(a) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979)---

----S. 156(3)---Rectification of mistakes---Where no order is passed on any mistake brought to the notice of Income-tax Authority by the end of financial year next following the date on which it was brought to its notice, the mistake sought to be rectified shall be deemed to have been so rectified.

(b) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979)---

----Ss. 156(3) & 3---Rectification of mistakes---Provisions of S.156(3), Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 is not applicable to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal-- Income Tax Appellate Tribunal had not been included in the expression "income-tax authorities", period of limitation provided in S. 156(3) of the Ordinance for the disposal of rectification application was not applicable to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal.

The provisions contained in subsection (3) of section 156 of Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 is not applicable to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. The reason is that the entire section 156 is to be read as a whole and further in conjunction with other provisions contained in the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979. A perusal of subsection (1) of section 156 shows that the legislature has distinguished the Appellate Tribunal from the Income-tax Authority in a very clear and unambiguous terms.

The legislature had distinctly referred to any Income-tax Authority or the Appellate "Tribunal" empowering them to amend their order by rectifying any mistake apparent from the record. It is established principle of the interpretation of statutes that whenever the expression "or" is used it is normally in disjunctive sense. Thus, the legislature had envisaged an Income-tax Authority quite distinct from Appellate Tribunal. In subsection (1) of section 156 an Income-Tax Authority as well as the Appellate Tribunal have been empowered to amend an order passed by them by way of rectification. However, while prescribing period of limitation for rectification in subsection (3) of section 156 the expression "Appellate Tribunal" is conspicuous by its absence. It only speaks of any mistake brought to the notice of any Income-tax Authority by the assessee and does not refer to the bringing of mistake to the notice of Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. The position is further clarified with the provisions contained in section 3 of the Income-tax Ordinance, 1979 wherein the classes of Income Tax authorities have been specified.

Section 3 of the Ordinance shows that the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal is not included in the Income-tax Authorities and, therefore, when subsection (1) of section 3 of the Income Tax Ordinance is read with subsection (1) and subsection (3) of section 156 it becomes absolutely clear that the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal is not included in the expression "Income-tax Authority" and, therefore, the period of limitation provided in subsection (3) of section 156 of the Income Tax Ordinance for the disposal of rectification application is not applicable to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal.

(c) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979)---

----S. 156(3)---Rectification of mistake---Provisions of S.156(3),. Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 when attracted---Condition precedent.

The condition proceedent for attracting the provision contained in section 156 (3) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 is that some mistake apparent on record should be brought to the notice of Income-tax Authority by an assessee. Thus, if any mistake apparent on record is brought to the notice of Income-tax Authority and thereafter no order is made under subsection (1) of section 156 within the period of limitation provided in subsection (3) of section 156 the mistakes apparent on record brought to the notice of Income Tax Authority shall be deemed to be rectified on expiry of the period of limitation. However, if no mistake as envisaged under section 156 is brought to the notice of Income-tax Authority the deeming provision shall not come into operation. The deeming provision shall become operative on the fulfilment of record as envisaged under section 156 or the application itself is misconceived, non-maintainable or beyond the scope of section 156 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, the condition precedent for attracting the deeming provision shall not be fulfilled and thus, the deeming provision shall not be operative.

(d) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979)---

----S. 156---Rectification of mistake---Second application for rectification-- New plea of fact sought to be introduced in second application for rectification of mistake is absolutely beyond the scope of S.156, Income Tax Ordinance, 1979.

(e) Interpretation of statutes---

----- Whenever expression "or" is used in the language of a statute normally it is used in disjunctive sense.

(f) Administration of justice---

---- Once a matter is decided conclusively, it attains -finality.

(g) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979)---

----S.156(3)---Rectification of mistake---Application for rectification of mistake once considered and dismissed could not be repeated again and again and if done so shall be treated as non-entity, misconceived and not warranted by law.

(h) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979)----

----S. 156(3)---Rectifications of mistake---Object, import and scope of S.156(3), illustrated.

