COMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAX VS ANNAYYAPPA AND SONS
1996 P T D 437
[Karnataka High Court (India)]
Before S.A. Hakeem and S. Venkataraman, JJ
COMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAX
Versus
ANNAYYAPPA AND SONS
Tax Referred Case No. 3 of 1990, decided on 22/10/1993.
Wealth tax---
----Revision---Powers of C.W.T.---Valuation of property---Discretion of W.T.O.---Discretion to be exercised judicially---Property consisting of industrial sheds which had been let out---Valuation of property by adopting land and building method at a lower figure ---WTO's action was erroneous and prejudicial to the Revenue---CWT justified in setting aside order of WTO-- Indian Wealth Tax Act, 1957, Ss.7 & 25.
Under section 7(1) of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957, as it stood at the relevant point of time, the value of any asset, other than cash, for the purposes of the Act, shall be estimated to be the price which in the opinion of the Assessing Officer, it would fetch if sold in the open market on the vlauation date. In fact under section 7, the Assessing Officer is required to find out the market value of the property as on the relevant date. While determining the market value, the Assessing Officer is required to follow the well-recognised principles of valuation and he cannot arbitrarily fix the value. Though there are different methods of valuing a property, it cannot be said that the Assessing Officer can arbitrarily 'select one method of valuation ignoring the well -recognised principles of valuation applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case. Whatever discretion he has in adopting the method of valuation, it has to be exercised in a judicious manner and in consonance with accepted principles of valuation. The preponderance of judicial pronouncements show that in the case of a building which has been let out or which can be let out, the appropriate method of valuation is the rent capitalization method and that valuation by land and building method is not the proper method.
The assessee-Hindu undivided family owned land. It had put up industrial sheds on it and leased them to tenants. The rent receivable by the assessee in respect of the sheds let out to the tenants was Rs 3,24,454 per year. For the purpose of wealth tax assessment for the year 1984-85, the assessee valued the land at Rs.1,45,000 on the basis of a report of an approved valuer and the value of the constructions was taken at the written down value. The total valuation of the assets declared was Rs.10,51,993. The Wealth Tax Officer accepted this valuation and completed the assessment under section 16(3). The Commissioner of Wealth Tax was of the view that the said assessment was erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue. He pointed out-in his order that the gross rental collections in respect of the sheds let out was as much as Rs.4,00,529 that even if 1/6th of this amount was deducted towards municipal taxes and repairs, the net rent would come to Rs.3,24,454 and if the multiplier of ten were adopted the value .of the property would work out to Rs.32,42,540. He set aside the assessment and directed the Wealth Tax Officer to recompute the total wealth by adopting the rent capitalization method. However, the Tribunal held that the Wealth Tax Officer had the discretion to adopt one of the various methods available for valuing a property; that if he had adopted one particular method of valuation in preference to others, the assessment so made would not be erroneous. It set aside the order of the Commissioner of Wealth Tax. On a reference:
Held, that the property in question consisted of several industrial sheds constructed in a land on Bannerghatta Road in Byrasandra which formed part of Bangalore. It was not disputed that the assessee was at that time realising rent of Rs.4,00,523 per annum from the sheds which had been let out. The rent fetched by the property was available on record and it was quite considerable. In such a case the recognised method of valuation that should have been adopted was the rental method. The adoption of the land and building method was prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue. The Commissioner of Wealth Tax had jurisdiction to revise the order of the Wealth Tax Officer which was erroneous and was also prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue. The Tribunal was, therefore, not justified in setting aside that order of the Commissioner.
CIT v. De Silva (L.F:) (1991) 192 ITR 547 (Kar.); CIT v. George (P. I.) (1988) 171 ITR 620 (Ker.); CIT v. Jagadhri Electric Supply and Industrial Co. (1983) 140 ITR 490 (P&H); CIT v. Simon Carves Ltd. (1976) 105 ITR 212 (SC); CWT v. Ramachandran (V.C.) (1966) 60 ITR 103 (Mys.); Neelaveni (S.) (Sint.) v. CWT.(1980) 125 ITR 665 (Kar.); Rajasekhara v. Chairman, CITB AIR 1957 Mys. 20 and State of Kerala v. Hassan Koya (P.P.) AIR 1968 SC 1201 ref.
H.L. Dattu for the Commissioner.
Ramabhadran and Parthasarathy for the Assessee.
