. Since the said tax is paid @ 2% of the landed cost of imports, total imports made by the company during the income year relevant to the assessment year 991-92 should be Rs.1,34,39,900. So, imports amounting to Rs.48,85,290 have not been disclosed and must have been sold out of books having not been account for in the manufacturing account or closing stock. Neither the profit earned from the sale of the said imports is exempt under clause 125-B nor investment made for purchases thereof, having been made from sources other than those disclosed in the books of accounts. "
4. The assessee relied in the following words:---
"(1) Return for the assessment year 1991-92 (Accounting period ending31-12-1990) was filed with the Income Tax Department in accordance with theprovisions of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979. Filing of the return for period ending 31-12-1990 was not at all prejudicial to the interest of the Department.
(2) Your observation that the assessee company has not shown imports to the sum of Rs.4,885,270 is totally wrong and not at all based on facts and circumstances of the case.
(3) We would like to bring to your kind attention that the assessee company is engaged in the manufacture of engineering goods and imports only the components for the manufacturing of those goods. The assessee company has never imported any item other than the components for the manufacturing of engineering goods.
Moreover, the assessee company being an approved engineering industry is specifically allowed to import the components at a Confessional duty rate of 20 % against the normal duty of 80 % on the components.
As you are aware, the value of import for the purposes of levy of income-tax under section 50(5), is taken as, C & F plus the normal duty and other levies. Hence the value for income-tax purposes is always more than the actual value of imports in the specific case of the assessee company is paying 20% duty against the normal rate of 80%.
This fact is further explained in the copy of the Bill of Entry enclosed herewith. You would observe that the value for tax deductions has been worked out on the basis of application of 80 % duty while the actual duty paid is 20% Annex. The above position is further explained in the working attached at Annexure II.
Therefore, your contention of working backward and arriving at the import figure is totally wrong and not at all based on facts of the case.
Therefore, it becomes quite clear that formulae followed by your good self for calculation of import value cannot be adopted in our case and similar other cases where concessions were available in duties and sales tax to industrial consumers.
In view of the above explanation notice under section 66-A for assessment year 1991-92 is uncalled for and may please be withdrawn. "
Subsequently, the above notice was improved on 20-9-1994 to add the following ground as one of the reasons to revise the assessment already framed:---
"The industrial undertaking was to be set up between the Ist day of July 1986 and 30th day of June, 1989, both days inclusive. As per incorporation certificate issued by the Joint Registrar Companies. Lahore, your company was incorporated on 29-6-1989 i.e., one day before the expiration of the limitation period for setting up the industrial undertaking to avail the exemption under clause 125-B of the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979. In other words, prior to 29-6-1989 your company was not registered under the Companies Ordinance 1984. The requirement of law is that exemption period starts with the month in which the industrial undertaking is set up or the commercial production is commenced, whichever is later. "
In this notice it was also observed that the assessee attempted to make out a case that industrial undertaking was set up and trial production of diesel engine started on 20-6-1989. This according to revising authority was sought to be supported with fabricated evidence of invitation cards issued for this purpose. Also in these cards the company held itself out as. a private limited company even before it wa3 registered as such with the Registrar of Companies. The notice also pointed out that in order to cover up these discrepancies the assessee chose to file one return for the period commencing from June, 1989 to 31-12-1990 i.e. more than 18 months which was not permissible under any provision of law. Notices in respect of the other two years viz. 1992-93 and 1993-94 with similar contents were also served. The assessee filed a writ petition in the High Court challenging the vires of the three notices. However, in absence of a restraint order the revising authority proceeded to cancel the three assessments through an order recorded on 26-12-1995. Thereupon, the assessee withdrew its writ petition on 29-1-1997 on the ground that the assessment had already made in the meanwhile.