Subsection (3) of section 156 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 speaks of rectification of a mistake brought to the notice of Income-tax Authority by an assessee and, therefore, the deeming provision is to be restricted to the extent it is envisaged by the legislature. There is no provision to the effect that any application whether maintainable or non-maintainable, containing any mistake apparent on record or not, shall be deemed to be allowed. The legislature in its own wisdom has provided that if any mistake is brought to the notice of any Income-tax Authority and such mistake is not disposed of by an order under subsection (1) of section 156 such mistake shall be deemed to have been rectified on the expiry of period of limitation. The legislature has not provided that the application howsoever frivolous, misconceived and non-maintainable, it may he shall be deemed to be allowed on expiry of the period of limitation. The deeming provision is to be construed strictly and shall remain confined and restricted to the extent intended by the legislature. By virtue of the provisions contained in subsection (3) of section 156 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 the legislature intended to provide relief to an assessee who had brought any mistake to the notice of income-tax Authority in a proper and valid manner. For example, if an application for rectification of mistake is submitted after the expiry of period of limitation such application shall not be allowed with the afflux of time for the reason that the application at the time of its very inception was not valid and proper and was liable to be dismissed as non-maintainable. Likewise, if an application is submitted for rectification of mistake and it stands disposed of, the law does not envisage the repetition of same application and thus, the application shall not be deemed to have been allowed with the afflux of time, as it was bad and non-maintainable at its very inception and the time of presentation. The reason being that no provision of law is to be interpreted in isolation and has to be considered in the totality of the scheme of law and keeping in view the entire circumstances and principles governing a particular issue. There are certain inherent principles of law which should always be deemed to be contained in every statute and should be held as a part of proceedings whether specifically mentioned in a particular statute or not. For instance, the principles of natural justice and the principle of audi alteram partem shall be deemed to be part of every statute whether provided specifically by the legislature in any statute or not. Likewise, the principle that a matter once decided by a judicial or quasi judicial authority shall attain finality subject to the provisions relating to rectification, review, revision and appeal shall be deemed to be inherent in every judicial/quasi-judicial proceedings.

(i) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979)---

----Ss. 156(3) & 136---Rectification of mistake, application for ---Reference-- Applicant who submitted both applications for rectification of mistake and reference application before High Court exhausted the remedy available in law---No further remedy being available to such applicant, repetition application for rectification of mistake by him was an exercise in futility for it was not envisaged in law and had no legal validity.

The order passed by Tribunal is not subject to revision or appeal before any authority. The Tribunal is not vested with the power of review and thus, an order passed by the Tribunal is final subject to rectification by the Tribunal itself and reference before High Court only. In the present case the applicant submitted rectification application and reference application both and thus exhausted the remedy available in law. No further remedy was available to the applicant and thus a repetition application was an exercise in futility as it was not, envisaged in law and had no legal validity.

Qamarul Islam for Applicant.

Malik Bashir Ahmad, D.R. for Respondent.

Date of hearing: 5th April, 1994.

ORDER

MUHAMMAD MUJIBULLAH SIDDIQUI (JUDICIAL MEMBER).--By above application the applicant seeks rectification in our order dated 31-7-1990 in ITA No.3536/KB of 1986-87 relating to the assessment year 1982-83.

2. Briefly stated relevant facts are that applicant preferred second appeal before this Tribunal against the order of learned C.I.T. (A), Zone-IV, Karachi assailing the non-acceptance of return under section 59(1) of the Income-tax Ordinance, application of G.P. rate, estimate of sales and addition made under section 13 read with section 30(2)(e) of the Income-tax Ordinance, 1979 as well as objecting to the non-honoring of agreement reached between Pakistan Silk and Rayon Mills Association and Regional Commissioner of Income-tax. The appeal was dismissed vide order dated 31-7-1990 and it was held that the learned C.I.T. (A) has already granted sufficient relief to the appellant and no further interference is required.

3. The applicant after receiving the copy of order submitted a rectification application dated 9-10-1990 which is reproduced below:

Dated 9th October, 1990.

Sub: MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION IN THE CASE M/S. SOHAIL SILK MILLS FOR THE ASSESSMENT YEAR 1982-83---ITA No.3536/KB OF 1986/87

While going through the learned appellate order ITA No.3536/KB of 1986-87 we have noted following legal apparent mistakes on record:

(1) That the addition, under section 13 read with section 30(2)(e) of the Income-taxOrdinance, 1979 made for Rs.2,57,870 by the learned Income Tax Officer (and reduced to Rs. 1,28,935 by the learned Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) Zone-IV, Karachi was without specifically confronting the appellant, which fact stressed at the time of hearings finds no place in learned Income Tax Appellate Tribunal order and no finding thereon.

