Per A.A. Zubairi, Accountant Member; Farhat 4li Khan, Chairman agreeing, Abrar Hussain Naqvi, Judicial Member, Contra--.

(a) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979)---

----S.2---Definitions---Held. though S.2 contained definitions of some 46 terms or expressions these were to be pressed into service if the context did not require otherwise.

(b) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979)---

---Ss.143 &2(32), (16)---Expressions "any person" and "any other person"--- Connotation---Provisions of S.143 unequivocally require that whenever a contract is entered into for the construction of a building etc. the value of which is not less than Rs. 100,000 a copy of the contract should be furnished to the assessing officer alongwith other particulars, as prescribed by the Central Board of Revenue---Expressions "any person" and "any other person" clearly refer to a contractor vis-a-vis his principal.

Though section 2 contains definitions of some 46 terms (or expressions) these are to be. pressed into service if the context does not require otherwise.

Bearing in mind subtlety of phrase "unless the context otherwise requires" employed in definition given in section 2 it may be noticed that the context in section 143 unequivocally requires that whenever a contract is entered into for the construction of a building (etc.) the value of which is not less than Rs. 100,00() a copy of the contract should be furnished to the assessing officer alongwith other particulars, as prescribed by the CBR. Therefore, the expression:

"Where any person enters into a contract for the construction of a building any other person clearly refer to a contractor vis-a-vis his principal. The intention of the legislature being unambiguous in the `context' of section 143, there appears to be no need to refer to the definition of the word `person' as obtaining in subsection (32) of section 2 to which a reference (according to Ordinance itself) should be made only when "the context otherwise requires". It also is not to be lost sight of that the definition of `person' in subsection (32) of section 2 is inclusive and not exhaustive as it specifically states; "Person includes..." while at other places (e.g. subsection (33) the definition is exhaustive when it says" .... means...". Therefore, it may not be possible to exclude any Department of the Government from the scope of section 143 of the Ordinance simply on the basis of definition in subsection (16) or (32) of section 2.

(1986) 53 Tax 31 (Editorial) ref.

(c) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979)---

----Ss.143 & 2(32), (16)---"Person"---Definition---Definition of person in S.2(32) is inclusive and not exhaustive.

(d) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979)---

----Ss.143 & 2(16), (32)---Department of the Government cannot be excluded from the scope of S.143 simply on the basis of definition in 5.2(16) & (32).

(e) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979)---

----Ss.143, 108 & 2(32), (16)--Provision of 5.143 draws no distinction between Government contractors and private contractors---Provisions of 5.143 thus are operative when contracts are obtained from Government or semi-Government organizations ---Assessee is bound to furnish to the I.T.O. having jurisdiction to assess him, a statement showing particulars relating to the contract in such form and verified in such manner as prescribed----Default of assessee to do the same would expose him to imposition of penalty by resort to S.108 of the Ordinance.

Section 143 of the Income Tax Ordinance draws no distinction between Government contractors and private contractors. The meaning of the word "person" is obtaining in clause 32 of section 2 of the Ordinance where it is defined to include (inter alia) "the company", a local authority, and every other artificial juridical person. The expression "company" also is defined by the Income Tax Ordinance at clause 16 of section 2 to mean "a company as defined in the Companies Act/Ordinance, a trust under Pakistani law; a body corporate (outside Pakistan); the Government of a Province; a foreign association (etc.). It would, therefore, not be correct to say that the provisions of section 143 are not operative when contracts are obtained from Government or semi-Government organizations more so when these are run by the Government on commercial lines and registered as body corporate formed by (or under) the law for the time being in force. In the present case the assessee acted as a contractor for an organization which had the status of a public limited company [as per sub-clause (a) of clause 16 of section 2 of the Ordinance] and was assessed to income-tax. Consequently as far as the present assessees were concerned, they entered into a contract for the construction with "any other person" who was a body corporate and consequently they could not be absolved of the responsibility for furnishing to the ITO having jurisdiction to assess them, a statement showing particulars relating to the contract in such form and verified in the prescribed manner with the result that the default had exposed them to imposition of penalty by resort to section 108 of the Ordinance.

Keeping in mind that the assessee had entered into contracts for construction with a statutory body and an identifiable juridical person, they were under a legal obligation created by section 143 of the Ordinance to "furnish to the ITO having jurisdiction to assess them" a statement prescribed in this behalf by the CBR and the lapse in this behalf resulted in default which was rightly taken cognizance of for imposition of penalty under section 108 of the Ordinance.