5. Parties have been heard. Learned A.R. for the assessee contends that issuance of notices under section 66-A was patently mala fide. The first in the row was issued only 15 days after the assessee lodged a claim for refund. It is also stated that in para. 2 of the Writ Petition filed by the assessee the claim of exemption under the aforesaid provisions of the Ordinance was repeated. Also that this factual position was admitted by the Revenue in its reply filed before the Honourable Court. Therefore, it is urged that the Revenue was estopped from taking up any position against its admission made in the reply to the aforesaid Constitutional petition of the assessee. The impugned order of revising authority is further assailed on the ground that the claimed exemption was duly accepted by the assessing officer after going through the details of the claim. Therefore, the action of the revising authority in cancelling the assessment in the three years was based upon mere change of opinion and thus was not sustainable.
6. On facts it is submitted that the Directors as promoters and individuals purchased factory land on 9-3-1989 and construction was started in the month of April. The generator and other equipments were purchased in the month of April and the trial production started in the month of June before the incorporation of the private limited company. It is claimed that in view of the industrial undertaking being in position the assessee company on the day of its incorporation viz. 29-6-1989 immediately fulfilled all the requirements for exemption as the industrial undertaking was "set up" on the 30th day of June. Therefore, the assessing officer rightly accepted the claimed exemption after considering all these facts. Learned A.R. for the assessee further states that the return filed in the year 1991-92 ranging over and for .a period of more than 18 months did not result into any prejudice to the Revenue as no tax was leviable for the business activity conducted during this period. According to him no revenue having been lost the return could at best be erroneous but not prejudicial to the interest of the revenue. As far the second ground in the notice dated 24-4-1994 it is stated that the revising authority miscalculated the imports by working back the duty paid in their respect.
7. For the assessee it is further maintained that the revising authority proceeded on assumptions and that no material was available on record that the industry in question was not "set up" before 30th June, 1989. It is further stated that the revising authority appeared dissatisfied only with the quality of the assessment order which ~ could hardly be described as a legal justification to revise an assessment order. In support of the legal submissions learned A.R. for the assessee has relied upon a number of reported decisions from local and foreign jurisdiction.
8. Learned L.A. speaking for the Revenue objects to the maintainability of these appeals on the ground that requirements of rule 12 had not been fulfilled and that the grounds taken in the memo, of appeal being argumentative are also violative of the directions contained in Rule 10 of the ITAT Rules, 1981. It is further stated that the first return filed by the assessee in the year 1991-92 being for a period of more than 18 months was clearly not permissible under any provision of law. Therefore, its acceptance by the assessing officer and framing of assessment in the year 1991-92 was clearly erroneous and against law. From various provisions of the Income Tax Ordinance he points out that return for a period of less than 12 months can be filed but no provision under the Income Tax Ordinance permits an assessee to file a return for a period beyond. On facts learned Legal Advisor states that even if the submissions with respect to purchase of land, installation of machinery and the alleged trial production on 20-6-1989 are accepted the claim for exemption would appear inadmissible. For, according to the Legal Advisor exemption was allowed only with the purpose and intention to install new industries and was not meant for the existing undertakings. Also challenges the claim of the assessee that the industrial undertaking was duly set up on or before 30th June; 1989. While repeating the contents of the notices in the three years learned Legal Advisor claims that the assessee has almost accepted the fact 'that its return for the first year viz. 1991-92 for a period of more than 18 months was improper. And, therefore, this fact alone could be taken as a good ground for revision of the assessment framed in that year.
