(Appeal by Special Leave from the judgment and order, dated November 20,1979, of the Madras High Court in Tax Case No.330 of 1976).

(a) Income-tax---

----"Income"---Definition---Inclusive and not exhaustive---Receipt not falling within ambit of any specific clause may yet be income---"Winnings" from races and other games of any sort---Not confined to races or games of gambling nature---Comprises prize received in car rally for testing skill and endurance- Indian Income Tax Act, 1961, Ss.2(24)(ix) & 10(3).

The respondent, an individual, who had income from salary and business, participated in a car rally during the accounting year relevant to the assessment year 1973-74. The rally was restricted to private motor cars. The length of the rally route was about 6,956 kms. One could start from any one of the cities of Delhi, Calcutta, Madras or Bombay, proceed anti-clockwise and arrive at the starting point. The rally was designed to test endurance driving and reliability of the automobiles. A competitor had to drive his vehicle observing traffic regulations as well as the regulations of the rally committee, The method of ascertaining the first prize winner was based on a system of penalty points for various violations, and the competitor with the least penalty points was adjudged the winner of the first prize. On this basis, the respondent won the first prize and received Rs.22,000 in all, Rs.20,000 from the Indian Oil Corporation and Rs.2,000 from the organisers of the rally. The question was whether the sum of Rs.22,000 was taxable in the hands of the respondent. The Appellate Tribunal found that (a) the rally was not a race; it was predominantly a test of skill and endurance as well as the reliability of the vehicle; (ii) the rally was not a "game" within the meaning of section 2(24)(ix) of the Income Tax Act, 1961; and (iii) the receipt was casual in the nature and not an income receipt; and held, that the amount was not taxable. The High Court, on a reference, upheld the decision of the Tribunal holding that the rally was not a race and that the receipt did not represent "winnings" which had acquired the meaning of money won by. gambling or betting, and that section 2(24)(ix) could not take in the amount received by the respondent in a race which involved skill in driving. On appeal to the Supreme Court:

Held reversing the decision of the High Court, (i) that since the definition of income in section 2(24) was an inclusive one, its ambit should be the same as that of the word "income" in entry 86 of List I of Schedule VII to the Constitution of India.

(ii) that the words "other games of any sort", in section 2(24)(ix) were of wide amplitude and their meaning was not confined to games of a gambling nature alone, and, therefore, section 2(24)(ix) -was not confined to mere gambling or betting activities.

(iii) that assuming that the expression "winnings" had acquired a particular meaning, viz. receipts from activities of a gambling or betting nature only, it did not follow that monies received from non-gambling or non-betting activities were not included within the ambit of "income".

(iv) that the definition of "income" in section 2(24) was inclusive, the purpose of the definition was not to limit the meaning of "income" but to widen its net, and the several clauses therein were not exhaustive of the meaning of income; even if a receipt did not fall within the ambit of any of those clauses, it might still be income if it partook of the nature of income.

(v) that the rally was a contest, if not a race and the respondent entered the contest to win it. What he got was a return for his skill and endurance. It was "income" construed in its widest sense. Though, it was casual in nature, it was nevertheless income. The receipt of Rs.22,000 constituted "income" as defined in section 2(24) and could be brought to tax.

(b) Income-tax---

-----Income"---Meaning of---Should be the same as that of word occurring in legislative list---Is of widest amplitude and must be given natural and grammatical meaning---Indian Income Tax Act, 1961, S.2(24)---Constitution of India, Sched. VII, List I, Entry 82---[C.I.T. v. G. R. Karthikeyan (1980) 124 TTR 85 reversed].

The word "income" is of the widest amplitude and it must be given its natural and grammatical meaning.

C.I.T. v. G. R. Karthikeyan (1980) 124 ITR 85 reversed.

Bhagwan Das Jain v. Union of India (1981) 128 ITR 315 (SC); Eisner v. Macomber (1919) 252 US 189; Gopal Saran Narain Singh (Maharajkumar) v. C.I.T. (1935) 3 ITR 237 (PC); Merchants' Loan and Trust Co. v. Smietanka (1920) 255 US 509; Navinchandra Mafatlal v. C.I.T. (1954) 26 ITR 758 (SC); Raja Bahadur Kamakshya Narain Singh of Ramgarh v. C.I.T. (1943) 11 ITR 513 (PC); Resch v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1943) 66 CLR 198; State of Andshra Pradesh v. Satyanarayana (K.) (1968) 2 SCR 387; AIR 1968 SC 825; State of Bombay v. Chamarbaugwala (R.M.D.) AIR 1957 SC 699 and United States of America v. Stewart (1940) 311 US 60 ref.