(2) That in view of the parallel cases filed and reference 123 cases of Art Silk Units having been assessed as referred in Minutes of Meeting between Pakistan Silk Rayon Mills Association and the then Regional Commissioner of Income Tax, Southern Region, Karachi of 19^th April, 1986 in accordance of agreement, dated 28^th November, 1986 between Pakistan Silk Rayon Mills Association and the then R.C.I.T., the appellant is discriminated, since in similar other cases tax at Rs.750 and penalty Rs. 750 was levied on per loom basis.

(3) That in view of the fact the appellant's sales prior to effect import for Rs.1,28,935 was Rs.6,67,342 as against total estimated sales for Rs.8,50,000 thus appellant had enough liquidity to effect import of Rs.1,28,935 added to his income said to be unexplained and added under section 13 read with 30(2)(e).

(4) That the learned Income Tax Officer at the time of passing the order under section 59(1) said to be passed on 12-2-1983 (a back date order) and served on appellant on 14-5-1983 had on record, tax deductions challans for Rs.11,702 and thus the same evidence cannot be utilised as a fresh information to reopen the case under section 65, which required fresh information to reopen the case on record the point very much pressed at the time of the hearing before learned Bench, and the learned Departmental Representative assisted by learned Income Tax Officer failed to rebut the challans for Rs. 11,702 were not on record at the time of completion of the assessment under section 59(1), the issue pressed is not given, again any place in learned I.TA.T. order.

(5) That the learned Income Tax Appellate Tribunal is not competent to review its own decisions passed in ITA 1988 PTD (Trib.) 987.

(6) That the order of the learned I.T.O. is an apparent dishonest order, facts twisted and misinterpreted against recognised accounting principles and in the line of manufacturing.

The mistake being of law is apparent mistake on record as such please rectify the learned Income Tax Appellate order 'at your earliest and oblige."

4. The above application was heard on 30-6-1991 and was disposed of on the same day. The order on rectification application is reproduced below:

"M.A.No.28/HQ of 1990-91

(Assessment Year 1982-83)

M/s. SOHAIL SILK MILLS, KARACHI---Applicant

Versus

THE ITO W-4, WEST ZONE, KARACHI---Respondent

Applicant by Mr. Qamarul Islam, ITP

Respondent by Mr. Chaudhry Nazir Ahmed, D.R.

Date of hearing: 30-6-1991.

Date of order: 30-6-1991.

ORDER

By this miscellaneous application Mr. Qamarul Islam, the learned counsel for the applicant seeks to point out that order bearing I.T.As. Nos.3536/KB, .1598/HQ, 1599/HQ dated 31-7-1990 the Tribunal failed to discuss the agreement -between the Pakistan Silk Rayon Mills Association and the R.C.I.T., Southern Region, Karachi, Had that agreement been discussed and finding given according to it the other issue raised could have automatically been settled.

2. This issue of not honoring the agreement reached between the Pakistan Silk and Rayon Mills Association and the R.C.I.T., by the assessing officer was challenged before us and it was taken up and discussed on page .8 of the Tribunal's order. As a copy of the agreement cited by the learned counsel was not produced but only a copy of letter of the Chairman, Standing Committee, Pakistan Silk and Rayon Mills Association dated 19-4-1986 was produced. This was a copy of Minutes of the Meeting and not an agreement as stated. Even today, when the learned counsel started to argue his case no agreement was produced in support of his contention that the issue on point of profit of the Members of Silk and Rayon Mills Association was settled with the R.C.I.T.

3. Ch. Nazir Ahmed the learned D.R. supported the order of the Tribunal.

4. In view of above discussion we do not find any mistake in the Tribunal's order cited above which calls for rectification.

5. The application is dismissed."

After receiving the order dated 30-6-1991 the learned counsel for the applicant repeated the earlier rectification application on 11-8-1991 (the application is dated 3-8-1991) which is reproduced below:

"Dated: 3-8-1991

Sub: MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION IN THE CASE M/S. SOHAIL SILK MILLS FOR THE ASSESSMENT YEAR 1982-83---ITA No.3536-KB of 1986-87

While going through the learned appellate order ITA No.3536/KB of 1986-87 we have noted following legal apparent mistakes on record.