(f) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979)----

---S.143---Primary purpose and object of S.143.

The primary purpose and the overriding anxiety of the legislature in enacting section 143 was to "preclude the evasion of tax" and (ii) the term "institution", in the phrase "contracts from private parties and institutions", covers a body corporate from whom the assessee obtained a contract for construction.

(g) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979)---

----S.143---S.R.0.156(1)/80, dated 10-2-1980----Purpose of S.R.O. 156(1)/80 dated 10-2-1980---Powers conferred on the I.T.O. by 5.143 were never withdrawn by S.R.0.156(1)/80, dated 10-2-1980 nor these could legally be withdrawn when the legislature had bestowed these powers on I.T.O.

The powers conferred on the I.T.O. by section 143 were never withdrawn by the S.R.O. 156(1)/80, dated 10-2-1980 nor these could legally be withdrawn when the legislature had bestowed these on him specifically. The S.R.O. merely extended to "the CIT (S&C) or any other authority subordinate to him" those powers which were not specifically assigned to them by the statute. If the argument (as advanced) is accepted, all powers in respect of issuance of refund, imposition of penalties, riling of appeals/references, hearing of revision petitions etc. etc. would vest with the Commissioner (S&C) to the exclusion of any other authority under the Ordinance. Such are interpretation would subvert the entire functioning of the Department. [p. 1339] G

(h) Administrative order---

--- Concession on administrative exigencies cannot deter or detract the operation of law or alter the legal position emerging on a scrutiny of a specific provision in an enactment---Agreement against the statute cannot hold good.

Per Abrar Hussain Naqvi, Judicial Member, Contra.

Per Farhat Ali Khan, Chairman agreeing with A.A. Zubairi, Accountant Member; Abrar Hussain Naqvi Judicial Member, Contra--

(i) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979)---

----S.143---Provisions of S.143, Income Tax Ordinance are not restricted to contracts entered into with private parties to the exclusion of those contracts which are entered into with institutions or organizations wholly or partly owned by the Government including a public limited company.

Mian M. Masood, D.R. for Appellant.

Latif Shahid for Respondent.

Date of hearing: 21st August, 1991.

ORDER

ABRAR HUSSAIN NAQVI (JUDICIAL MEMBER).--These are two departmental appeals against the cancellation of penalties imposed under section 143 of the Income-tax Ordinance for the assessment years 1984-85 and 1985-86.

2. Brief facts of the case under which these appeals have arisen are that the assessee, a registered firm, was assessed under section 59(1) of the Income tax Ordinance. Subsequently, on discovery that the assessee had failed to submit returns as required by section 143 of the Ordinance, 1979, the assessing officer issued notice under section 116 of the Income-tax Ordinance and imposed penalties at Rs.27,500 for the each year. It may be stated that the assessee is a contractor of PASSCO. The assessee's plea before the ITO as well as before the learned CIT (A) was that provisions of section 143 were not Applicable as they were applicable to the private contractors. In the assessee's case the tax under section 50(4) of the Ordinance was also deducted by PASSCO. The assessing officer did not accept the plea of the assessee. However, on appeal the learned CIT(A) accepted the contention of the assessee and held that the provisions of section 143 were applicable . to the private contractors and the reliance was placed by the learned CIT(A) on Circular No.4 of 1979, dated 28-8-79.

3. The learned D.R. contended that the learned CIT(A) was not justified in cancelling the penalty as section 143 of the Ordinance is not restricted to private contractors. The section applies to all the contractors, therefore, when a contractor makes a default and does not file return under section 143 of the Ordinance, the penalty had to be imposed.

4. The learned counsel for the assessee reiterated the same arguments as before the learned CIT(A) and contended that section 143 is applicable to private contractors only and the object of the section is to prevent the evasion of tax by contractors doing work with private parties. Since, in the case of Government contractors the tax cannot be evaded because under the law the deduction is made under section 50 of the Ordinance, therefore, section 143 of the Ordinance has no application on the assessee. The learned counsel for the assessee again relied upon Circular No.4 of 1979, dated 28-8-79.

5. We have considered the arguments of the parties. Section 143 of the Ordinance is reproduced below for reference:--

"Statement re Jar din certain contracts.--Where any person (hereinafter referred to as the contractor) enters into a contract for the construction of a building for, or the supply of goods or services in connection therewith to, any other person, the value of which is not less than (one hundred thousand) rupees, he shall, within one month of making of the contract, furnish to the Income Tax Officer having jurisdiction to assess the contractor or any other officer authorised in this behalf by the Central Board of Revenue a statement showing such particulars relating to the contract and in such form and verified in such manner, as may be prescribed."