A. Raghuvir, Senior Advocate (M.B. Rao, P. Parameswaran and Ms. A. Subhashini, Advocates with him) for Appellant.

Mrs. Janaki Ramachandran, Advocate for Respondent.

JUDGMENT

B. P. JEEVAN REDDY, J.---This appeal is preferred against the judgment of the Madras High Court (see (1980) 124' TTR 85) answering the question referred to it in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. The question referred under section 256(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, reads as follows (at page 86):

"Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was right in holding that the total sum of Rs.22,000 received by the assessee from the Indian Oil Corporation and All India Highway Motor Rally should not be brought to tax?"

The assessment year concerned is 1973-74. The assessee, G. R. Karthikeyan, assessed as an individual, was having income from various sources including salary and business income. During the accounting year relevant to the said assessment year, he participated in the All India Highway Motor Rally. He was awarded the first prize of Rs.20,000 by the Indian Oil Corporation and another sum of Rs.2,000 by the All India Highway Motor Rally. The rally was organised jointly by the Automobile Association of Eastern India and the Indian Oil Corporation and was supported by several regional automobile associations as well as the Federation of Indian Motor Sports Clubs and the Federation of Indian Automobile Associations. The rally was restricted to private motor cars. The length of the rally route was approximately 6,956 k.m. One could start either from Delhi, Culcutta, Madras or Bombay, proceed anti-clockwise and arrive at the starting point. The rally was designed to test endurance driving and the reliability of the automobiles. One had to drive one's vehicle observing the traffic regulations at different places as also the regulations prescribed by the Rally Committee. Prizes were awarded on the basis of overall classification. The method 'of ascertaining the first prize was based on a system of penalty points for various violations. The competitor with the least penalty points was adjudged the first prize winner. On the above basis, the assessee won the first prize and received a total sum of Rs.22,000. The Income-tax Officer included the same in the income of the respondent-assessee relying upon the definition of "income" in clause (24) of section 2. On appeal, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner held that inasmuch as the rally was not a race, the amount received cannot be treated as income within the meaning of section 2(24)(ix). An appeal preferred by the Revenue was dismissed by the Tribunal. The Tribunal recorded the following findings:

(a)That the said rally was not a race. It was predominantly a test of skill and endurance as well as of reliability of the vehicle.

(b)That the rally was also not a "game" within the meaning of section 2(24)(ix).

(c)That the receipt in question was casual in nature. It was nevertheless not an income receipt and hence fell outside the provisions of section 10(3) of the Act.

At the instance of the Revenue, the question aforementioned was stated for the opinion of the Madras High Court. The High Court held in favour of the assessee on the following reasoning:

(a)The expression "winnings" occurring at the inception of sub-clause (ix) in section 2(24) is distinct and different from the expression "winnings". The expression "winnings" has acquired a connotation of its own. It means money won by gambling or betting. The expression "winnings" controls the meaning of several expressions occurring in the sub-clause. In this view of the matter, the sub-clause cannot take in the receipt concerned herein which was received by the assessee by participating in a race which involved skill in driving the vehicle. The rally was not a race. In other words, the said receipt does not represent "winnings".

(b)A perusal of the memorandum explaining the provisions of the. Finance Bill, 1972, which inserted the said sub-clause in section 2(24) also shows that the idea behind the sub-clause was to rope in windfalls from lotteries, races and card games, etc.

(c)Section 74-A, which too was introduced by the Finance Act, 1972, supports the said view. Section 74-A provides that any loss resulting from any of the sources mentioned therein can be set off against the income received from the source alone. The sources referred to in the said section are the very same sources mentioned in sub-clause (ix) of section 2(24), namely, lotteries, cross-word puzzles, races including horse races, card games, etc.

The correctness of the view taken by the High Court is questioned herein.