(1) That the addition made under section 13/30(2)(e) is without jurisdiction and without double approval and further against findings in ITA No.554/(IB) of 1988-89 as such a mistake apparent in law is a mistake apparent on record, (I.TA. No.554(IB) reported at 1991 PTD (Trib.) 802.

(2) That the addition, under section 13 read with section 30(2) (e) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 made for Rs.2,57,870 by the learned Income Tax Officer (and reduced to Rs.1,28,935 by learned Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) Zone-IV, Karachi, was without specifically confronting the appellant, which fact stressed at the time of hearing finds no place in learned Income Tax Appellate Tribunal order and no finding thereon.

(3) That in view of the parallel cases filed and reference 123 cases of Art Silk Units having been assessed as referred in Minutes of Meeting between Pakistan. Silk Rayon Mills Association and the then Regional Commissioner of Income Tax, Southern Region, Karachi of 19th April, 1986 in accordance of agreement, dated 28th November, 1986 between Pakistan Silk Rayon Mills Association and the then R.C.I.T. the appellant is discriminated, since in similar other cases tax at Rs.750 and penalty Rs.750 was levied on per loom basis.

(3-A)That in view of the fact that appellants sale prior to effect import for Rs.1,28,935 was Rs.6,67,342 as against to total estimated sales for Rs.8,50,000 of Rs.1,28,935 added to this income said to be unexplain6d and added under section 13 read with 30(2)(e).

(4) That the learned Income Tax Officer at the time of passing the order under section 59(1) said to be passed on 12-2-1983 (a back date order) and served on appellant on 14-5-1983 had on record tax deductions challans for Rs.11,702 and thus the same evidence cannot be utilised as a fresh information to reopen the case under section 65, which required fresh information to reopen the case on record, the point very much pressed at the time of the hearing before learned Bench, and the learned Departmental Representative assisted by learned Income Tax -Officer failed to rebut that the challans for Rs.11,702 were not on record at the time of completion of the assessment under section 59(1), the issue pressed is not given, again any place in learned I.TA.T. order.

(5) That the learned Income Tax Appellate Tribunal is not competent to review its own decisions passed in I.TAs. (1988 PTD (Trib.) 987).

(6) That the order of the learned Income Tax Officer is an apparent dishonest order, facts twisted and misinterpreted against recognised accounting principles, and in line of manufacturing.

The mistake being of law is apparent mistake on record, as such please rectify the learned Income Tax Appellate order at your earliest and oblige."

6. The second application was fixed for hearing on 17-12-1991 and the applicant sought adjournment for want of preparation which was allowed. The hearing was adjourned to 23-2-1992 which was again adjourned and the hearing was fixed on 14-4-1992. On the adjourned date none appeared on behalf of applicant though the date was noted by the learned counsel for the applicant. Due to absence of learned counsel for the applicant the hearing was again adjourned to date in office and ultimately the application came up for hearing on 5-4-1994. Mr. Qamarul Islam, the learned counsel for the applicant contended that the application was submitted on 11-8-1991 and was required to be disposed of by 30th of June, 1993 which has not been done and, therefore, by virtue of provisions contained in subsection (3) of section 156 the application shall be deemed to have been allowed and the mistake sought to be rectified shall be deemed to have been rectified. Subsection (3) of section 156 4 reads as follows:

"156(3). Where any such mistake is brought to the notice of any income tax authority by the assessee and no order under subsection (1) is made by such authority before the expirations of the financial year next following the date in which it was so brought to its notice, the mistake shall be deemed to have been rectified and all the provisions of this Ordinance shall have effect accordingly."

7. Mr. Qamarnl Islam has contended that by virtue of the provisions contained in subsection (3) of section 156 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 the mistake sought to be rectified should be deemed to have been rectified and thus the only order which this Tribunal can make is the recording of fact that the application stands allowed. The learned D.R. has opposed the application contending that no mistake apparent on record has been pointed out and, therefore, the question of rectification does not arise.