6. From the reading of the above section it is obvious that this applies to the private contractors. This interpretation is evident from the use of the words in the section. This section applies where there is a contract between one person and any other person. The contractors of Government and the semi- Government organisation are therefore, excluded. The word `person' has been defined under section 2(32) of the Ordinance which reads as under:--

`person' includes an individual, a firm, an association of persons, a Hindu undivided family, a company, a local authority and every other artificial juridical person;"

Obviously, a person does not include the Government or semi-Government organisation. The Circular No.4 referred to above also supports the contentions of the assessee. Para. 58 of the aforesaid Circular reads as under:--

"58. Statement of contracts.--It is a new provision which stipulates that every contractor who obtains a contract to construct a building for or supply any goods or services to any other person, the value of which is not less than Rs.50,000 shall within 15 days of receipt of contract furnish to the Income Tax Officer who has jurisdiction to assess him a statement shoving particulars of the contract obtained. This provision is intended to preclude evasion of tax by contractors to private parties and institutions."

The learned counsel for the assessee has also defended the order of the learned CIT(A) on the ground that the IT() concerned had no jurisdiction to impose the penalty. The learned counsel relied upon SR0.156(1)/80 dated 10-2-1980 wherein the CBR has authorised Commissioner of Income-tax (Survey and Collection) and any subordinate to him to exercise jurisdiction and perform functions, inter alia, under section 138 to section 149 which ohviously includes section 143. The aforesaid Notification reads as under:--

"Charges of Commissioner of Income Tax (Survey and Collection):

S.R.O. 156(1) 80, dated 10-2-1980.--In exercise of the powers conferred by subsection (2) of section 5 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 (XXXI of 1979), the Central Board of Revenue is pleased to direct that the Commissioner of Income Tax (Survey and Collection) and any authority subordinate to him shall perform the functions falling under sections 85 to 98, 100, 103, 104, 108 to 120, 123, 124, 126, 134(2), 134(3), 130(1), 136(2), 137(1), 138 to 149, 156, 161, 162 of the said Ordinance."

7. The learned counsel for the assessee has also produced a photo copy of the minutes of the Tax Advisory Committee of the Regional Commissioner Central Region, Lahore held on 13th April, 1980. Item No.7 of these. minutes had stated that the penalties under section 143 were not being levied and the penalties already levied were being quashed in revision. The aforesaid item No.7 is also reproduced below:---

"TO DISCUSS FINAL POSTION REGARDING ACTION TAKEN UNDER SECTION 143

The house was informed that penalties are not being levied for default of the provisions of section 143 at present. Penalties already levied are being quashed in revision.

After discussion of the above issues, items from the formal agenda which had not already been covered were taken up for discussion. The next item discussed was as follows:---"

8. For the foregoing reasons we see no reason to interfere in the order of the learned CIT(A). Both the appeals of the department are therefore dismissed.

A.A. ZUBERI (ACCOUNTANT MEMBER).---I have had the benefit of going through the order proposed by my learned brother, the Judicial Member, whereby the appeal by the Department has been dismissed. 1, however, have a different view on the legal issue.

Having considered the pleadings by the learned counsel and having applied my mind to the provisions of law referred to by him, I do not feel pursuaded by the arguments. I am of the view that though section 2 contains definitions of some 46 terms (or expressions) these are to be pressed into service if the context does not require otherwise. Section 2 reads as under:

"2. Definitions.--In this Ordinance unless the context otherwise requires means .(includes) .."

Bearing this subtlety in mind it may be noticed that the context in section 143 unequivocally requires that whenever a contract is entered into for the construction of a building (etc.) the value of which is not less than Rs.100,000 a copy of the contract should be furnished to the assessing officer alongwith other particulars, as prescribed by the CBR. Therefore, the expression:

"where any person ....enters into a contract ....for the construction of a building ....any6ther person...";

clearly refers to a contractor vis-a-vis his Principal. The intention of the legislature being unambiguous in the context of section 143, there appears to be no need to refer to the definition of the word `person' as obtaining in subsection (32) of section 2 to which a reference (according to Ordinance itself) should be made only when "the context otherwise requires". It also is not to be lost sight of that the definition of `person' in subsection (32) of section 2 is inclusive and not exhaustive as it specifically states; "person includes..:" while at other places (e.g. subsection (33) the definition is exhaustive when it says" .... means..:'. Therefore, it may not be possible to exclude any Department of the Government from the scope of section 143 of the Ordinance simply on the basis of definition in subsection (16) or (32) of section 2. Undoubtedly, it must be an impelling consideration when the CBR in its reply dated 9-2-1986 to queries raised by an Advocate of Lahore, apprised that it does not agree with the view that provisions of section 143 do not apply to the contracts with Government Departments. The letter by the Advocate and the reply by the CBR is reported as (1986) 53 Tax 31 (Editorial).