JUDGMENT
S. VENKATARAMAN, J.---At the instance of the Revenue, the Tribunal has referred the following two questions of law arising from its order under section 27(1) of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957 ("the Act", for short), for the opinion of this Court:
"(1) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal is right in cancelling the order passed by the Commissioner of Wealth- tax under section 25(2) of the Wealth-tax Act and set aside the orders of the Wealth Tax Officer on the ground that the order is erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue?
(2) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal is justified in holding that the Commissioner of Wealth-tax cannot set aside the assessment and issue directions to value .the property by capitalization of rent when the properties were leased to tenants for rent?"
The facts leading to the above reference are as hereunder:
The assessee is a Hindu undivided family which owned land measuring 1 acre 6 guntas. The assessee has put up industrial sheds on this plot and has leased them to tenants. The total net rent receivable by the assessee in respect of the sheds let out to the tenants was Rs.3,24,454 per year. For the purpose of wealth tax assessment for the year 1984-85, the assessee valued the land at Rs.1,45,000 on the basis of a report of an approved valuer and the value of the constructions was taken at the written down value. The total valuation of the assets declared was Rs.10,51,993. The Wealth Tax Officer accepted this valuation and completed the assessment under section 16(3) of the Act. The Commissioner of Wealth Tax was of the view that the said assessment was erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue. He has pointed out in his order that the gross rental collections in respect of the sheds let out was as much as Rs.4,00,529; that even if 1/6th of this amount is deducted towards repairs after deduction of municipal taxes, the net rent would come to Rs.3,24,454; that, even if the multiplier '10' is adopted, the value of the assets would work out to Rs.32,42,540. He was of the opinion that the rent capitalization method was the proper method for determining the market value. He, therefore, revised the order of the Wealth Tax Officer under section 25(2) of the Act and set aside the assessment and directed the Wealth Tax Officer to re-compute the total wealth by adopting the capitalization method. The assessee challenged the order of the Commissioner before the Tribunal. The Tribunal held that the Wealth tax Officer had the discretion to adopt one of the various methods available for valuing a property, that if he had adopted one particular method of valuation in preference to others, the assessment so made would not be erroneous. The Tribunal relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in CIT v. Simon Carves Ltd. (1976) 105 ITR 212 in support of the above conclusion. In this view of the matter, the Tribunal set aside the revisional order passed by the Commissioner. The Revenue, aggrieved by the order of the Tribunal, has 'sought for reference of the above questions of law for the opinion of this Court.
The learned Government Advocate strenuously contended that, with regard to the valuation of buildings which are fetching rent or capable of fetching rent if let out, the well-recognised method is the rent capitalization method; that this Court, while laying down this principle in CWT v. V.C. Ramachandran (1966) 60 ITR 103 and in Rajasekhara v. Chairman, CITB, AIR 1957 Mys 20, has further held that, in such a case, valuing the land and building separately and adding the value of the one to the other does not furnish a reliable estimate of the property; that even the Supreme Court m State of Kerala v. P.P. Hassan Koya, AIR 1968 SC 1201, has laid down the same principle and that as the Wealth Tax Officer has accepted the valuation made by adopting the land and building method, completely ignoring the rent fetched by the property, his order is erroneous and is prejudicial to the Revenue. According to him, the Tribunal was not correct in holding that the Wealth Tax Officer had the discretion to adopt any of the several methods available for valuing the property and that adoption of one method by him would not render his order erroneous. He also contended that the Department has issued a circular regarding the method to be adopted in valuing land with building; that the circular is binding on the Wealth Tax Officer and that as he has not followed the circular, for that reason also his order is erroneous.
Learned counsel for the assessee contended that the rent capitalization method for purpose of valuation can be adopted only in cases of pucca building in developed urban area to which rent restriction laws apply; that in the present case, the property consists of only industrial sheds and not regular buildings and that they were also not subject to the Rent Control Act having been built recently and as such the rent capitalization method could not have been applied. He further contended that, under section 7 of the Act, the Wealth Tax Officer had a discretion to apply any one of the methods of valuation and that as he has adopted the land and building method and fixed the value under section 16(3) of the Act, his order cannot be said to be erroneous. He pressed into service the decision in CIT v. Simon Carves Ltd. [1976] 105 ITR 212 (SC), which is also referred to by the Tribunal, in support of the contention that, when the officer in exercise of his discretion, adopts one of the methods available to value a property, that order cannot be said to be erroneous merely because if he had adopted another method, the value would have been more. With regard to the Departmental circular, he submitted that, firstly, the circular is not mandatory in terms, that it only lays down certain guidelines and that as such merely because the Assessing Officer has not followed it, his order cannot be said to be erroneous and that, secondly, as the Commissioner had not set aside the order of the Assessing Officer on the ground that he had not followed the Departmental circular, it is not open to the Department to now make out a new ground to sustain the order of the Commissioner.