8. We have considered the contentions raised by the learned representatives for the parties and the facts-obtaining on record. A perusal of subsection (3) of section 156 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 reproduced above shows that where no order is passed or any mistake brought to the notice of income-tax authority by the end of financial year next following the date on which it was brought to its notice the mistake sought to be rectified shall be deemed to have been so rectified. On perusal of entire section 156 we are of the opinion that the provision contained in subsection (3) of section 156 is not applicable td the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. The reason is that the entire section 156 is to be read as a whole and further in conjunction with other provisions contained in the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979. A perusal of subsection (1) of section 156 shows that the legislature has distinguished the Appellate Tribunal from the Income-tax authority in a very clear and unambiguous terms. Subsection (1) of section 156 reads as follows:

"156(1). Any income-tax authority or the Appellate Tribunal may amend any order passed by it to rectify any mistake apparent from the record on its own motion or on such mistake being brought to its notice by any other income-tax authority or by the assessee."

9. A perusal of the above provision shows that the legislature has distinctly referred to "any income-tax authority or the Appellate Tribunal " empowering them to amend their order by rectifying any mistake apparent from the record. It is established principle of the interpretation of statutes that whenever the expression "or" is used it is normally in disjunctive sense. Thus, the legislature has envisaged an income-tax authority quite distinct from Appellate Tribunal. In subsection (1) of section 156 an income-tax authority as well as the Appellate Tribunal have been empowered to amend an order passed by them by way of rectification. However, while prescribing period of limitation for rectification in subsection (3) of section 156 the expression "Appellate Tribunal" is conspicuous by absence. It only speaks of any mistake brought to the notice of any income-tax authority by the assessee and does not refer to the bringing mistake to the notice of Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. The position is further clarified with the provisions contained in section 3 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 wherein the classes of income-tax authorities have been specified. Section 3(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance reads, as follows:

"3. Income Tax Authorities.---(1) There shall be the following classes of income-tax authorities for the purposes of this Ordinance, namely:

(a) Central Board of Revenue;

(aa) Regional Commissioner of Income-tax;

(b) Directors of Survey, Vigilance, Inspection and Audit.

(c) Commissioner of Income-tax;

(d) Additional Commissioner of Income tax, who may be either Appellate Additional Commissioner of Income-tax or Inspecting Additional Commissioner of Income Tax;

(dd) Income-tax panels;

(e) Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax; and

(f) Inspectors of Income Tax."

10. A perusal of above section shows that the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal is not included in the income-tax authorities and, therefore, when subsection (1) of section 3 of the Income Tax Ordinance is read with subsection (1) and subsection (3) of section 156 it becomes absolutely clear that the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal is not included in the expression "income-tax authority" and, therefore, the period of limitation provided in subsection (3) of section 156 of the Income Tax Ordinance for the disposal of rectification application is not applicable to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal.