Coming to the facts in the appeal before us, I find the reasons assigned by my learned brother to dismiss the appeal are as under:---

(i) Section 143 of the Income Tax Ordinance which obliges every contractor to rile a statement about the contracts/agreements to the Income Tax Officer, does not apply to contracts for construction obtained from Government or semi-Government.

(ii) CBR Circular No.4 of 1979 (particularly paragraph 58 thereof) explained that the provisions of section 143 were "intended to preclude evasion of tax by contractors to private companies and institutions".

(iii) SRO 156(1) 80, dated 10-2-1980 authorised the Commissioner of Income Tax (Survey and Collection). to exercise jurisdiction and perform functions in respect of section 143.

(iv) Item 7 of the Minutes dated 13-4-1988 of the meeting held by the Tax Advisory Committee of the Regional Commissioner (Central Region), Lahore. indicates that it was resolved that penalties for default of section 143 would not be imposed and those already imposed were being quashed through revision petitions.

My reasons for difference of opinion in respect of each of the above are as under:

Section 143 of the Income Tax Ordinance, in my opinion, draws no distinction between Government contractors and private contractors. The words of the enactment are:

"Where any person enters into a contract for the construction of a building for any other person :"

The meanings of the word "person" are obtaining in clause 32 of section 2 of the Ordinance where it is defined to include (inter alia) "the company", a local authority, and every other artificial juridical person. The expression "company" also is defined by the Income Tax Ordinance at clause 16 of section 2 to mean "a company as defined in the Companies Act/Ordinance, a trust under Pakistani law; a body corporate (outside Pakistan); the Government of a Province a foreign association (etc.). It would, therefore, not be correct to say that the provisions of section 143 are not operative when contracts are obtained from Government or semi-Government organizations more so when these are run by the Government on commercial lines and registered as body corporate formed by (or under) the law for the time being in force. In the present case the respondent acted as a contractor for PASSCO Ltd. which has the status of a public limited company [as per sub clause (a) of clause 16 of section 2 of the Ordinance] and is assessed to income-tax on NTN: 07-15-1703742. Consequently as far as the present respondent is concerned, they entered into a contract for the construction with "any other person" (PASSCO Ltd.) who is a body corporate and consequently they could not be absolved of the responsibility for furnishing to the ITO having jurisdiction to assess them, a statement showing particulars relating to the contract in such form and verified in the prescribed manner with the result that the default had exposed them to imposition of penalty by resort .to section 108 of the Ordinance.

As respects Circular 4 of 1979 the arguments by the learned counsel for the respondent appear fallacious to me for these place unnecessary emphasis on the concluding part of the Circular completely ignoring, the full import of the explanation. The points to be remembered are: (i) the primary purpose and the overriding anxiety of the legislature in enacting section 143 was "to preclude the evasion of tax" and (ii) the term "institution" in I the phrase "contracts from private parties and institutions", covers a body corporate like PASSCO Ltd. from whom the respondent obtained a contract for construction.

Coming to SRO dated 10-2-1980 which vested authority in respect of various Sections, including Section 143, with the CIT (Survey and Collection), the argument by the learned counsel for the respondent appears erroneous to me for the reason that the powers conferred on the I.T.O. by section 143 were never withdrawn by the above S.R.O. nor these can legally be withdrawn when the legislature had bestowed these on him specifically. The S.R.O. merely extended to "the CIT (S&C) or any other authority subordinate to him" those powers which were not specifically assigned to them by the statute. If the argument (as advanced) is accepted, all powers in respect of issuance of refund, imposition of penalties, riling of appeals/references, hearing of revision petitions etc. would vest exclusively with the Commissioner (S&C) to the exclusion of any other authority under the Ordinance: Such an interpretation would subvert the entire functioning of the Department.