The definition of "income" in section 2(24) is an inclusive definition. Parliament has been adding to the definition by adding sub-clauses) from time to time. Sub-clause (ix), which was inserted by the Finance Act, 1972, reads as follows:

"(ix) any winnings from lotteries, cross-word puzzles, races including horse races, card games and other games of any sort or from gambling or betting of any form or nature whatsoever;"

We may notice at this stage a provision in section 10. Section 10 occurs in Chapter III which carries the heading "Incomes which do not form part of total income". Section 10 in so far as is relevant reads thus:

"10. Incomes not included in total income: --In computing the total income of a previous year of any person, any income falling within any of the following clauses shall not be included--...

(3) any receipts which are of a casual and non-recurring nature, not being winnings from lotteries, to the extent such receipts do not exceed one thousand rupees in the aggregate." (The clause has been amended by the Finance Act, 1986, but we are not concerned with it. Similarly, it is not necessary to notice the proviso to the said clause).

It is not easy to define income. The definition in the Act is an inclusive one. As said by Lord Wright in Raja Bahadur Kamakshya Narain Singh of Ramgarh v. C.I.T.(1943) 11 ITR 513, 521 (PC), "income is a word difficult and perhaps impossible to define m any precise general formula. It is a word of the broadest connotation". In Maharajkumar Gopal Saran Narain Singh v. C.I.T. (1935) 3 ITR 237, 242 (PC), the Privy Council pointed out that "anything which can properly be described as income, is taxable under the Act unless expressly exempted". This Court had to deal with the ambit of the expression "income" in Navinchandra Mafatlal v. C.I.T. (1954) 26 ITR 758 (SC). The Indian Income-tax and Excess Profits Tax (Amendment) Act, 1947 had inserted section 12-B in the Indian Income-tax Act. 1922. Section 12-B imposed a tax on capital gains. The validity of the said Amendment was questioned on the ground that tax on capital gains is not a tax on "income" within the meaning of entry 54 of List I nor is it a tax on the capital value of the assets of individuals and companies within the meaning of entry 55 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act. 1935. The Bombay High Court repelled the attack. The matter was brought to this Court. After rejecting the argument on behalf of the assessee that the word "income" has acquired, by legislative practice, a restricted meaning and after affirming that the entries in the Seventh Schedule should receive the most liberal construction the Court observed thus (at page 764):

"What, then, is the ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning of the word `income'? According to the dictionary it means `a thing that comes in.' (See Oxford Dictionary, Volume V, page 162; Stroud, Vol. Il, pages 14-16). In the United States of America and in Australia both of which also are. English-speaking countries the word `income' is understood in a wide sense so as to include a capital gain. Reference may be made to Eisner v. Macomber (1919) 252 US 189; Merchants' Loan and Trust Co. v. Smietanka (1920) 255 US 509 and United States of America v. Stewart (1940) 311 US 60 and Resch v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1943) 66 CLR 198. In each of these cases a very wide meaning was ascribed to the word `income' as its natural meaning. The relevant observations of the learned Judges deciding those cases which have been quoted in the judgment of Tendolkar, J., quite clearly indicate that such wide meaning was put upon the word `income' not because of any particular legislative practice either in the United States or in the Commonwealth of Australia but because such was the normal concept and connotation of the ordinary English word `income'. Its natural meaning embraces any profit or gain, which is actually received. This is in consonance with the observations of Lord Wright to which reference has already been made. The argument founded on an assumed legislative practice being thus out of the way, there can be no difficulty in applying its natural and grammatical meaning to the ordinary English word `income'. As already observed, the word should be given its widest connotation in view of the fact that it occurs in a legislative head conferring legislative power."

Since the definition of "income" in section 2(24) is an inclusive one, its ambit, in our opinion, should be the same as that of the word `income' occurring in entry 82 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution (corresponding to entry 54 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act).