Before considering the question as to whether the Assessing Officer had committed any error in adopting the land and building method to determine the market value of the property, we may deal with the contention of the Government Advocate that, because the Assessing Officer has failed to follow the method laid down in the Departmental circular, the order is vitiated. The circular relied upon by the Government is extracted in .CWT v. V.C. Ramachandran [1966] 60 ITR 103 (Mys), at page 110. That circular reads as hereunder:-- .
"The value of lands and buildings should be estimated with due regard to the nature, size and locality of the property, the amenities available and the price prevailing for similar assets in the same locality or in the neighbourhood of that locality. Where the value is not easily ascertainable in this manner, the Wealth Tax Officer may adopt the capital value of the property determined by the appropriate authority in the latest assessment for purposes of property taxation, under the laws and regulations relating to municipalities and municipal corporations. However, where the municipal valuation is prima facie too low having in view the rents actually received, or where an assessment of capital value is not made by a municipality, or. the property is located in an area where there is no municipality, the Wealth Tax Officer may estimate the reasonable annual value of the property. and determine its capital value as a multiple, say 20 times, of such annual value."
It is only for the first time during arguments that the Revenue has made a reference to the circular. The Commissioner has not held the order of the Wealth Tax Officer to be erroneous on the ground that he had not followed the Departmental circular. The Tribunal, in the appeal before it, could have only considered the question whether the Commissioner's order could be sustained on the ground on which it was made. If it could not be sustained on the ground on which it was made, the Tribunal, in the assessee's appeal, could not have sustained the Commissioner's order on some other ground. In this connection, we may refer to the decision in CIT v. L.F.D silva [1991] 192 ITR 547 (Kar) The Court was dealing with the provisions of section 263 of the Income Tax Act which are similar to section 25 of Wealth Tax Act and the power of the Appellate Tribunal under section 253(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act corresponding to section 26 of the Wealth Tax Act. This Court has agreed with the following principles laid down in CIT v. Jagadhri Electric Supply and Industrial Co. (1983) 140 ITR 490, 502 (P & H) (at page 555):
"The jurisdiction vested in the Commissioner under section 263(1) of the Act is of a special nature or, in other words, the Commissioner has the exclusive jurisdiction under the Act to revise the order of the Income-tax Officer, if he considers that any order passed by him was erroneous in so far as it was prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue. Before doing so, he is also required to give an opportunity of being heard to the assessee. If after hearing the assessee in pursuance of the notice issued by him under section 263(1) of the Act, he is not satisfied, he may pass the necessary orders. Of course, the order thus passed will contain the grounds for holding the order of the Income-tax Officer to be erroneous, as contemplated under section 263(1) of the Act. Feeling aggrieved thereby, the assessee may file an appeal against the same, as provided under section 253(1)(c) of the Act. In the memorandum of appeal, the assessee is supposed to attack the order of the Commissioner and to challenge the grounds for decision given by him in his order. At the time of the hearing, if the assessee can satisfy the Tribunal that the grounds for decision given in the order by the Commissioner are wrong on facts or are not tenable in law, the Tribunal has no option, but to accept the appeal and to set aside the order of the Commissioner. The Tribunal cannot uphold the order of the Commissioner on any other ground which, in its opinion, was available to the Commissioner as well.
If the Tribunal is allowed to find out the ground available to the Commissioner to pass an order under section 263(1) of the Act, then, it will amount to a sharing of the exclusive jurisdiction vested in the Commissioner, which is not warranted under the Act. It is all the more so, because the Revenue has not been given any right of appeal under the Act against an order of the Commissioner under section 263(1) of the Act. In case he proceeds thereunder after hearing the assessee in pursuance of the notice given by him, then, the appeal filed by the assessee under section 253(1)(c) of the Act cannot be treated on the same footing as an appeal against the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner passed in assessment proceedings, where both the parties have been given the right of appeal. In this view of the matter, the argument raised on behalf of the Revenue that, in appeal, the Tribunal may uphold the order appealed against on grounds other than those taken by the Commissioner in his order, is not tenable. Under section 263 of the Act, it is only the Commissioner who has been authorized to proceed in the matter and, therefore, it is his satisfaction according to which he may pass necessary orders thereunder in accordance with law. If the grounds which were available to him at the time of the passing of the order do not find a mention in his order appealed against, then it will be deemed that he rejected those grounds for the purpose of any action under section 263(1) of the Act ...."