As regards the minutes (dated 13-4-1986) of the meeting of Tax Advisory Committee, I hold the opinion that such concession on administrative it exigencies should not deter or detract the operation of law or alter the legal position emerging on a scrutiny of a specific provision in the Ordinance. Moreover it is well settled that an agreement against the statute cannot hold good.

On the basis of the foregoing reasoning, I would hold that keeping in mind that the respondent had entered into contracts for construction with PASSCO Limited, which is a statutory body and an identifiable juridical person, they were under a legal obligation created by section 143 of the Ordinance to "furnish to the ITO having jurisdiction to assess them" a statement prescribed in this behalf by the CBR and the lapse in this behalf resulted in default which was rightly taken cognizance of for imposition of penalty under section 1118 of the Ordinance which the learned AAC cancelled on incorrect' appraisal of circumstances and on misreading of law hence rendering his order erroneous which must be vacated so as to restore the penalty imposed by the assessing officer for non-compliance with the provisions of section 143 of the Ordinance. I would, therefore, accept the appeal.

ORDER OF THE BENCH

As a difference of opinion has arisen between us, it is suggested that the record may be submitted to the Chairman, ITAT for exercise of powers under subsection (7) of section 133 of the Income Tax Ordinance for referring the appeal for hearing by a third Member on the following point:

"Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case the applicability of section .143 of the Income Tax Ordinance should be restricted to private parties alone to the exclusion of those contracts which were entered into with institutions and organizations wholly (or partly) owned by the Government e.g. PASSCO which is a public limited company?"

A.A. Zuberi,

Accountant Member

Abrar Hussain Naqvi,

Judicial Member.

FARHAT ALI KHAN (CHAIRMAN).---This appeal has come up before me because the learned Judicial and Accountant Members have referred the following question for the opinion of third Member:

"Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case the applicability of section 143 of the Income Tax Ordinance should be restricted to private parties alone to the exclusion of those contracts which were entered into with institutions and organizations wholly (or partly)owned by the Government e.g. PASSCO which is a public limited company." .

2. Since both learned Judicial and Accountant Members have discussed all the relevant facts, and laws and the submissions of both the learned counsel, I take up instantly the arguments advanced before me.

3. Mr. Latif Shahid the learned counsel for the respondent firstly argues that the conclusion arrived at by learned Judicial Member is correct for the simple reason that a Corporation owned by Federal Government fell within the net of income tax by virtue of insertion of Article 165A in Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan by the Constitution (Amendment) Order, 1985. His argument, therefore, is that since assessment in the case was framed on 28th June, 1985 no penalty under section 108 for default under section 143 of the income Tax Ordinance could be imposed. In other words his argument is that since Article 165A has specifically extended the net of tax to Government owned corporations, they, therefore, can't be subjected to tax laws in the period which preceded the date of introduction of aforesaid Article 165A. In order to better appreciate the submission of the learned counsel I am reproducing herein below Article 165A which reads as under:---

"165A.--(1) For the removal of doubt, it is hereby declared that Majlis-e Shoora (Parliament) has, and shall be deemed always to have had, the power to make a law to provide for the levy and recovery of a tax on the income of a corporation company or other body or institution established b or under a Federal Law or a Provincial law or an existing, law or a corporation, company or other body or institution owned or controlled, either directly or indirectly, by the Federal Government or a Provincial Government, regardless of the ultimate destination of such income.

(2) All orders made proceedings taken and acts done by any authority or person, which were made, taken or done, or purported to have been made, taken or done, before the commencement of the Constitution (Amendment) Order, 1985, in exercise of the powers derived from any law referred to in clause (1), or in execution of any orders made by any authority in the exercise or purported exercise of powers as aforesaid, shall notwithstanding any judgment of any Court or Tribunal including the Supreme Court and a High Court be deemed to be and always to have been validly made taken or done and shall not be called in question in any Court, including the Supreme Court and a High Court, on any ground whatsoever.

(3) Every judgment or order of any Court or Tribunal including the Supreme Court and a High Court, which is repugnant to the provisions of clause (1) or clause (2) shall be, and shall be deemed always to have been void and of no effect whatsoever." (Emphasis added).