9. After hearing the parties and considering their arguments we are not persuaded to interfere with the impugned order. In the year 1991-92 filing of return for a period of more than 18 months was not proper. Whatever be the reasons to file a return for a period beyond one year, it certainly does not find support from any provision of the Ordinance nor was it in accordance with the total scheme of the law laid down therein. The second ground qua intended revision viz. incorrect disclosure of imports was also not effectively rebutted by the assessee. The difference of Rs.48,85,290 between the declared and worked out imports remained unexplained. In reply the assessee attempted to justify the declared version on the basis of a copy of only one bill of entry. The submission made by the Revenue that in spite of requisition the other bills of entry reconciling the total imports with the tax deducted under section 50(5) were not provided has not been controverted either. The acceptance of claim of exemption in the next two years viz. 1992-93 and 1993-94 also does not appear free of turbidity. The finding of the revising authority that setting up of the undertaking even before registration of the assessee company with the Registrar of Companies was sought to be supported by fabricated -evidence cannot be disbelieved out rightly. His observation appears convincing that inauguration ceremony allegedly held on 20-6-1989 was hosted by the assessee company which in fact came into being after nine days of the alleged ceremony. The submissions made for the assessee with regard to purchase of land, material and construction of factory building before registration of the company cannot be ruled upon at this stage. It may further be noted that the revising authority did not opt to frame assessment after cancellation of the earlier one. Therefore, the door for consideration of various surrounding circumstances to judge if the assessee was entitled to the claimed exemption are still open to that extent. The revising authority does not appear unjustified in forming a prima facie opinion for the facts and documents available on record that a company incorporated on second last day of limitation provided for claim of exemption could not be said to have been in a position to "set up" an industrial undertaking or be able to make commercial production. However, as said above, this finding of fact by revising authority is still not final and the assessing officer can reach his own conclusion after allowing the assessee to establish that an undertaking was factually 'set up.' or the commercial production commenced on or before the 30th day of June, 1989. We will, therefore, refrain from expressing ourselves on the finding of fact which be recorded in fresh assessment proceedings. Also for the reason that the matter may still revert to us after an assessment has been framed on a finding of fact that the industrial undertaking was not so set up before the appointed day.
10. As observed above the parties have relied upon on number of reported- decisions. As for the issue whether the assessee had already "set up" an industrial undertaking it has relied upon (1956) 60 ITR 24 re: Dalmia Dadri Cement Limited, (1978) 114 ITR 283 (Bom.) re: CIT v. Andhra Valley and (1978) 112 ITR 407 (Bom.) re: Century Spinning Manufacturing v. CWT. Learned Legal Advisor has also cited case-law to claim that in the circumstances borne out from the record the assessee company could not be said to have set up an industrial undertaking before the expiry of the dead line given in clause 125(B) of the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Ordinance. His reliance has been upon (1979) 119 ITR 608 re: CIT v. Industrial Solvent, (1979) 119 ITR 616 re: VIT v. Forging and Stamping Private Limited and (1966) 62 ITR 21 re: CIT v. Ram Raju Surgical Cotton Mills. As noted earlier, the setting up of an industrial undertaking on or before a particular date is necessarily a question of fact and we do not have anything before us to effectively rule upon the factual controversy. On record there is only an allegation from the Revenue that setting up of an industrial undertaking in one day after incorporation of the company was factually impossible. On the other hand the assessee company alleges to have been ready and possessed with everything to enable it to take of on the happening of incidence of incorporation. These claims need regular inquiry which is not possible at this stage. The parties, therefore, may cite these cases before the assessing officer as and when such inquiry is held.
11. The assessee has also relied upon a number of cases which pertain only to reopening of assessment under section 65 of the Ordinance. None of these cases has any direct relevance to the facts and legal issues before us. In first cited two cases 1994 PTD (Trib.) 858 and 1992 PTD (Trib.) 612 on the facts before us we held that no definite information was available with the assessing officer to reopen the case. In 1990 SCMR 697 re: Arfat Woollen Mills v. ITO the Supreme Court of Pakistan found that reopening on account of change of opinion was not legal. In (1975) 100 ITR lore: Gemini Leather Store v. ITO the Supreme Court of India disapproved reopening of the assessment as the assessee had disclosed all facts in its possession and it was the assessing officer who ignored them due to oversight etc. In 1990 PTD 873 re: Jennings Private School v. ITO the Honourable Karachi High Court found absence of definite information meriting reopening of the case. In the next case cited PLD 1989 Kar. 337 = 1989 PTD 478 re: Cartunes v. ITO the Karachi High Court declared the notice issued for reopening based upon material already available on record at the time of framing of assessment to be illegal. In (1979) 118 ITR 447 re: Ganaga Properties v. ITO difference between revision proceedings and rectification was examined by the Court. This case was relied upon by this Tribunal in 1990 PTD (Trib.) 914 which is also cited at the Bar for the assessee. Since the parameters and scope of proceedings in revision under section 66-A are different from reopening of an assessment under section 65 of the Ordinance no purpose will be served to discuss the above case-law any length. Nor these reported decisions are otherwise attracted to the facts before us.