In the present case, the Commissioner has nowhere referred to the Departmental circular in his order to come to the conclusion that the Wealth Tax Officer's order is erroneous. Even the points referred to this Court do not require the Court to give any opinion on whether the Commissioner's order was correct in view of the Departmental circular. As such, the revenue cannot now be permitted to urge that the Commissioner's order is correct because the Wealth Tax Officer had not followed the Departmental circular. In the circumstances, it is not necessary to go into the question whether the Departmental circular only lays down the guidelines or whether it is mandatory.
Now, coming to the point at issue, the Commissioner has held that the order of the Wealth Tax Officer was erroneous and prejudicial to the Revenue mainly on the ground that, when there was material on record to show that the buildings had been let out and were fetching considerable rent, the Wealth Tax Officer ought not to have adopted the land and building method to determine the value of the assets instead of the rent capitalization method.
It is undisputed that the property in question consists of several industrial sheds constructed in land on Bannerghatta Road in Byrasandra, which forms part of Bangalore. It is also not disputed that, at the relevant point of time six industrial sheds had been let out to some industries and one shed was being used by the family of the assessee for running an industry. It is further not disputed that the assessee was at that time realising rent of Rs.4,00,523 per annum from the sheds which had been let out. The order of the Commissioner shows that this property is assessed to municipal tax. Even learned counsel for the assessee did not dispute this during arguments.
Under section 7(1) of the Act, as it stood at the relevant point of time, the value of any asset, other than cash, for the purposes of the Act, shall be estimated to be the price which, in the opinion of the Assessing Officer, it would fetch if sold in the open market on .the valuation day. In effect, under section 7, the Assessing Officer is required to find out the market value of the property as on the relevant date. While determining the market value, the Assessing Officer is required to follow the well-recognised principles of valuation and he cannot arbitrarily fix the value, In determining the market value of a property, the best evidence that could be relied upon is the value fetched by the very property if it had been the subject-matter of purchase at a point of time proximate to the relevant date. The price fetched by a similar property possessing similar advantages and disadvantages in that locality, at or about the relevant time would afford the next best evidence. In the case of a building, the second type of evidence would be difficult to secure as no one building would be similar either in area or in design to another. However, the preponderance of judicial pronouncements shows that, in the case of a building which has been let out or which can be let out, the appropriate method of valuation is the rent capitalization method and that valuation by the land and building method is not the proper method. At this juncture, we may refer to some of the decisions of this Court and the Supreme Court.
In Rajasekhara v. Chairman, CITB, AIR 1957 Mys 20, it has been held that a well-recognised basis of valuation of buildings in urban areas is the rent normally realised by the owner when they are leased to others and the rent expected to be got, if these are in occupation of the owners; that the valuation of land with building thereon by-valuing the land and the building separately and adding the value of the one to the other does not furnish a reliable estimate of the property.
In C.W.T. v. V.C. Ramachandran (1966) 60 ITR 103 (Mys), it has been held at page 110 as hereunder:
....A well recognised basis of valuation of buildings in urban areas is the rent normally realised by these when these are leased out to others and the rent expected to be got if these are in occupation of the owners. The valuation of a land with building thereon by valuing the land and the building separately and adding the value of the one to the other does not furnish a reliable estimate of the property."
In the above case, the Court has taken note of the fact that the properties were in the occupation of tenants; that the assessee could not have secured possession of the properties except as provided in the Rent. Control Act and that the landlord was not competent to enhance the rent."