In Bhagwan Dass Jain v. Union of India (1981)128 ITR 315 (SC), the challenge was to the validity of section 23(2) of the Act which provided that where the pro arty consists of a house in the occupation of the owner for the purposes of hi; own residence, the annual value of such house shall first be determined in the same manner as if the property had been let and further be reduced by one-half of the amount so determined or Rs.1,800 whichever is less. The contention of the assessee was that he was not deriving any monetary benefit by residing in his own house and, therefore, no tax can be levied on him on the ground that he is deriving income from that house. It was contended that the word "income" means realisation of monetary benefit and that in the absence of any such realisation by the assessee, the inclusion of any amount by way of notional income under section 23(2) of the Act in the chargeable income was impermissible and outside the scope of entry 82 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. The said contention was rejected affirming that the expression "income" is of the widest amplitude and that it includes not merely what is received or what comes in by exploiting the use of the property but also that which can be converted into income.

Sub-clause (ix) of section 2(24) refers4o lotteries, crossword puzzles, races including horse races, card games, other games of any sort and gambling or betting of any form or nature whatsoever. All cross-word puzzles are not of a gambling nature. Some are-. some are not. See State of Bombay v. R. M. D. Chamarbaugwala AIR 1957 SC 699. Even in card games there are some games which are games of skill without an element of gamble (See State of Andhra Pradesh v. K. Satyanarayana (1968) 2 SCR 387). The words "other games of any sort" are of wide amplitude. Their meaning is not confined to games of a gambling nature alone. It thus appears that sub-clause (ix) is not confined to mere gambling or betting activities. But, says the High Court, the meaning of all the aforesaid words is controlled by the word "winnings" occurring at the inception of the sub-clause. The High Court says, relying upon certain material, that the expression "winnings" has come to acquire a particular meaning, viz., receipts from activities of a gambling or betting nature alone. Assuming that the High Court is right in its interpretation of the expression winnings", does it follow that merely because winnings from gambling/betting activities are included within the ambit of income, the monies received from non-gambling and non-betting activities are not so included? What is the implication flowing from the insertion of clause (ix)? If the monies which are not earned--in the true sense of the word--constitute income why do monies earned by skill and toil not constitute income? Would it not look odd, if one is to say that monies received from games and races of gambling nature represent income but not those received from games and races of non- gambling nature? The rally in question was a contest, if not a race. The respondent-assessee entered the contest to win it and to win the first prize. What he got was a "return" for his skill and endurance. Then why is it not income--which expression must be construed in its widest sense. Further, even if a receipt does not fall within sub-clause (ix), or for that matter, any of the sub-clauses in section 2(24), it may yet constitute income. To say otherwise would mean reading the several clauses in section 2(24) as exhaustive of the meaning of "income' when the statute expressly says that it is inclusive. It would be a wrong approach to try to place a given receipt under one or the other sub-clauses in section 2(24) and if it does not fall under any of the sub -clauses, to say that it does not constitute income. Even if a receipt does not fall within the ambit of any of the sub-clauses in section 2(24), it may still be income if it partakes of the nature of the income. The idea behind providing an inclusive definition in section 2(24) is not to limit its meaning but to widen its net. This Court has repeatedly said that the word "income" is of the widest amplitude, and that it must be given its natural and grammatical meaning. Judging from the above standpoint, the receipt concerned herein is also income. May be it is casual in nature but it is income nevertheless. That even casual income is "income" is evident from section 10(3). Section 10 seeks to exempt certain "incomes" from being included in the "total income". A casual receipt--which should mean, in the context, casual income--is liable to be included in the total income, if it is in excess of Rs.1,000, by virtue of subsection (3) of section 10. Even though it is a clause exempting a particular receipt/income to a limited extent, it is yet relevant on the meaning of the expression "income". In our respectful opinion, the High Court, having found that the receipt in question does not fall within sub-clause (ix) of section 2(24), erred in concluding that it does not constitute income. The High Court has read the several sub-clause in section (24) as exhaustive of the definition of income when in fact it is not so. In this connection, it is relevant to notice the finding of the Tribunal. Is found that the receipt in question was casual in nature but--it opined--it was nevertheless not an income receipt and fell outside the provision of section 10(3) of the Act. We have found it difficult to follow the logic behind the argument.

For the above reasons we hold that the receipt in question herein does constitute "income" as defined in clause (24) of section 2 of the Act. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the question referred by the Tribunal under section 256(1) of the Act is answered in the negative, i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. There shall be no order as to costs.

M.BA./2468/TOrder accordingly.