12. Learned A.R. for the assessee has further tried to make out a case that since all the facts before the assessing officer were explained the action on the part of the revising authority was a mere result of change of opinion only. In support of this contention reliance is placed upon an unreported decision of this Tribunal in I.T.A. No.122/KB of 1996-97, decided on 19-12-1996 (Assessment year 1994-95). In this judgment a Division Bench of this Tribunal at Karachi followed 1984 PTD 137 (AJ&K), re: United Builders Corporation v. CIT to hold that mere disagreement on result of an assessment was not a valid ground for revision. In the next case relied upon viz. (1993) 203 ITR 108 (CIT v. Gabriel India) the Supreme Court of India laid down that mere disagreement the Supreme Court of India laid down that mere disagreement with the conclusions arrived at by the ITO was not a good ground for exercise of revisional powers likewise in (1984) 49 Tax 34 similar findings were recorded by AJ&K High Court as followed in the aforesaid unreported decision by the Tribunal. In 1990 PTD (Trib.) 914 a Single Bench of the Tribunal followed the aforesaid reported decision from India jurisdiction re: Ganga Properties to hold that the CIT as revising authority fell on error in relying upon material which was not available before the ITO while framing the assessment. In 1996 PTD (Trib.) 1069 this Tribunal disapproved the issuance of notice by the ITO after completion of assessment and then making a motion to the IAC to revise the same. In 1990 PTD (Trib.) 524 where assessment record was not before the IAC his finding that the assessment was prejudicial to the interest of revenue was held to be without any basis. In 1987 PTD (Trib.) 863 the terms "erroneous" and "prejudicial to the interest of revenue" were examined in the perspective of the facts that the assessment order was revised only to apply a higher G.P. rate. In 1990 PTD (Trib.) 415 enhancement of G.P. rate through a revisional order for which purpose the ITO forwarded the case to the IAC was disapproved. In another unreported decision of the Tribunal cited at the Bar in ITA No. 113/KB of 1994-95 decided on 19-12-1991 .we found that an agreed assessment could not be revised on mere ground of its poor quality.
13. None of these cases have any direct relevance to the preposition of law and facts under consideration before us. As observed earlier the filing of return for a period of more than one year was not in accordance with law. The assessee failed to rebut the allegation that it had understated certain quantities of imports. The revisional authority in view of the facts already noted above does not appear to have acted illegally in doubting the fulfilment of the conditions to avail the exemption. We have also noted that the IAC did not proceed to frame assessments and instead cancelled them for de novo proceedings. In such proceedings the assessee can always establish its view point that the first impression weighing with the revising authority with respect to the setting up of the industrial undertaking was not correct. For this purpose a factual inquiry may be held by the assessing officer. The parties may support their claims by various cases cited before us and the assessing officer decide the issue of exemption as claimed by the assessee.
14. Learned counsel for the assessee has placed a lot of stress on the fact that in reply to the writ petition filed by the assessee the department through para. 2 on merits admitted the facts stated in the corresponding para. of the writ petition. According to him the contents of the para where in the assessee had alleged to be qualified for the exemption having been admitted, the revenue was estopped from denying the same at a later stage. The admission so made at the Bar by the Revenue is ought to stand as a Bar against any kind of proceedings to dispute the claimed exemption.