In State of Kerala v. P.P. Hassan Koya, AIR 1968 SC 1201, it has been 'held as hereunder (headnote):
"When the property sold is land with building, it is often difficult to secure reliable evidence of instances of sale of similar lands with buildings proximate in time to the date of the notification under section 4. Therefore, the method which is generally resorted to in determining the value of the land with buildings especially those used for business purposes, is the method of capitalization of return actually received or which might reasonably be received from the land and the buildings. "
In Smt. S. Neelaveni v. CWT [1980) 125 ITR 665, a Division Bench of this Court dealing with the question of valuation for purposes of determining the value of an estate under section 7 of the Wealth Tax Act held as hereunder (head-note):
"What is relevant under section 7 of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957, is the price that a property would fetch if sold in the open market on the valuation date. This assumes a notional sale and a willing buyer and a willing seller. There are several methods adopted in determining the market value of a particular residential house property at a particular time. The best evidence in regard to the market value would be the value of the property itself if it has been the subject of purchase near about the valuation date. The next best evidence would be the value fetched for a similar property in the vicinity at about the same time: In the absence of such evidence, the value may be determined by capitalising the rent which the property would fetch if let out or is fetching if already let out. Resort can also be made to an estimate by an expert on the basis of the value of the land and buildings. It is usual to value the properties by more than one method so as to cross-check and adopt an average. This is resorted to when there is great disparity between the valuations arrived at by the different methods. When evidence is available in regard to the rent which a property is fetching or the rent for which it could be let out, the authorities who have the duty to determine the value of the property cannot ignore the same altogether. "
In the above rulings, it has been clearly laid down that, in valuing land with building actually fetching rent, the proper method to be adopted is the rent capitalization method and that the land and building method does not reflect the probable worth of the property.
Coming to the contention learned counsel for the assessee that the adoption of the rental method is restricted to cases where the property is a pucca building in a developed area and to which rent restriction laws are applicable, in the present case, merely because the property is described as industrial sheds, it cannot be said that they are only temporary structures or that they are not pucca buildings. With regard to the applicability of rent restriction laws, though in some cases the fact that the rent restriction laws were applicable to the buildings involved in those cases has been referred to, that has not been the main consideration to hold that rental method has to be adopted. In fact in P. P. Hassan Koya's case, AIR 1968 SC 1201, the Supreme Court has not referred to the applicability of any rent restriction laws while holding that, in determining the value of land with building, the method to be adopted is capitalization of the return actually received or which might reasonably be received from the property. If rent restriction laws are applicable to a building, then, at the instance of either the landlord or the tenant, fair rent can be fixed by the authority concerned. In such a case, it may be reasonable and proper to adopt the fair rent that could be fixed under the law for purposes of capitalization. No authority which has laid down that if rent restriction laws are not applicable, then the rental method should not be applied for valuing property or that the land and building method would be appropriate in such a case even though the property is fetching rent has been brought to our notice. If rent restriction laws are not applicable, then the owner can recover the agreed rent and there is no bar on taking that rent for purpose of capitalization. Even if, for any reason, in a particular case, there is material to indicate that the actual rent that is being received does not reflect the real rental value or that is not the rent which can reasonably be expected for that property and that it is on the higher side, it is open to the authority to arrive at the reasonable rent by scaling it down for purposes of capitalization. But, it would be against the recognised legal principles to totally ignore the return fetched by the property and value the property only on the land and building method.
This takes us to the question whether the order of the Wealth Tax Officer can be said to be erroneous because he has valued the property by adopting the land and building method. It was strenuously contended by learned counsel for the assessee that it was within the discretion of the Assessing Officer to adopt any one of the recognised methods to value the property and that when he had adopted one method, his order cannot be said to be erroneous merely because the value would have been more, if rental method had been adopted. Though there are different methods of valuing a property, it cannot be said that the Assessing Officer can arbitrarily select one method of valuation ignoring the well-recognised principles of valuation applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case. Whatever discretion he has in adopting the method of valuation has to be exercised in a judicious manner and in consonance with accepted principles of valuation. In CWT v. V.C. Ramachandran [1966] 60 ITR 103, this Court has' held at page 108 that the power conferred on the Wealth Tax Officer under section 7 of the Act is a judicial power and that the same has to be exercised in a judicial manner.
In the present case, the industrial sheds had been constructed for letting them out for running industries and they had been so let out for that purpose, which is commercial in nature, to which rent restriction was not applicable under the Rent Control Act since it was within the exempted period. The rent fetched by the property was available on record and it was quite considerable. In such a case, the recognised method of valuation that should have been adopted was the rental method. The decisions of the Supreme Court and this Court which are binding on the assessing authority have laid down that, in a case of this type; the land and building method is not proper for the purpose of determining the value. The Wealth Tax Officer, ignoring the well-recognised principles of valuation and also ignoring the material available on record regarding the rent fetched by the property, accepted the valuation made by the assessee by adopting land and building method. The assessing authority has not acted judiciously and he has committed an error in valuing the property by the land and building method. As pointed out by the Commissioner, the adoption of the land and building method is prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue.