4. From perusal of Article 165A (1) it appears that it is intended to give cover to all the laws enacted by the Parliament regarding lew and. recovery of tax on' the income of Corporation, Company and other body or Institution established by Federal or Provincial Governments. From its opening sentence it is evident that this Article is a declaratory piece of legislation calculated to provide validity with retrospective effect to all laws empowering levy and recovery of tax on Corporation, company or other body or Institution established by Federal or Provincial Governments. From perusal of its sub Article (2) it appears that it also provides legal cover to all proceedings taken and acts done or ,purported to have been done or taken before the commencement of the Constitution (Amendment) Order, 1985. It is also obvious from it that it is intended to supersede any judgment of any Court or Tribunal including the Supreme Court and the High Courts. Its sub-Article (3) indicates that it is aimed at excluding the effect of any judgment or order of any Court or Tribunal including the Supreme Court and High Courts which is repugnant to the provisions of sub-Article (1) and sub-Article (2) of this Article.

5. Now turning to the amendment and impugned order it appears that the former was recorded on 28th February 1986 whereas the latter was recorded on 27th May 1986. It is thus clear that both of them have been recorded after introduction of Article 165A in the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Thus, the assessment order is very much protected by it. I am, therefore, unable to see any force in submission of Mr. Latif Shahid the learned counsel, that Article 165A helps him. On the contrary I feel that it completely demolishes the case of the assessee.

6. Mr. Latif Shahid the learned counsel has also referred to Rule 51 of the Income Tax Rules in support of his argument. From perusal of Rule 51 it appears that it has vested in the CBR the powers of prescribing Income Tax Authorities for the purposes of submission of original copies of the Income Tax challan under Rule 50. According to Mr. Latif Shahid, the learned counsel for the appellant, the CBR have specified the Director of Survey, Viligance and Collation of Islamabad, Lahore and Karachi and their subordinate officers for the respective regions as prescribed authorities for the purposes of Rule 51 of the Income Tax Rules by virtue of Circular No.2 of 1987 issued by them on 22nd March, 1977.

7. From persual of rule 202 it appears that this rule lays down the pro forma in which statement under section 143 is required to be submitted, Rule 202 alongwith the pro forma is reproduced as under:---

"202. Statement under section 143 regarding certain contracts.--A statement under section 143 in respect of a contract or contracts entered into by a person for the construction of a building for, or the supply of goods or services in connection therewith to another person shall be furnished to the Income Tax Officer having jurisdiction to assess the contractor or another authority specified by the Board under rule 51, as the case may be, in the following form and verified in the manner indicated therein namely:--

STATEMENT UNDER SECTION 143 OF THE INCOME TAX ORDINANCE, 1979

Signature of the contractor____________________

Name____________________

Address____________________

Dated______19_____National Tax Number.

"Specify whether the contract involves the construction of a building or the supply of goods or services and the identification no. of such building or the kind of such goods or services." (Emphasis added).

8. With due respect to Mr. Latif. Shahid, the learned counsel for the respondent, I am unable to understand as to how both these Rules 51 and 202 help him. It is true that Rule 51 has mentioned certain officers. However, as pointed out by learned Accountant Member, the ITO has not been excluded by CBR. On the contrary Rule 202 specifically mentions that statement under section 143 would be submitted to the ITO of the relevant circle or to any other authority specified by Board under Rule 51. In other words it is clear from perusal of Rule 51 with Rule 202 that the statement under section 143 is to be submitted to the ITO concerned or to any other authority specified by CBR under Rule 51 which have been discussed above. Thus I find no force in this submission of Mr. Latif Shahid the learned counsel also and consequently I feel very much inclined to agree with the conclusion of learned Accountant Member.

9. Mr. Latif Shahid, the learned counsel has also referred to a Circular No.4 of 1979 and SRO 156 of 10th February 1980 and the Minutes of the Tax Advisory Committee of Regional Commissioner of Income Tax Centre Region, dated 13th April, 1988. I have gone through all of them and with due respect I feel very much tempted to agree with conclusion arrived at by learned Accountant Member mainly for the reason that M/s. PASSCO Ltd. is an existing assessee bearing NTN. 07-15-1703742 and thus not only falls within the definition of a person being a company owned by the Federal Government but also for the reason that it is an existing assessee.

10. Thus the upshot of this discussion is that I do not find any force in submission of the learned counsel and with addition of the reasons given above, I also respectfully agree with the reasons advanced by my brother the learned Accountant Member. Thus I am of the view that section 143 of the J Income Tax Ordinance is not restricted to contracts entered into with private parties to the exclusion of those contracts which are entered into with Institution or Organization wholly or partly owned by the Government including M/s. PASSCO Ltd. which is a Public Limited Company.

11. Since I have agreed with learned Accountant Member the appeal stands disposed of as per majority in the manner as indicated by him.

M.BA./1618/TOrder accordingly.