15. Estoppel and admission are two different rules of evidence having different significances and consequences. The rule of estoppel comes into play only when one person has by his declaration, act or omission caused or permitted another person to believe a thing to be true and to act upon such belief. In such situation neither the person holding out nor his legal representative is allowed to deny the truth of that thing which lead the other to act upon the same. No kind of promise or any other assurance in the case before us having been held out to the assessee the rule of estoppel is not at all attracted. The other submission with respect to the alleged admission is also open to exception. In the first instance the alleged admission was made before the High Court and the assessee could have a resort to the same forum to require the revenue to desist from acting against the admitted fact. It may further be noted that whether or not a person is entitled to exemption is mixed question of law and fact. Unlike English jurisdiction in Pakistan an admission on point of law by a party even before a Court of law is not covered by the kind of admissions which are relevant as a rule of evidence under the Qanoon-e-Shahadat, Articles 30 to 36 and 45.
16. To sum up the impugned order of the revising authority does not suffer from any alleged infirmities. The powers of a revising authority as conferred under section 66-A fairly wide and we do not find therein any restrictions which the learned counsel for the assessee is attempting to bring home. The alleged rule of change of opinion attributed is not attracted where an order is made by two different authorities. It applies only where one and the same authority changes the conclusion already drawn and expressed on certain facts. A difference of opinion on the other hand is crux of the matter when an authority exercising supervisory jurisdiction examines an order made by a subordinate authority. To accept that exercise of revisional jurisdiction on the basis of difference of opinion is illegal will mean to reduce whole of the provisions providing for such power to be a nullity. A revising authority can proceed to exercise its jurisdiction both on points of law as well as on facts. This is how their Lordships of the Lahore High Court in PLD 1976 Lah. 547 re: CIT, Lahore, v. M. Iqbal Saigol concluded. It was found that one of the main functions of the IAC for which he was appointed was to detect tax evasion. Their Lordships interpreting the comparable provision of section 34-A of the late Act of 1922 did not find any restriction on the power of a revising authority except those contained in the provision itself. It was further laid down that nothing in the provision warranted to conclude that at this stage of case the revising authority must confine himself solely to the examination of the record of ITO called by him or in other words in deciding to entertain the revision he is permitted to rely on any other material or information not forming part of the record. According to their Lordships any such narrow interpretation on the opening part of subsection (1) of section 34-A was bound to unnecessarily curtail the power of superintendence and control vested in the IAC to sit in revision against the order passed by the ITO. Further, that this power is liable to be rendered almost nugatory and meaningless if its exercise is confined to the correction of errors on the face of record. Therefore, it was found that in the course of his inquiry he could even go beyond the record if he found it necessary to do so. The power vested in .a revising authority under the aforesaid provisions of the late Act which are exactly comparable to those vested under section 66-A of the Ordinance were considered by their i Lordships in the following words:---
"At this initial stage of the case even before any notice is issued to the assessee he is required to make up his mind on an altogether subjective consideration. But there is nothing in this section to warrant the conclusion that at that stage of the case he must confine himself solely to the examination of the record of the Income Tax Officer called by him or in other words in deciding to entertain the revision he is not permitted to rely on any other material or information not forming part of the record. Any such narrow interpretation on the opening part of subsection (1) of this section is bound to unnecessarily curtail the power of superintendence and control vested in the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner to sit in revision against the order passed by the Income Tax Officer. This power is liable to be rendered almost nugatory and meaningless if indeed its exercise is confined only to the correction of errors on the face of the record. "
17 Since the impugned order does not suffer from any of the alleged illegalities and since the assessee will have a chance to establish its point of view in the re-assessment proceedings which may follow, no justifiable cause is made out to interfere with the impugned order.
18. Therefore, all the three appeals shall be rejected:
19. The appeals having failed on merits, the objections raised by the Revenue on their maintainability are not discussed.
M.B.A./332/Trib. sAppeals rejected.