The Tribunal, in accepting the contention of learned counsel for the assessee, has relied upon the decision in CIT v. Simon Carves Ltd. [1976] 105 ITR 212 (SC) to hold that when the Assessing Officer has adopted one of several methods of valuing the property, his order cannot be said to be erroneous, merely because adoption of another method would have resulted in higher revenue. That was a case where the assessment of income of a non-resident company was made by the Income Tax Officer by adopting one of the methods specified under rule 33 of the Income-tax Rules and computed the income of the firm. Subsequently, the Income Tax Officer reopened the assessment under section 147(b) of the Income Tax Act and applying a different method permissible under rule 33, determined the income which was higher than the income which had been computed earlier. The Supreme Court, on these facts, held that a discretion was vested in the Income-tax Officer under rule 33 for the purpose of making his choice of the method; that there was nothing to show that the discretion was not exercised by him in a proper or judicious manner; nor was it suggested that the officer was actuated by some oblique motive and that, from the mere fact that the method selected by him was such which resulted in lower tax liability of the assessee compared to the liability which would have resulted from the adoption of another method, it did not follow that the discretion was not exercised in a proper and judicious manner. It is further held that the order made by the Income-tax Officer at the time of the original assessment was a legally correct order and was not vitiated by any error.
In the above case, under the statute, the Assessing Officer had discretion to select one of the three methods prescribed in the rule and when he selected one method and computed the income, the Supreme Court has held that that order cannot be said to be erroneous and that the matter cannot be reopened as there was nothing to show that the selection of the method made by the officer was not judicious or proper.
In the present case, no such discretion under any statute is given to the Wealth Tax Officer to select any one of the methods for valuing a property. Though there are some recognised methods of valuation, the officer had to adopt that method which has been recognised as the proper method by judicial pronouncements, considering the nature of the property. Even in a case where discretion is given under the statute, the above decision shows that the selection of the method must be judicious. In the present case, as already pointed out, the method chosen by the Wealth Tax Officer on the material available on record and in the light of the binding decisions of this Court and the Supreme Court for valuing the property in question was not judicious. Hence, the Tribunal could not have, on the basis of the above decision, held that the order of the Wealth Tax Officer was not erroneous or that the Commissioner could not have interfered with it.
Learned counsel for the assessee contended that it is for the final fact finding authority to decide on the facts of the case as to which is the method to be adopted to arrive at the proper market value and that that finding of the Tribunal would be binding on the High Court. In support of this contention, he relied upon the decision in CIT v. P.I. George [1988] 171 ITR 620 (Ker). This decision could have been of some help to the assessee, if in the present case, the Tribunal had, after considering the facts of the case, held that the land and building method was the proper method to value the asset in question. But the Tribunal has nowhere gone into the question as to which was the proper method that should have been applied for valuing the property. All that it has done is to state that it was within the discretion of the Wealth Tax Officer to apply any one of several methods available for valuing the property and that when he has chosen one method, then the Commissioner could not have interfered with that choice and directed the Wealth-tax Officer to adopt one particular method of valuation. According to the Tribunal, the order passed by the Wealth-tax Officer cannot be said to be erroneous as the Revenue was unable to point out any particular relevant evidence which was ignored or irrelevant evidence which was taken into consideration. The contention of learned counsel for the assessee that as the Tribunal has held that it cannot be said that the order passed by the Wealth Tax Officer is erroneous, it must be taken to have held that the adoption of the land and building method was proper. We are unable to agree with this submission. The Tribunal is also not correct in stating that the Wealth Tax Officer had not ignored relevant evidence. He has patently ignored the fact that the buildings had been rented out and they were fetching considerable rent while deciding the method to be chosen for valuing the property. Under section 25 of the Act, the Commissioner had jurisdiction to revise the order of the Wealth Tax Officer which was erroneous and was also prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue. The Tribunal was, therefore, not justified in setting aside that order of the Commissioner.
For the above reasons, we answer the two questions referred for our opinion in the negative and against the assessee.
M.B.A/427/T.F.Reference answered.