11. In addition to above finding that subsection (3) of section 156 is not applicable to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal we would like to examine the issue as to when the provision contained in subsection (3) of section 156 is attracted. We are of the opinion that the condition precedent for attracting the provision contained in section 156(3) of the Income-tax Ordinance, 1979 is that some mistake apparent on record should be brought to the notice of income- tax authority by an assessee. Thus, if any mistake apparent on record is brought to the notice of Income-tax Authority and thereafter no order is made under subsection (1) of section 156 within the period of limitation provided in subsection (3) of section 156 the mistake apparent on record brought to the notice of income-tax authority shall be deemed to be rectified on expiry of the period of limitation. However, if no mistake as envisaged under section 156 is brought to the notice of income-tax authority the deeming provision shall not come into operation. The deeming provision shall become operative on the fulfilment of condition precedent of bringing mistake apparent record to the notice of income-tax authority and not otherwise. Thus, if an application is submitted to any income-tax authority which does not contain any mistake apparent on record as envisaged under section 156 or the application itself is misconceived, non-maintainable or beyond the scope of section 156 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, the condition precedent for attracting the deeming provision shall not be fulfilled and thus, the deeming provision shall not be operative. Now reverting to the facts of the present case we find that a rectification application was submitted on 9-10-1990 which was heard and dismissed on 30-6-1991 being MA. No.28/HQ of 1990-91. It was specifically held that there was no mistake in the Tribunal's order requiring rectification. The applicant/appellant repeated the application which was already dismissed. The contents of application dated 9-10-1990 and 3-8-1091 have been reproduced in the earlier part of this order to show that the application which already stood dismissed was repeated word by word without change of even comma and full-stop except that in para. one a new fact was added which was never raised at any earlier stage, and it was in respect of double approval. Thus, a new plea of fact was sought to be introduced in the second rectification application which is absolutely beyond scope of section 156 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979. All other contents were already adjudicated upon and it was held that there was no mistake in the order of Tribunal requiring rectification. The principle that once a matter is decided conclusively it attains finality, does not require emphasis, as it is one of the fundamental principles of the administration of justice. The rectification application once considered and dismissed could not be repeated and again and if done so shall be treated as non-entity, misconceived and not warranted in law. Thus, the second application submitted on behalf of the applicant/appellant being not warranted in law merits no consideration at all. The reason being that, first, the contention already stands disposed of and finding has been given that there is no mistake requiring rectification, therefore, with the presentation of second application the applicant cannot be allowed to agitate that there is mistake in the order of Tribunal requiring rectification. The result would be that by virtue of second application no mistake apparent on record would be deemed to have been brought to the notice of Tribunal. Secondly, the application being no maintainable because of containing decided issue must be deemed to be invalid in law requiring no consideration at all. Thirdly, subsection (3) of section 156 speaks of rectification of a mistake brought to the notice of income-tax authority by an assessee and, therefore, the deeming provision is to be restricted to the extent it is envisaged by the legislature. There is no provision to the effect that any application whether maintainable or non-maintainable, containing any mistake apparent on record or not shall be deemed to be allowed. The legislature in its own wisdom has provided that if any mistake is brought to the notice of any income-tax authority and such mistake is not disposed of by an order under subsection (1) of section 156 such mistake shall be deemed to have been rectified on the expiry of period of limitation. The legislature has not provided that the application howsoever frivolous, misconceived and non-maintainable, it may be, shall be deemed to be allowed on expiry of the period of limitation. The deeming provision is to be construed strictly and shall remain confined and restricted to the extent intended by the legislature. We are of the considered opinion that by virtue of the provisions contained in subsection (3) of section 156 of the Income-tax Ordinance, 1979 the legislature intended to provide relief to an assessee who has brought any mistake to the notice of income-tax authority in a proper and valid manner. For example, if an application for rectification of mistake is submitted after the expiry of period of limitation such application shall not be allowed with the efflux of time for the reason that the application at the time of its very inception was not valid and proper and was liable to be dismissed as non- maintainable. Likewise, if an application is submitted for rectification of mistake and it stands disposed of the law does not envisage the repetition of same application as has been done in the present case and thus, the application shall not be deemed to have been allowed with the efflux of time, as it was bad and non-maintainable at its very inception and the time of presentation. The reason being that no provision of law is to be interpreted in isolation and has to be considered in the totality of the scheme of law and keeping in view the entire circumstances and principles governing a particular issue. There are certain inherent principles of law which should always be deemed to be contained in every statute and should be held as a part of proceedings whether specifically mentioned in a particular statute or not. For instance, the principle of natural justice and the principle of audi alteram partem shall be deemed to be part of every statute whether provided specifically by the legislature in any statute or not. Likewise, the principle that a matter once decided by a judicial or quasi-judicial authority shall attain finality subject to the provisions relating to rectification, review, revision and appeal shall be deemed to be inherent in every judicial/quasi-judicial proceedings. The order passed by this Tribunal is not subject to revision or appeal before any authority. Tribunal is not vested with the power of review and thus, an order passed by this Tribunal is final subject to rectification by the Tribunal itself and reference before Hon'ble High Court only. In the present case the applicant submitted rectification application and reference application both and thus exhausted the remedy available in law. No further remedy was available to the applicant and thus a repetition of application was an exercise in futility, as it is not envisaged in law and had no legal futility.

9. As a result of above discussion it is held that second rectification application dated 3-8-1991 which was actually repetition of application dated 9-14-1990 (which already stood disposed of vide order dated 30-6-1991) was invalid, non-maintainable, misconceived and not warranted in law. Such application is not envisaged in subsection (3) of section 156 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 and, therefore, cannot be held to be allowed by virtue of the deeming provision. The application stands dismissed accordingly.

M.BA./70/T.T.Appeal dismissed.